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Maven

GHSA-p279-2cqp-84jg

CRITICAL

OpenDJ SASL PLAIN authzid bypassing the proxy ACI scope check

Published
Jul 24, 2026
Updated
Jul 24, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
org.openidentityplatform.opendj:opendj-server-legacy

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

When a SASL PLAIN bind supplies an authorization identity (authzid) that resolves to a different user, PlainSASLMechanismHandler verified only the PROXIED_AUTH privilege and never evaluated the "proxy" access-control right (the mayProxy ACI scope check). As a result, any account holding the proxied-auth privilege could assume any resolvable non-root identity without being granted a proxy ACI for that target.

This diverges from every other proxy path in OpenDJ — the proxied-authorization controls (RFC 4370) and the DIGEST-MD5 / GSSAPI authzid handlers all require both the privilege and the mayProxy scope grant.

Impact

Privilege escalation / authorization bypass: a holder of proxied-auth can act as arbitrary directory users beyond the scope intended by the deployment's proxy ACIs, defeating the ACI-based restriction on which identities may be impersonated. Root/Directory Manager is not assumable this way.

Fix

Enforce the mayProxy scope check on the SASL PLAIN authzid path (both dn: and u:/bare forms), sharing one hasProxyAccess helper with the DIGEST-MD5/GSSAPI path. Denial returns INVALID_CREDENTIALS (49) before password verification — matching DIGEST-MD5/GSSAPI — so an unauthenticated client cannot distinguish a missing privilege from a missing ACI grant.

Workaround

Restrict or revoke the proxied-auth privilege until upgraded.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
Mavenorg.openidentityplatform.opendj:opendj-server-legacyall versions5.1.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.openidentityplatform.opendj:opendj-server-legacy. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update org.openidentityplatform.opendj:opendj-server-legacy to 5.1.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-p279-2cqp-84jg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-p279-2cqp-84jg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-p279-2cqp-84jg. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary When a SASL PLAIN bind supplies an authorization identity (authzid) that resolves to a **different** user, PlainSASLMechanismHandler verified only the PROXIED_AUTH privilege and never evaluated the "proxy" access-control right (the mayProxy ACI scope check). As a result, any account holding the proxied-auth privilege could assume **any resolvable non-root identity** without being granted a proxy ACI for that target. This diverges from every other proxy path in OpenDJ — the proxied-authorization controls (RFC 4370) and the DIGEST-MD5 / GSSAPI authzid handlers all require **both** t
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-p279-2cqp-84jg in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-p279-2cqp-84jg across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.