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GHSA-mrx3-gxjx-hjqj

MEDIUM

Authentik vulnerable to PKCE downgrade attack

Also known asBIT-authentik-2024-23647CVE-2024-23647GO-2024-2479
Published
Jan 29, 2024
Updated
Apr 17, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk41th percentile+0.45%
0.00%0.35%0.70%1.04%0.1%0.5%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected
🐹goauthentik.io🐹goauthentik.io

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

PKCE is a very important countermeasure in OAuth2 , both for public and confidential clients. It protects against CSRF attacks and code injection attacks. Because of this bug, an attacker can circumvent the protection PKCE offers.

Patches

authentik 2023.8.7 and 2023.10.7 fix this issue.

Details

There is a bug in our implementation of PKCE that allows an attacker to circumvent the protection that PKCE offers. PKCE adds the code_challenge’ parameter to the authorization request and adds the code_verifier’ parameter to the token request. We recently fixed a downgrade attack (in v2023.8.5 and 2023.10.4) where if the attacker removed the code_verifier’ parameter in the token request, authentik would allow the request to pass, thus circumventing PKCE’s protection. However, in the latest version of the software, another downgrade scenario is still possible: if the attacker removes the code_challenge’ parameter from the authorization request, authentik will also not do the PKCE check.

Note that this type of downgrade enables an attacker to perform a code injection attack, even if the OAuth client is using PKCE (which is supposed to protect against code injection attacks). To start the attack, the attacker must initiate the authorization process without that code_challenge’ parameter in the authorization request. But this is easy to do (just use a phishing site or email to trick the user into clicking on a link that the attacker controls – the authorization link without that code_challenge’ parameter).

The OAuth BCP (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-security-topics) explicitly mentions this particular attack in section 2.1.1: “Authorization servers MUST mitigate PKCE Downgrade Attacks by ensuring that a token request containing a code_verifier parameter is accepted only if a code_challenge parameter was present in the authorization request, see Section 4.8.2 for details.”

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogoauthentik.io2023.10.0&&< 2023.10.72023.10.7
🐹Gogoauthentik.ioall versions2023.8.7

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for goauthentik.io. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update goauthentik.io to 2023.10.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mrx3-gxjx-hjqj is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-mrx3-gxjx-hjqj is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-mrx3-gxjx-hjqj. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary PKCE is a very important countermeasure in OAuth2 , both for public and confidential clients. It protects against CSRF attacks and code injection attacks. Because of this bug, an attacker can circumvent the protection PKCE offers. ## Patches authentik 2023.8.7 and 2023.10.7 fix this issue. ## Details There is a bug in our implementation of PKCE that allows an attacker to circumvent the protection that PKCE offers. PKCE adds the `code_challenge’ parameter to the authorization request and adds the `code_verifier’ parameter to the token request. We recently fixed a downgrade attac
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-mrx3-gxjx-hjqj in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-mrx3-gxjx-hjqj across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.