How severe is GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7?

GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7 has a CVSS score of 3/10, rated LOW. Review your exposure and patch according to your risk tolerance.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7?

GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7 affects the following packages: biscuit-auth (crates.io). Ecosystems affected: crates.io.

How do I fix GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7?

Update biscuit-auth to 5.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7 in my crates.io dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for biscuit-auth. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7?

GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7 has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.2%, placing it in the 15th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7?

GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7 is classified as Improper Privilege Management (CWE-269). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7 was published on July 31, 2024 and was last updated on October 15, 2025. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🦀 crates.io

GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7

LOW

biscuit-auth vulnerable to public key confusion in third party block

Also known asCVE-2024-41949 CVE-2024-42350 GHSA-47cq-pc2v-3rmp GHSA-rgqv-mwc3-c78mHSEC-2024-0009

Published

Jul 31, 2024

Updated

Oct 15, 2025

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk15th percentile+0.13%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🦀biscuit-auth

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Third-party blocks can be generated without transferring the whole token to the third-party authority. Instead, a ThirdPartyBlock request can be sent, providing only the necessary info to generate a third-party block and to sign it:

the public key of the previous block (used in the signature)
the public keys part of the token symbol table (for public key interning in datalog expressions)

A third-part block request forged by a malicious user can trick the third-party authority into generating datalog trusting the wrong keypair.

Consider the following example (nominal case)

Authority A emits the following token: check if thirdparty("b") trusting ${pubkeyB}
The well-behaving holder then generates a third-party block request based on the token and sends it to third-party authority B
Third-party B generates the following third-party block thirdparty("b"); check if thirdparty("c") trusting ${pubkeyC}
The token holder now must obtain a third-party block from third party C to be able to use the token

Now, with a malicious user:

Authority A emits the following token: check if thirdparty("b") trusting ${pubkeyB}
The holder then attenuates the token with the following third party block thirdparty("c"), signed with a keypair pubkeyD, privkeyD) they generate
The holder then generates a third-party block request based on this token, but alter the ThirdPartyBlockRequest publicKeys field and replace pubkeyD with pubkeyC
Third-party B generates the following third-party block thirdparty("b"); check if thirdparty("c") trusting ${pubkeyC}
Due to the altered symbol table, the actual meaning of the block is thirdparty("b"); check if thirdparty("c") trusting ${pubkeyD}
The attacker can now use the token without obtaining a third-party block from C.

Impact

Tokens with third-party blocks containing trusted annotations generated through a third party block request

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🦀crates.io	`biscuit-auth`	≥ 4.0.0&&< 5.0.0	5.0.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for biscuit-auth. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update biscuit-auth to 5.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

Third-party blocks can be generated without transferring the whole token to the third-party authority. Instead, a `ThirdPartyBlock` request can be sent, providing only the necessary info to generate a third-party block and to sign it: - the public key of the previous block (used in the signature) - the public keys part of the token symbol table (for public key interning in datalog expressions) A third-part block request forged by a malicious user can trick the third-party authority into generating datalog trusting the wrong keypair. Consider the following example (nominal case) - Authority

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-p9w4-585h-g3c7 across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

Scan my dependencies How O3 SCA works