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🐍 PyPI

GHSA-mgf9-4vpg-hj56

HIGH

tornado AsyncHTTPClient accumulates decompressed chunks without size limit (gzip bomb)

Also known asCVE-2026-49855PYSEC-2026-3389
Published
Jun 15, 2026
Updated
Jul 13, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.7%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk49th percentile0.00%

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍tornado

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Tornado's gzip decompression routines work in limited-size chunks, but have no overall limit for the total size of decompressed chunks that they will accumulate (There has always been a limit for the total compressed size). This allows a malicious server to consume effectively unlimited amounts of memory if it is accessed via SimpleAsyncHTTPClient in its default configuration. HTTPServer is not affected in its default configuration, but it is if decompress_request=True is set.

This bug is fixed in Tornado 6.5.6. max_body_size is now checked both for the compressed and cumulative decompressed size of the response.

Prior to upgrading, this issue can be mitigated by setting decompress_response=False or using CurlAsyncHTTPClient.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPItornadoall versions6.5.6

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for tornado. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update tornado to 6.5.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mgf9-4vpg-hj56 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-mgf9-4vpg-hj56 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-mgf9-4vpg-hj56. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

Tornado's gzip decompression routines work in limited-size chunks, but have no overall limit for the total size of decompressed chunks that they will accumulate (There has always been a limit for the total *compressed* size). This allows a malicious server to consume effectively unlimited amounts of memory if it is accessed via SimpleAsyncHTTPClient in its default configuration. `HTTPServer` is not affected in its default configuration, but it is if `decompress_request=True` is set. This bug is fixed in Tornado 6.5.6. `max_body_size` is now checked both for the compressed and cumulative decom
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-mgf9-4vpg-hj56 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-mgf9-4vpg-hj56 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.