GHSA-p9jm-q85p-7mcp is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-401 vulnerability in io.netty:netty-codec-redis. A fix is available for io.netty:netty-codec-redis — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Netty: RedisArrayAggregator max-elements failure leaves retained partial aggregate state
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-p9jm-q85p-7mcp.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-p9jm-q85p-7mcp plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,333 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
io.netty:netty-codec-redis☕io.netty:netty-codec-redisReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
RedisArrayAggregator clears retained partial aggregate state when the maxNestedArrayDepth limit is exceeded, but it does not clear the same state when the sibling maxElements limit is exceeded. A peer can start a valid RESP array, send a bulk-string child, then send a nested array header longer than the configured maxElements. Netty throws a decoder exception, but the existing partial aggregate remains retained in the handler.
If the application leaves the channel alive after the exception, later messages are still consumed into the pre-error aggregate. The supplied PoV proves both the retained ByteBuf reference and the stale parser state continuation.
Technical Details
RedisArrayAggregator.decode(...) retains non-array messages before adding them to depths.peek().children. In decodeRedisArrayHeader(...), the header.length() > maxElements branch throws immediately:
if (header.length() > maxElements) {
throw new CodecException("this codec doesn't support longer length than " + maxElements);
}
The immediately following nested-depth branch clears retained aggregate state before throwing:
if (depths.size() >= maxNestedArrayDepth) {
releaseAndClearDepths();
throw new CodecException("max nested array depth exceeded: " + maxNestedArrayDepth);
}
The missing cleanup in the first branch leaves retained children and aggregate state reachable after the exception.
PoC
Place the supplied RedisArrayAggregatorIncompleteCleanupPovTest.java under:
codec-redis/src/test/java/io/netty/handler/codec/redis/
Run:
./mvnw -pl codec-redis -am -Dtest=RedisArrayAggregatorIncompleteCleanupPovTest -Dsurefire.failIfNoSpecifiedTests=false -DskipNativeTests -DskipAutobahnTests test
The test suite includes:
- serialized RESP trigger through
RedisDecoder,RedisBulkStringAggregator, andRedisArrayAggregator; - direct refcount proof that max-elements overflow does not release the retained child immediately;
- post-exception continuation proof that the stale aggregate consumes a later message;
- nested-depth controls that clear the same partial aggregate state.
All five tests pass on current 4.2, 4.2.15.Final, and 4.1.135.Final.
Impact
For Redis codec pipelines that continue after codec exceptions, an unauthenticated peer can keep attacker-controlled aggregate state alive across a security-limit exception. This can pin retained pooled buffers until channel close/removal or until a later message completes the stale aggregate.
RedisBulkStringAggregator permits bulk strings up to RedisConstants.REDIS_MESSAGE_MAX_LENGTH (512MB), so the retained child can be large in deployments that aggregate untrusted Redis streams.
Applications that always close the channel or remove the handler on decoder exceptions will trigger existing cleanup; the issue is the missing immediate cleanup on the max-elements failure path while the handler remains installed.
Suggested Fix
Call releaseAndClearDepths() before throwing from the max-elements branch. Consider applying the same cleanup to all unrecoverable decodeRedisArrayHeader(...) error exits that can occur while depths is non-empty.
Affected Package/Versions
io.netty:netty-codec-redis
Confirmed on:
- current
4.2branch head7bae566a93e69409697fe57fa807910ba5c9720e 4.2.15.Finalata41f7b289ce14.1.135.Finalatf05f765d8146
Advisory History
This differs from the public Redis codec advisories because it reproduces on their patched tags:
GHSA-5w86-c3rq-vjj7GHSA-3244-j874-rhc2/CVE-2026-44250GHSA-6jv9-x5w9-2ccm/CVE-2026-48006GHSA-6ghj-frrj-jjj3/CVE-2026-44890
Why This Is Not Intended Behavior
The public API docs document RedisArrayAggregator as aggregating RedisMessage parts into ArrayRedisMessage and document a CodecException when an array header exceeds maxElements. They do not document preserving pre-exception partial aggregate state after that limit fires.
The adjacent nested-depth branch already calls releaseAndClearDepths() before throwing. The max-elements branch is the sibling aggregation-limit branch but throws without cleanup. Netty's later Redis lifecycle cleanup patch explicitly added release behavior for nested-array failure and handler removal, leaving the max-elements failure branch as a missed cleanup path.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | io.netty:netty-codec-redis | all versions | 4.1.136.Finalio.netty:netty-codec-redis:4.1.136.Final |
| ☕Maven | io.netty:netty-codec-redis | ≥ 4.2.0-Final&&< 4.2.16.Final | 4.2.16.Finalio.netty:netty-codec-redis:4.2.16.Final |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.netty:netty-codec-redis, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update io.netty:netty-codec-redis to 4.1.136.Final or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-p9jm-q85p-7mcp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-p9jm-q85p-7mcp can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-p9jm-q85p-7mcp. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-p9jm-q85p-7mcp in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-p9jm-q85p-7mcp across Maven dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.