GHSA-mq53-pc65-wjc4 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.8) CWE-915 vulnerability in flowise. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-mq53-pc65-wjc4 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
FlowiseAI: Evaluation create+update mass-assignment allows cross-workspace evaluation takeover
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-mq53-pc65-wjc4.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-mq53-pc65-wjc4 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 0 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
flowisenpmDescription
Summary
Type: Mass assignment via Object.assign(entity, body) -> client-controlled workspaceId (and on create, id) overwritten on the Evaluation entity -> cross-workspace data takeover and IDOR.
File: packages/server/src/services/evaluations/index.ts
Root cause: The Evaluation controller/service constructs a new Evaluation() and copies the request body into it via Object.assign(...) without an explicit field allowlist. The request body therefore can include workspaceId, id, createdDate, updatedDate. The server only rebinds some of these after the assign (e.g. on create, it overwrites workspaceId but not id; on update, it overwrites id but not workspaceId). The remaining client-controlled values land directly on the persisted row, breaking workspace isolation. Same root pattern as the evaluation entity's sibling controllers and as DocumentStore before it was patched in commit 840d2ae.
Affected Code
File: packages/server/src/services/evaluations/index.ts
// at line 69
Object.assign(newEvaluation, body) // <-- BUG: body.id, body.workspaceId, body.createdDate, body.updatedDate accepted
Why it's wrong: Object.assign(target, source) copies every own enumerable property of source onto target. The TypeORM/SQL persistence layer below it does not strip ownership-bearing columns, so workspaceId set in the request body lands as the new workspaceId of the persisted row. The DocumentStore patch (commit 840d2ae) demonstrated the intended fix shape (explicit field-by-field allowlist) but it has not been applied to this entity.
Exploit Chain
- Attacker is an authenticated member of workspace A. They have a session cookie / JWT for the Flowise web UI. State at this point: attacker can read and write entities scoped to workspace A.
- Attacker creates a evaluation in workspace A via the documented API (or reuses an existing one they own). They note its entity
id. - Attacker issues a
PUT /api/v1/evaluations/<id>(or equivalent endpoint) with a JSON body that includes"workspaceId": "<workspace-B-id>"(an arbitrary other workspace's UUID). State at this point: the request reaches the controller as a workspace-A authenticated request. - The controller calls
Object.assign(updateEntity, body). The body'sworkspaceIdoverwrites the entity'sworkspaceIdfield. The persistence layer commits the row. - Final state: the evaluation row is now owned by workspace B. Workspace B members can see it, modify it, and use it. Workspace A loses access (it no longer satisfies their workspace filter). The original creator's workspace audit shows nothing because the operation looked like a normal update.
Security Impact
Severity: High. Cross-workspace boundary violation by any authenticated workspace member.
Attacker capability: Any authenticated user with permission to update a evaluation can move it to any workspace whose UUID they can guess or enumerate (workspace UUIDs are exposed in many API responses, so enumeration is trivial). Evaluation runs (which may include captured prompts, model outputs, scoring data) can be moved cross-workspace via workspaceId overwrite, exposing the data to attacker workspace members.
Preconditions: Authenticated session with edit permission for the source evaluation. No second factor required. Workspace UUIDs are exposed via the /api/v1/workspaces listing or via any cross-referenced object's workspaceId field, so target enumeration is trivial.
Differential: PoC-verified by source inspection of the original GHSA-q4pr-4r26-c69r. Patched build (with the suggested fix below) refuses the workspaceId field; vulnerable build accepts it and persists it.
Suggested Fix
Already fixed in PR https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/6050 (allowlist pattern applied).
// Allowlist pattern (matches commit 840d2ae for DocumentStore):
const updatedEvaluation = new Evaluation()
if (body.<allowed_field_1> !== undefined) updatedEvaluation.<allowed_field_1> = body.<allowed_field_1>
if (body.<allowed_field_2> !== undefined) updatedEvaluation.<allowed_field_2> = body.<allowed_field_2>
// ...whitelist only the documented fields. Never copy id, workspaceId, createdDate, updatedDate from the client.
Regression tests should assert that a request body containing workspaceId, id, createdDate, or updatedDate is rejected (or at minimum: does not change those columns on the persisted row) for both create and update paths.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | flowise | all versions | 3.1.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for flowise. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update flowise to 3.1.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mq53-pc65-wjc4 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-mq53-pc65-wjc4 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-mq53-pc65-wjc4. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-mq53-pc65-wjc4 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-mq53-pc65-wjc4 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.