What is GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m?

### Summary An authenticated party can add a malicious name to the Energy entity, allowing for Cross-Site Scripting attacks against anyone who can see the Energy dashboard, when they hover over any information point (The blue bar in the picture below) An alternative, and more impactful scenario, is that the entity gets a malicious name from the provider of the Entity (in this case the energy provider: Tibber), and gets exploited that way, through the default nam

How severe is GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m?

GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m affects the following packages: homeassistant (PyPI). Ecosystems affected: PyPI.

How do I fix GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m?

Update homeassistant to 2025.10.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m in my PyPI dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for homeassistant. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

What is the EPSS score for GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m?

GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m has an EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) score of 0.5%, placing it in the 40th percentile of all CVEs. EPSS is maintained by FIRST.org and estimates the probability that a vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days. This score indicates relatively lower exploitation probability, though the CVSS severity should still guide your patching priority.

What type of vulnerability is GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m?

GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m is classified as Cross-site Scripting (XSS) (CWE-79), CWE-80 (CWE-80). These weakness types describe the underlying flaw category, which helps determine the potential impact and the right class of mitigation. This is a high-impact weakness class that often enables remote code execution or data exposure.

When was GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m was published on October 14, 2025 and was last updated on March 27, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

🐍 PyPI

GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m

Home Assistant has Stored XSS vulnerability in Energy dashboard from Energy Entity Name

Also known asCVE-2025-62172

Published

Oct 14, 2025

Updated

Mar 27, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗

0.5%probability of exploitation in next 30 days

Lower Risk40th percentile+0.50%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

🐍homeassistant

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

An authenticated party can add a malicious name to the Energy entity, allowing for Cross-Site Scripting attacks against anyone who can see the Energy dashboard, when they hover over any information point (The blue bar in the picture below) <img width="955" height="568" alt="1_cens" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ed855216-c306-4b50-affc-cda100e72b74" />

An alternative, and more impactful scenario, is that the entity gets a malicious name from the provider of the Entity (in this case the energy provider: Tibber), and gets exploited that way, through the default name.

Details

The incriminating entity in my scenario is from the Tibber integration, as shown in the screenshot below: <img width="822" height="309" alt="2_cens" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d0d5a7aa-8d0c-4dcb-825b-e4cb8ea8885b" />

The exploit should be possible regardless of the Energy integration, as the user can name the entity themselves and as such pick a malicious name. The default name given by the Energy integration can also be taken directly from their system, and be vulnerable that way. The execution happens within the energy dashboard, when hovering over a data point:

Update found after issue was reported: I found that the issue presents itself for any entity with a html-entity in the name, which is included and rendered in the graph view. Following is an example for a speaker: <img width="423" height="96" alt="11_cens" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/3b4d43dd-d9e0-466b-85c0-277af3195acf" />

Source code

The relevant source code is added in a comment, but copy pasted here as well:

The offending line of code rendering the payload appears to be: https://github.com/home-assistant/frontend/blob/c13a80ce5e7ae39f0262444e2b6295a074a96732/src/panels/lovelace/cards/energy/hui-energy-devices-graph-card.ts#L110 Where the parameter marked with bold and italic is the vulnerable value: return `${title}${params.marker} ${params.seriesName}: ${value}`;

From the trace below, we can see that the only change done to the friendly_name of an entity is replacing underscores with spaces (computeObjectId(entityId).replace(//g, " ")_). We can also determine that any power entity will have it's name used if there is one, and fall back to the friendly name if it cannot find one:

data.push({
  id: `${compare ? "compare-" : ""}${statId}-${type}`,
  type: "bar",
  cursor: "default",
  name:
    type in labels
      ? labels[type]
      : getStatisticLabel(
          this.hass,
          statId,
          statisticsMetaData[statId]
        ),

(https://github.com/home-assistant/frontend/blob/c13a80ce5e7ae39f0262444e2b6295a074a96732/src/panels/lovelace/cards/energy/hui-energy-usage-graph-card.ts#L467-L478)

The value comes from:

https://github.com/home-assistant/frontend/blob/c13a80ce5e7ae39f0262444e2b6295a074a96732/src/panels/lovelace/cards/energy/hui-energy-usage-graph-card.ts#L467-L478 (This is the relevant call: getStatisticLabel(this.hass, statId, statisticsMetaData[statId];)
getStatisticLabel is defined here: https://github.com/home-assistant/frontend/blob/c13a80ce5e7ae39f0262444e2b6295a074a96732/src/data/recorder.ts#L329-L339 (This is the relevant call: computeStateName(entity);)
computeStateName is defined here: https://github.com/home-assistant/frontend/blob/c13a80ce5e7ae39f0262444e2b6295a074a96732/src/common/entity/compute_state_name.ts

PoC

Set up a new energy provider with a price sensor.
Give the price sensor a malicious name <img width="814" height="100" alt="4_cens" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/64bf7a00-47a2-46db-ae0f-b93e328837d2" />

Configure the energy dashboard to get data from the price sensor <img width="582" height="394" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/74c99ab8-0842-4c1b-b2e9-994827d89609" />

Look at the data and hover the data point for code to execute. (You may have to trigger data ingestion or add a false data point to be able to hover a data point when testing, you need at least one datapoint to trigger the vulnerability) <img width="1547" height="575" alt="9_cens" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/087cdf78-a503-427d-8e0c-bb5db24de5c8" />

Impact

It is possible to exploit this over the internet, by using an energy provider, like Tibber, with a malicious name, and relying on the default naming in Home Assistant being used. This is actually how I found this bug: <img width="453" height="152" alt="10_cens" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/45451efb-2688-4589-a988-88d1fc0b4e25" />

This means that a malicious employee or someone with access to your electricity provider can attack your Home Assistant instance from your electricity provider. I am unsure if you consider this a sanitization and escaping issue in the respective integrations or not, but I believe a central fix in the form of fixing the Energy Dashboard is more appropriate, rather than to rely on every integration properly handling user input.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
🐍PyPI	`homeassistant`	≥ 2025.1.0&&< 2025.10.2	2025.10.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for homeassistant. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update homeassistant to 2025.10.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-mq77-rv97-285m. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary An authenticated party can add a malicious name to the Energy entity, allowing for Cross-Site Scripting attacks against anyone who can see the Energy dashboard, when they hover over any information point (The blue bar in the picture below) <img width="955" height="568" alt="1_cens" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ed855216-c306-4b50-affc-cda100e72b74" /> An alternative, and more impactful scenario, is that the entity gets a malicious name from the provider of the Entity (in this case the energy provider: Tibber), and gets exploited that way, through the default nam

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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