tj-actions/changed-files has Potential Actions command injection in output filenames (GHSL-2023-271)GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63
HIGHFix: tj-actions/changed-files@0102c07GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.3) CWE-74 vulnerability in tj-actions/changed-files. 1 public exploit or proof-of-concept reference is indexed, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for tj-actions/changed-files — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
tj-actions/changed-filesReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects GitHub Actions packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The tj-actions/changed-files workflow allows for command injection in changed filenames, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code and potentially leak secrets.
Details
The changed-files action returns a list of files changed in a commit or pull request which provides an escape_json input enabled by default, only escapes " for JSON values.
This could potentially allow filenames that contain special characters such as ; and ` (backtick) which can be used by an attacker to take over the GitHub Runner if the output value is used in a raw fashion (thus being directly replaced before execution) inside a run block. By running custom commands an attacker may be able to steal secrets such as GITHUB_TOKEN if triggered on other events than pull_request. For example on push.
Proof of Concept
- Submit a pull request to a repository with a new file injecting a command. For example
$(whoami).txtwhich is a valid filename. - Upon approval of the workflow (triggered by the pull request), the action will get executed and the malicious pull request filename will flow into the
List all changed filesstep below.
- name: List all changed files
run: |
for file in ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}; do
echo "$file was changed"
done
Example output:
##[group]Run for file in $(whoami).txt; do
for file in $(whoami).txt; do
echo "$file was changed"
done
shell: /usr/bin/bash -e {0}
##[endgroup]
runner.txt was changed
Impact
This issue may lead to arbitrary command execution in the GitHub Runner.
Resolution
-
A new
safe_outputinput would be enabled by default and return filename paths escaping special characters like ;, ` (backtick), $, (), etc for bash environments. -
A safe recommendation of using environment variables to store unsafe outputs.
- name: List all changed files
env:
ALL_CHANGED_FILES: ${{ steps.changed-files.outputs.all_changed_files }}
run: |
for file in "$ALL_CHANGED_FILES"; do
echo "$file was changed"
done
Resources
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦GitHub Actions | tj-actions/changed-files | all versions | 41 |
Affected Products
changed-filestj-actionsResearch use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for tj-actions/changed-files, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update tj-actions/changed-files to 41 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-mcph-m25j-8j63 in your dependencies?
Find it across GitHub Actions, including transitive dependencies.