Docling has SSRF guard bypass in remote resource fetching (DNS rebinding / multi-record resolution; no IP validation in HTML render mode)GHSA-pc36-qwjq-x68c
MEDIUMFix: docling-project/docling#4420GHSA-pc36-qwjq-x68c is a medium-severity (CVSS 4) CWE-367 vulnerability in docling. A fix is available for docling — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-pc36-qwjq-x68c.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-pc36-qwjq-x68c by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 394,803 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.
Real-World Exposure
docling🐍docling-slimReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
When remote fetching is enabled (enable_remote_fetch=True, together with fetch_images=True or HTML render_page=True), docling's protection against requests to private and loopback addresses can be bypassed.
- The URL check resolves the host name once, to a single IPv4 address. The HTTP request then resolves it again. A name that returns a public A record together with an internal AAAA record, or one that changes its answer between the two lookups (DNS rebinding), reaches internal addresses.
- The check and the HTTP request parse the URL differently. With a backslash in the authority, such as
http://127.0.0.1:8080\@1.1.1.1/x.png, the check validates1.1.1.1while the HTTP client connects to127.0.0.1:8080. - In HTML browser-rendering mode (
render_page=True), requests made by the page are allowed for anyhttp(s)URL without an IP check.
Details
validate_url_safetyindocling/backend/utils/image_resource_loader.pycallssocket.gethostbyname(), which returns one IPv4 address. It checks that address and then passes the original URL string torequests, which parses it again with urllib3 and resolves the name independently throughgetaddrinfo.urllib.parsetreats a backslash in the authority as part of the host section, while urllib3 ends the authority there, so the two can pick different hosts. This loader is shared by the HTML, Markdown, AsciiDoc, OpenDocument and JATS backends.docling/backend/html_backend.pyroutes browser requests in render mode. Whenenable_remote_fetchis set, it continues anyhttp(s)request, including iframes and images, without resolving or checking the destination.
JavaScript is disabled during rendering, so the browser path can only show internal responses passively in the page screenshot. It cannot read them and send them elsewhere.
Affected configurations
- Affected: callers that enable
enable_remote_fetch(CLI:--html-image-fetch remoteorall) and process untrusted documents. - Not affected: the default configuration (
enable_remote_fetch=False).
The main-URL fetch for DocumentConverter.convert("https://...") is implemented in docling-core and is tracked there.
Impact
Requests from the converting host to internal services such as cloud metadata endpoints and loopback services. Response content is exposed only when it decodes as an image or is rendered into the page screenshot.
Patches
Fixed in docling 2.132.0 by #4420. The image loader now resolves the host once, requires every resolved address (IPv4 and IPv6, including IPv4-mapped, 6to4 and NAT64 forms) to be globally routable, and connects to one of the validated addresses, using the same parsed host for the check and the connection. Remote requests made during HTML browser rendering are downloaded by the same loader, and the browser itself stays offline. When a proxy is configured through environment variables, requests go through the proxy, which is then responsible for filtering destinations.
Workarounds
Upgrade to 2.132.0. For older versions:
Keep enable_remote_fetch=False for untrusted documents, or block egress to private, link-local and loopback ranges at the network level.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | docling | ≥ 2.91.0&&< 2.132.0 | 2.132.0pip install --upgrade 'docling==2.132.0' |
| 🐍PyPI | docling-slim | ≥ 2.92.0&&< 2.132.0 | 2.132.0pip install --upgrade 'docling-slim==2.132.0' |
Affected Products
doclingdoclingDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for docling, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update docling to 2.132.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-pc36-qwjq-x68c is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Restrict outbound requests from the affected component to an allowlist of hosts, block access to link-local and internal address ranges at the network layer, and require authentication on internal services so a forged request cannot reach them unauthenticated.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
A LOW severity server-side request forgery (SSRF) flaw was found in docling, a document conversion library shipped as a bundled dependency in Red Hat OpenShift AI and Lightspeed Core offerings. When remote resource fetching is enabled, the validate_url_safety check in docling's image resource loader resolves a host…
Exploitation requires remote resource fetching to be enabled, which is disabled by default in docling. Deployments that process untrusted documents should keep remote fetching disabled (enable_remote_fetch=False, avoiding CLI options such as --html-image-fetch remote or all). Where remote fetching must remain enabled, block egress from the converting host to private, link-local, and loopback address ranges at the network level, for example using firewall rules or Kubernetes network policies restricting outbound traffic from the docling service. This issue is fixed upstream in docling 2.132.0; fixes for the affected Red Hat products are deferred as described in the statement.Source: Red Hat security advisory for GHSA-pc36-qwjq-x68c (CC BY 4.0)
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-pc36-qwjq-x68c in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.