GHSA-p7c4-8x34-8j8f is a high-severity (CVSS 8.2) Missing Authentication vulnerability in github.com/DatanoiseTV/tinyice. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-p7c4-8x34-8j8f is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
TinyIce: Missing authentication on WebRTC ingest endpoint allows unauthorized stream injection
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-p7c4-8x34-8j8f.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-p7c4-8x34-8j8f plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 0 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/DatanoiseTV/tinyiceReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Title
Missing authentication on WebRTC ingest endpoint allows unauthenticated stream injection in TinyIce
Ecosystem / Package
- Ecosystem:
Go(or "Other" — TinyIce is shipped as a Go binary, not a Go module published to a registry) - Package name:
github.com/DatanoiseTV/tinyice
Affected versions
>= 0.8.95, <= 2.4.1
(Introduced 2026-02-21 in commit e2b60d6 — "debug: add Go Live connection tracing and backend data flow logging" — when handleWebRTCSourceOffer was registered at /webrtc/source-offer without an authentication check. Every tagged release from v0.8.95 through v2.4.1 ships the vulnerable handler.)
Patched versions
>= 2.5.0
Severity
- CVSS 3.1 base score: 7.4 (High)
- CVSS vector:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L - CWE: CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
Description
TinyIce's WebRTC source-ingest HTTP endpoint, POST /webrtc/source-offer?mount=<mount>, accepted any inbound WebRTC SDP offer with no authentication check. The handler routed the offer to WebRTCManager.HandleSourceOffer, which then accepted whatever audio/video tracks the peer published and broadcast them on the named mount as if they were the legitimate source.
The other ingest paths (POST /<mount> over HTTP/1 with the icecast SOURCE / PUT verb, RTMP, SRT) all require the per-mount source password, falling back to default_source_password from the config. The WebRTC ingest path didn't.
Impact
A network attacker who can reach the TinyIce HTTP port can:
- Identify a target mount (mount names are public — they appear in the directory listing, the player URL, and the YP listing).
- Negotiate a WebRTC peer connection with the server.
- Publish arbitrary Opus / H.264 to that mount.
- Have it broadcast to every listener on the mount.
This is a high-integrity-impact issue: an attacker can replace a radio's broadcast with their own audio (silence, noise, malicious content, branded competitor content, etc.). Listeners hear what the attacker sends, not what the legitimate publisher intended.
The legitimate publisher can re-establish their session — TinyIce's source-takeover handshake gives the new offer priority once it arrives, with a 3-second drain of the previous pump goroutine — but the attacker can in principle re-connect immediately after, producing a sustained broadcast hijack until the operator manually intervenes (block at firewall, rotate source passwords once the patch is applied, restart the service).
There is no direct confidentiality impact through this endpoint: the attacker doesn't gain access to listener data or other mounts' content.
Workarounds
If users cannot upgrade immediately:
- Recommended: block
POST /webrtc/source-offerat the reverse proxy in front of TinyIce. The endpoint has no production use case for clients outside the operator's own administration — disabling it loses no functionality unless the consuming application specifically use the browser-based "go-live" feature. - Restrict TinyIce's HTTP port to a trusted network (VPN, internal LAN). Listener access can still be served via a separately-firewalled CDN if the application needs public listening.
Detection
To check whether an application's deployment is exposed, run from outside the network:
curl -i -X POST 'https://your-tinyice-host/webrtc/source-offer?mount=/anymount' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"type":"offer","sdp":"v=0\r\n"}'
- If the response is
400 Bad Requestwith a JSON body containing an SDP-parsing error frompion/webrtc, a consuming application is vulnerable — the server tried to negotiate the (malformed) offer without asking for credentials. - If the response is
401 Unauthorized(Basic auth challenge), the consuming application has been patched.
Authenticated log lines on a patched server will look like:
WARN Authentication failed for user 'webrtc-source' from 1.2.3.4: invalid source password
Fix
Upstream commit: 8067d6b "fix(api): require source password on /webrtc/source-offer + CSRF/access on /go-live-chunk".
The handler now:
- Requires either HTTP Basic auth or a
?password=query parameter. - Compares the supplied password against the per-mount source password (or the
default_source_passwordfallback) using bcrypt. - Hooks into the existing brute-force IP rate-limiter (5 failed attempts per IP within 15 minutes triggers a lockout).
- Rejects requests for mounts in
disabled_mounts.
The same release also tightens an adjacent endpoint, POST /admin/golive/chunk, which previously required session authentication but did not verify the session user's per-mount access nor check the CSRF token.
Timeline
- 2026-02-21 — Vulnerable handler introduced (
e2b60d6). - 2026-05-09 — Vulnerability identified during a maintainer-led audit.
- 2026-05-09 — Patched in commit
8067d6b, released asv2.5.0. - 2026-05-09 — GitHub Security Advisory published, CVE assigned.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/DatanoiseTV/tinyice | ≥ 0.8.95&&< 2.5.0 | 2.5.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/DatanoiseTV/tinyice. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/DatanoiseTV/tinyice to 2.5.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-p7c4-8x34-8j8f is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-p7c4-8x34-8j8f is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-p7c4-8x34-8j8f. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-p7c4-8x34-8j8f in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-p7c4-8x34-8j8f across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.