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GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69 v2

Fix: filebrowser/filebrowser@31194fb

GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69 is a Information Exposure vulnerability in github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2. A fix is available for github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 — see the affected versions and patch details below.

FileBrowser has Path Traversal in Public Share Links that Exposes Files Outside Shared Directory

Also known asCVE-2026-28492GO-2026-4585
Published
Mar 2, 2026
Updated
Mar 23, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Sep 21, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs25th percentile — riskier than 25% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

When a user creates a public share link for a directory, the withHashFile middleware in http/public.go (line 59) uses filepath.Dir(link.Path) to compute the BasePathFs root. This sets the filesystem root to the parent directory instead of the shared directory itself, allowing anyone with the share link to browse and download files from all sibling directories.

Details

In http/public.go lines 52-64, the withHashFile function handles public share link requests:

basePath := link.Path    // e.g. "/documents/shared"
filePath := ""

if file.IsDir {
    basePath = filepath.Dir(basePath)  // BUG: becomes "/documents" (parent!)
    filePath = ifPath
}

d.user.Fs = afero.NewBasePathFs(d.user.Fs, basePath)

When a directory at /documents/shared is shared, filepath.Dir("/documents/shared") evaluates to "/documents". The BasePathFs is then rooted at the parent directory /documents/, giving the share link access to everything under /documents/ - not just the intended /documents/shared/.

This affects both publicShareHandler (directory listing via /api/public/share/{hash}) and publicDlHandler (file download via /api/public/dl/{hash}/path).

PoC

  1. Set up filebrowser with a user whose scope contains:
    • /documents/shared/public-file.txt (intended to be shared)
    • /documents/secrets/passwords.txt (NOT intended to be shared)
    • /documents/private/financial.csv (NOT intended to be shared)
  2. Create a public share link for the directory /documents/shared (via POST /api/share/documents/shared)
  3. Access the share link: GET /api/public/share/{hash}
    • Expected: Lists only contents of /documents/shared/
    • Actual: Lists contents of /documents/ (parent), revealing secrets/, private/, and shared/ directories
  4. Download sibling files: GET /api/public/dl/{hash}/secrets/passwords.txt
    • Expected: 404 or 403 (file outside share scope)
    • Actual: 200 with file contents (sibling file downloaded successfully) Standalone Go test reproducing the exact vulnerable code path with afero.NewBasePathFs:
func TestShareScopeEscape(t *testing.T) {
    baseFs := afero.NewMemMapFs()
    afero.WriteFile(baseFs, "/documents/shared/public.txt", []byte("public"), 0644)
    afero.WriteFile(baseFs, "/documents/secrets/passwords.txt", []byte("admin:hunter2"), 0644)

    linkPath := "/documents/shared"
    basePath := filepath.Dir(linkPath) // BUG: "/documents"
    scopedFs := afero.NewBasePathFs(baseFs, basePath)

    // Sibling file is accessible through the share:
    f, err := scopedFs.Open("/secrets/passwords.txt")
    // err is nil - file accessible! Content: "admin:hunter2"
}

This test passes, confirming the vulnerability.

Impact

Unauthenticated information disclosure (CWE-200, CWE-706). Anyone with a public share link for a directory can:

  • Browse all sibling directories and files of the shared directory
    • Download any file within the parent directory scope
    • This works without authentication (public shares) or after providing the share password (password-protected shares) All filebrowser v2.x installations that use directory sharing are affected.

Recommended Fix

Remove the filepath.Dir() call and use link.Path directly as the BasePathFs root:

if file.IsDir {
    // Don't change basePath - keep it as link.Path
    filePath = ifPath
}
d.user.Fs = afero.NewBasePathFs(d.user.Fs, basePath)

Affected commit: e3d00d591b567a8bfe3b02e42ba586859002c77d (latest) File: http/public.go, line 59

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2all versions2.61.0go get github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2@v2.61.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2 to 2.61.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary When a user creates a public share link for a **directory**, the `withHashFile` middleware in `http/public.go` (line 59) uses `filepath.Dir(link.Path)` to compute the `BasePathFs` root. This sets the filesystem root to the **parent directory** instead of the shared directory itself, allowing anyone with the share link to browse and download files from all sibling directories. ### Details In `http/public.go` lines 52-64, the `withHashFile` function handles public share link requests: ```go basePath := link.Path // e.g. "/documents/shared" filePath := "" if file.IsDir { bas
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-mr74-928f-rw69: v2 Info Disclosure | O3 Security