GHSA-mp5h-m6qj-6292 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-345 vulnerability in openclaw. A fix is available for openclaw — see the affected versions and patch details below.
OpenClaw has a Telegram webhook request forgery (missing `channels.telegram.webhookSecret`) → auth bypass
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-mp5h-m6qj-6292.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-mp5h-m6qj-6292 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.
openclawnpmDescription
Summary
In Telegram webhook mode, if channels.telegram.webhookSecret is not set, OpenClaw may accept webhook HTTP requests without verifying Telegram’s secret token header. In deployments where the webhook endpoint is reachable by an attacker, this can allow forged Telegram updates (for example spoofing message.from.id).
Note: Telegram webhook mode is not enabled by default. It is enabled only when channels.telegram.webhookUrl is configured.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected:
<= 2026.1.30 - Patched:
>= 2026.2.1
Impact
If an attacker can reach the webhook endpoint, they may be able to send forged updates that are processed as if they came from Telegram. Depending on enabled commands/tools and configuration, this could lead to unintended bot actions.
Mitigations / Workarounds
- Set a strong
channels.telegram.webhookSecretand ensure your reverse proxy forwards theX-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Tokenheader unchanged. - Restrict network access to the webhook endpoint (for example bind to loopback and only expose via a reverse proxy).
Fix Commit(s)
- ca92597e1f9593236ad86810b66633144b69314d (config validation:
webhookUrlrequireswebhookSecret)
Defense-in-depth / supporting fixes:
- 5643a934799dc523ec2ef18c007e1aa2c386b670 (default webhook listener bind host to loopback)
- 3cbcba10cf30c2ffb898f0d8c7dfb929f15f8930 (bound webhook request body size/time)
- 633fe8b9c17f02fcc68ecdb5ec212a5ace932f09 (runtime guard: reject webhook startup when secret is missing/empty)
Thanks @yueyueL for reporting.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | openclaw | all versions | 2026.2.1npm install openclaw@2026.2.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update openclaw to 2026.2.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mp5h-m6qj-6292 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-mp5h-m6qj-6292 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-mp5h-m6qj-6292. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-mp5h-m6qj-6292 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-mp5h-m6qj-6292 across npm dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.