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GHSA-mr34-8733-grr2

Memos' Access Tokens Stay Valid after User Password Change

Also known asCVE-2024-21635GO-2025-4127
Published
Nov 14, 2025
Updated
Mar 13, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk16th percentile+0.20%
0.00%0.25%0.50%0.75%0.0%0.2%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/usememos/memos

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

Access Tokens are used to authenticate application access. When a user changes their password, the existing list of Access Tokens stay valid instead of expiring. If a user finds that their account has been compromised, they can update their password.

The bad actor though will still have access to their account because the bad actor's Access Token stays on the list as a valid token. The user will have to manually delete the bad actor's Access Token to secure their account. The list of Access Tokens has a generic Description which makes it hard to pinpoint a bad actor in a list of Access Tokens.

Details

To improve Memos security, all Access Tokens will need to be revoked when a user changes their password. This removes the session for all the user's devices and prompts the user to log in again. You can treat the old Access Tokens as "invalid" because those Access Tokens were created with the older password.

PoC

  1. Have 2 devices on hand
  2. Log onto your Memos account on both devices. Notice how Access Tokens are created for each.
  3. On one device, successfully change the password. Refresh the page on the 2nd device and notice how it doesn't log out the user.
  4. On the 2nd device, change the password again. Refresh the page on the 1st device and notice how it doesn't log out the user.

Impact

A bad actor will still have access to the user's account because the Access Token does not expire on a password update. Having multi-factor authentication will vastly improve account security in Account Takeover cases instead of just relying on a password.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/usememos/memosall versions0.18.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/usememos/memos. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/usememos/memos to 0.18.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mr34-8733-grr2 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-mr34-8733-grr2 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-mr34-8733-grr2. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary Access Tokens are used to authenticate application access. When a user changes their password, the existing list of Access Tokens stay valid instead of expiring. If a user finds that their account has been compromised, they can update their password. The bad actor though will still have access to their account because the bad actor's Access Token stays on the list as a valid token. The user will have to manually delete the bad actor's Access Token to secure their account. The list of Access Tokens has a generic Description which makes it hard to pinpoint a bad actor in a list of
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-mr34-8733-grr2 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-mr34-8733-grr2 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.