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MEDIUM severity

Electron: Registry key path injection in app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient on WindowsGHSA-mwmh-mq4g-g6gr

MEDIUM

GHSA-mwmh-mq4g-g6gr is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.7) Improper Input Validation vulnerability in electron. A fix is available for electron — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-34773
Published
Updated
Affected
4 pkgs
Patched
4 / 4
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 9, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-mwmh-mq4g-g6gr.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs16th percentile — riskier than 16% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.26%0.51%0.77%0.0%0.2%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

4 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

2Kother npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
electronnpm
12.7Mdownloads / week

Description

Impact

On Windows, app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient(protocol) did not validate the protocol name before writing to the registry. Apps that pass untrusted input as the protocol name may allow an attacker to write to arbitrary subkeys under HKCU\Software\Classes\, potentially hijacking existing protocol handlers.

Apps are only affected if they call app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient() with a protocol name derived from external or untrusted input. Apps that use a hardcoded protocol name are not affected.

Workarounds

Validate the protocol name matches /^[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+.-]*$/ before passing it to app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient().

Fixed Versions

  • 41.0.0
  • 40.8.1
  • 39.8.1
  • 38.8.6

For more information

If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please email [email protected]

Affected Packages

4 total 4 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmelectronall versions38.8.6npm install electron@38.8.6
📦npmelectron≥ 39.0.0-alpha.1&&< 39.8.139.8.1npm install electron@39.8.1
📦npmelectron≥ 40.0.0-alpha.1&&< 40.8.140.8.1npm install electron@40.8.1
📦npmelectron≥ 41.0.0-alpha.1&&< 41.0.041.0.0npm install electron@41.0.0

Affected Products

1 product · 17 configurations
Application
electronelectronjs
≥ 40.0.0 && < 40.8.1
1 version
41.0.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for electron, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update electron to 38.8.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mwmh-mq4g-g6gr is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Fixing This On Your OS

If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.

Red HatModerate
Workaround published by Red Hat
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base or stability.
Source: Red Hat security advisory for GHSA-mwmh-mq4g-g6gr (CC BY 4.0)

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact On Windows, `app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient(protocol)` did not validate the protocol name before writing to the registry. Apps that pass untrusted input as the protocol name may allow an attacker to write to arbitrary subkeys under `HKCU\Software\Classes\`, potentially hijacking existing protocol handlers. Apps are only affected if they call `app.setAsDefaultProtocolClient()` with a protocol name derived from external or untrusted input. Apps that use a hardcoded protocol name are not affected. ### Workarounds Validate the protocol name matches `/^[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+.-]*$/` before
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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