How severe is GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69 yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69?

GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69 affects the following packages: github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 (Go). Ecosystems affected: Go.

How do I fix GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69?

Update github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 to 2.61.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69 in my Go dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69 if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69 actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69 yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69?

GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69 has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.3%, placing it in the 24th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69?

GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69 is classified as Information Exposure (CWE-200). This weakness type describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation.

When was GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69 published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69 was published on March 2, 2026 and was last updated on March 23, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐹 Go

GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69

FileBrowser has Path Traversal in Public Share Links that Exposes Files Outside Shared Directory

Also known asCVE-2026-28492GO-2026-4585

Published

Mar 2, 2026

Updated

Mar 23, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk24th percentile+0.27%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐹github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

When a user creates a public share link for a directory, the withHashFile middleware in http/public.go (line 59) uses filepath.Dir(link.Path) to compute the BasePathFs root. This sets the filesystem root to the parent directory instead of the shared directory itself, allowing anyone with the share link to browse and download files from all sibling directories.

Details

In http/public.go lines 52-64, the withHashFile function handles public share link requests:

basePath := link.Path    // e.g. "/documents/shared"
filePath := ""

if file.IsDir {
    basePath = filepath.Dir(basePath)  // BUG: becomes "/documents" (parent!)
    filePath = ifPath
}

d.user.Fs = afero.NewBasePathFs(d.user.Fs, basePath)

When a directory at /documents/shared is shared, filepath.Dir("/documents/shared") evaluates to "/documents". The BasePathFs is then rooted at the parent directory /documents/, giving the share link access to everything under /documents/ - not just the intended /documents/shared/.

This affects both publicShareHandler (directory listing via /api/public/share/{hash}) and publicDlHandler (file download via /api/public/dl/{hash}/path).

PoC

Set up filebrowser with a user whose scope contains:
- /documents/shared/public-file.txt (intended to be shared)
- /documents/secrets/passwords.txt (NOT intended to be shared)
- /documents/private/financial.csv (NOT intended to be shared)
Create a public share link for the directory /documents/shared (via POST /api/share/documents/shared)
Access the share link: GET /api/public/share/{hash}
- Expected: Lists only contents of /documents/shared/
- Actual: Lists contents of /documents/ (parent), revealing secrets/, private/, and shared/ directories
Download sibling files: GET /api/public/dl/{hash}/secrets/passwords.txt
- Expected: 404 or 403 (file outside share scope)
- Actual: 200 with file contents (sibling file downloaded successfully) Standalone Go test reproducing the exact vulnerable code path with afero.NewBasePathFs:

func TestShareScopeEscape(t *testing.T) {
    baseFs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
    afero.WriteFile(baseFs, "/documents/shared/public.txt", []byte("public"), 0644)
    afero.WriteFile(baseFs, "/documents/secrets/passwords.txt", []byte("admin:hunter2"), 0644)

    linkPath := "/documents/shared"
    basePath := filepath.Dir(linkPath) // BUG: "/documents"
    scopedFs := afero.NewBasePathFs(baseFs, basePath)

    // Sibling file is accessible through the share:
    f, err := scopedFs.Open("/secrets/passwords.txt")
    // err is nil - file accessible! Content: "admin:hunter2"
}

This test passes, confirming the vulnerability.

Impact

Unauthenticated information disclosure (CWE-200, CWE-706). Anyone with a public share link for a directory can:

Browse all sibling directories and files of the shared directory
- Download any file within the parent directory scope
- This works without authentication (public shares) or after providing the share password (password-protected shares) All filebrowser v2.x installations that use directory sharing are affected.

Recommended Fix

Remove the filepath.Dir() call and use link.Path directly as the BasePathFs root:

if file.IsDir {
    // Don't change basePath - keep it as link.Path
    filePath = ifPath
}
d.user.Fs = afero.NewBasePathFs(d.user.Fs, basePath)

Affected commit: e3d00d591b567a8bfe3b02e42ba586859002c77d (latest) File: http/public.go, line 59

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐹Go	`github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2`	all versions	2.61.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 to 2.61.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary When a user creates a public share link for a **directory**, the `withHashFile` middleware in `http/public.go` (line 59) uses `filepath.Dir(link.Path)` to compute the `BasePathFs` root. This sets the filesystem root to the **parent directory** instead of the shared directory itself, allowing anyone with the share link to browse and download files from all sibling directories. ### Details In `http/public.go` lines 52-64, the `withHashFile` function handles public share link requests: ```go basePath := link.Path // e.g. "/documents/shared" filePath := "" if file.IsDir { bas

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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