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📦
📦 GitHub Actions
Not in CISA KEV
HIGH severity

tj-actions/changed-files has Potential Actions command injection in output filenames (GHSL-2023-271)GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63

HIGHFix: tj-actions/changed-files@0102c07

GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.3) CWE-74 vulnerability in tj-actions/changed-files. 1 public exploit or proof-of-concept reference is indexed, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for tj-actions/changed-files — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2023-51664
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
1 known
Exploitation data as of Nov 7, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
3.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs89th percentile — riskier than 89% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%1.41%2.82%4.23%0.4%3.4%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
📦tj-actions/changed-files

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects GitHub Actions packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The tj-actions/changed-files workflow allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets.

Details

The changed-files action returns a list of files changed in a commit or pull request which provides an escape_json input enabled by default, only escapes " for JSON values.

This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as ; and ` (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the GitHub Runner if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a run block. By running custom commands an attacker may be able to steal secrets such as GITHUB_TOKEN if triggered on other events than pull_request. For example on push.

Proof of Concept

  1. Submit a pull request to a repository with a new file injecting a command. For example $(whoami).txt which is a valid filename.
  2. Upon approval of the workflow (triggered by the pull request), the action will get executed and the malicious pull request filename will flow into the List all changed files step below.
      - name: List all changed files
        run: |
          for file in ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}; do
            echo "$file was changed"
          done

Example output:

##[group]Run for file in $(whoami).txt; do
    for file in $(whoami).txt; do
        echo "$file was changed"
    done
shell: /usr/bin/bash -e {0}
##[endgroup]
runner.txt was changed

Impact

This issue may lead to arbitrary command execution in the GitHub Runner.

Resolution

  • A new safe_output input would be enabled by default and return filename paths escaping special characters like ;, ` (backtick), $, (), etc for bash environments.

  • A safe recommendation of using environment variables to store unsafe outputs.

- name: List all changed files
  env:
    ALL_CHANGED_FILES: ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}
  run: |
    for file in "$ALL_CHANGED_FILES"; do
      echo "$file was changed"
    done

Resources

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦GitHub Actionstj-actions/changed-filesall versions41

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
changed-filestj-actions
< 41.0.0
range
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for tj-actions/changed-files, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update tj-actions/changed-files to 41 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The `tj-actions/changed-files` workflow allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets. ### Details The [`changed-files`](https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files) action returns a list of files changed in a commit or pull request which provides an `escape_json` input [enabled by default](https://github.com/tj-actions/changed-files/blob/94549999469dbfa032becf298d95c87a14c34394/action.yml#L136), only escapes `"` for JSON values. This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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