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📦 npm

GHSA-p36r-qxgx-jq2v

MEDIUM

Lobe Chat API Key Leak

Also known asCVE-2024-37895
Published
Jun 17, 2024
Updated
Jun 17, 2024
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk42th percentile-0.06%
0.05%0.46%0.87%1.29%0.7%0.5%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

@lobehub/chatnpm
13Kdownloads / week

Description

Summary

If an attacker can successfully authenticate through SSO/Access Code, they can obtain the real backend API Key by modifying the base URL to their own attack URL on the frontend and setting up a server-side request.

Details

The attack process is described above.

image

PoC

Frontend:

  1. Pass basic authentication (SSO/Access Code).
  2. Set the Base URL to a private attack address.
  3. Configure the request method to be a server-side request.
  4. At the self-set attack address, retrieve the API Key information from the request headers.

Backend:

  1. The LobeChat version allows setting the Base URL.
  2. There is no outbound traffic whitelist.

Impact

All community version LobeChat users using SSO/Access Code authentication, tested on version 0.162.13.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npm@lobehub/chatall versions0.162.25

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @lobehub/chat. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update @lobehub/chat to 0.162.25 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-p36r-qxgx-jq2v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-p36r-qxgx-jq2v is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-p36r-qxgx-jq2v. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary If an attacker can successfully authenticate through SSO/Access Code, they can obtain the real backend API Key by modifying the base URL to their own attack URL on the frontend and setting up a server-side request. ### Details The attack process is described above. ![image](https://github.com/lobehub/lobe-chat/assets/36695271/df5e0c3c-af28-45c3-959f-182cc9d06680) ### PoC Frontend: 1. Pass basic authentication (SSO/Access Code). 2. Set the Base URL to a private attack address. 3. Configure the request method to be a server-side request. 4. At the self-set attack address, retri
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-p36r-qxgx-jq2v in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-p36r-qxgx-jq2v across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.