GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63
HIGHtj-actions/changed-files has Potential Actions command injection in output filenames (GHSL-2023-271)
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
tj-actions/changed-filesReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects GitHub Actions packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The tj-actions/changed-files workflow allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets.
Details
The changed-files action returns a list of files changed in a commit or pull request which provides an escape_json input enabled by default, only escapes " for JSON values.
This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as ; and ` (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the GitHub Runner if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a run block. By running custom commands an attacker may be able to steal secrets such as GITHUB_TOKEN if triggered on other events than pull_request. For example on push.
Proof of Concept
- Submit a pull request to a repository with a new file injecting a command. For example
$(whoami).txtwhich is a valid filename. - Upon approval of the workflow (triggered by the pull request), the action will get executed and the malicious pull request filename will flow into the
List all changed filesstep below.
- name: List all changed files
run: |
for file in ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}; do
echo "$file was changed"
done
Example output:
##[group]Run for file in $(whoami).txt; do
for file in $(whoami).txt; do
echo "$file was changed"
done
shell: /usr/bin/bash -e {0}
##[endgroup]
runner.txt was changed
Impact
This issue may lead to arbitrary command execution in the GitHub Runner.
Resolution
-
A new
safe_outputinput would be enabled by default and return filename paths escaping special characters like ;, ` (backtick), $, (), etc for bash environments. -
A safe recommendation of using environment variables to store unsafe outputs.
- name: List all changed files
env:
ALL_CHANGED_FILES: ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}
run: |
for file in "$ALL_CHANGED_FILES"; do
echo "$file was changed"
done
Resources
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦GitHub Actions | tj-actions/changed-files | all versions | 41 |
Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for tj-actions/changed-files. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update tj-actions/changed-files to 41 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63 across GitHub Actions dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.