GHSA-mjmj-j48q-9wg2
HIGHGHSA-mjmj-j48q-9wg2 is a high-severity (CVSS 8.3) Improper Input Validation vulnerability in org.yaml:snakeyaml. 7 public exploit references exist, so weaponization risk is real. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-mjmj-j48q-9wg2 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
SnakeYaml Constructor Deserialization Remote Code Execution
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-mjmj-j48q-9wg2.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-mjmj-j48q-9wg2 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE sits: patch-first territory.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 370,894 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the ≥ 90% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
org.yaml:snakeyamlReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
SnakeYaml's Constructor class, which inherits from SafeConstructor, allows
any type be deserialized given the following line:
new Yaml(new Constructor(TestDataClass.class)).load(yamlContent);
Types do not have to match the types of properties in the
target class. A ConstructorException is thrown, but only after a malicious
payload is deserialized.
Severity
High, lack of type checks during deserialization allows remote code execution.
Proof of Concept
Execute bash run.sh. The PoC uses Constructor to deserialize a payload
for RCE. RCE is demonstrated by using a payload which performs a http request to
http://127.0.0.1:8000.
Example output of successful run of proof of concept:
$ bash run.sh
[+] Downloading snakeyaml if needed
[+] Starting mock HTTP server on 127.0.0.1:8000 to demonstrate RCE
nc: no process found
[+] Compiling and running Proof of Concept, which a payload that sends a HTTP request to mock web server.
[+] An exception is expected.
Exception:
Cannot create property=payload for JavaBean=Main$TestDataClass@3cbbc1e0
in 'string', line 1, column 1:
payload: !!javax.script.ScriptEn ...
^
Can not set java.lang.String field Main$TestDataClass.payload to javax.script.ScriptEngineManager
in 'string', line 1, column 10:
payload: !!javax.script.ScriptEngineManag ...
^
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.Constructor$ConstructMapping.constructJavaBean2ndStep(Constructor.java:291)
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.Constructor$ConstructMapping.construct(Constructor.java:172)
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.Constructor$ConstructYamlObject.construct(Constructor.java:332)
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.BaseConstructor.constructObjectNoCheck(BaseConstructor.java:230)
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.BaseConstructor.constructObject(BaseConstructor.java:220)
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.BaseConstructor.constructDocument(BaseConstructor.java:174)
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.BaseConstructor.getSingleData(BaseConstructor.java:158)
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.Yaml.loadFromReader(Yaml.java:491)
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.Yaml.load(Yaml.java:416)
at Main.main(Main.java:37)
Caused by: java.lang.IllegalArgumentException: Can not set java.lang.String field Main$TestDataClass.payload to javax.script.ScriptEngineManager
at java.base/jdk.internal.reflect.UnsafeFieldAccessorImpl.throwSetIllegalArgumentException(UnsafeFieldAccessorImpl.java:167)
at java.base/jdk.internal.reflect.UnsafeFieldAccessorImpl.throwSetIllegalArgumentException(UnsafeFieldAccessorImpl.java:171)
at java.base/jdk.internal.reflect.UnsafeObjectFieldAccessorImpl.set(UnsafeObjectFieldAccessorImpl.java:81)
at java.base/java.lang.reflect.Field.set(Field.java:780)
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.introspector.FieldProperty.set(FieldProperty.java:44)
at org.yaml.snakeyaml.constructor.Constructor$ConstructMapping.constructJavaBean2ndStep(Constructor.java:286)
... 9 more
[+] Dumping Received HTTP Request. Will not be empty if PoC worked
GET /proof-of-concept HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Java/11.0.14
Host: localhost:8000
Accept: text/html, image/gif, image/jpeg, *; q=.2, */*; q=.2
Connection: keep-alive
Further Analysis
Potential mitigations include, leveraging SnakeYaml's SafeConstructor while parsing untrusted content.
See https://bitbucket.org/snakeyaml/snakeyaml/issues/561/cve-2022-1471-vulnerability-in#comment-64581479 for discussion on the subject.
Timeline
Date reported: 4/11/2022 Date fixed: 30/12/2022 Date disclosed: 10/13/2022
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | org.yaml:snakeyaml | all versions | 2.0 |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
SnakeYaml's Constructor() class does not restrict types which can be ins…
SnakeYaml's Constructor() class does not restrict types which can be ins…
SnakeYaml's Constructor() class does not restrict types which can be ins…
SnakeYaml's Constructor() class does not restrict types which can be ins…
SnakeYaml's Constructor() class does not restrict types which can be ins…
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.yaml:snakeyaml. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update org.yaml:snakeyaml to 2.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mjmj-j48q-9wg2 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-mjmj-j48q-9wg2 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-mjmj-j48q-9wg2. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Fixing This On Your OS
If you run this on a Linux distribution, patch through your package manager against the distro's own security advisory below — it tracks the exact backported fix for your release, which can ship on a different timeline (and sometimes a different severity) than the upstream project.
In the Red Hat Process Automation 7 (RHPAM) the untrusted, malicious YAML file for deserialization by the vulnerable Snakeyaml's SafeConstructor class must be provided intentionally by the RHPAM user which requires high privileges. The potential attack complexity is also high because it depends on conditions that are…
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-mjmj-j48q-9wg2 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-mjmj-j48q-9wg2 across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.