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🐍 PyPI

GHSA-m9jh-jf9h-x3h2

MEDIUM

OctoPrint vulnerable to possible file extraction via upload endpoints

Also known asCVE-2025-48067
Published
Jun 10, 2025
Updated
Jun 23, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk11th percentile+0.11%
0.00%0.24%0.47%0.71%0.0%0.2%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍octoprint

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

OctoPrint versions up until and including 1.11.1 contain a vulnerability that allows an attacker with the FILE_UPLOAD permission to exfiltrate files from the host that OctoPrint has read access to, by moving them into the upload folder where they then can be downloaded from.

The primary risk lies in the potential exfiltration of secrets stored inside OctoPrint's config, or further system files. By removing important runtime files, this could also be used to impact the availability of the host. Given that the attacker requires a user account with file upload permissions, the actual impact of this should however hopefully be minimal in most cases.

Patches

The vulnerability has been patched in version 1.11.2.

Details

A specially crafted HTTP Request to an affected upload endpoint that contains some form inputs only supposed to be used internally can be used to make OctoPrint move a file that it thinks is a freshly uploaded temporary one into its upload folder.

The following endpoints in OctoPrint are affected:

  • /api/files/{local|sdcard}
  • /api/languages
  • /plugin/backup/restore
  • /plugin/pluginmanager/upload_file

Further upload endpoints in third party plugins might be affected too.

The fix removes any internal-only form inputs from incoming requests in the central file upload processor component.

Credits

This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed to OctoPrint by Jacopo Tediosi

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIoctoprintall versions1.11.2

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for octoprint. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update octoprint to 1.11.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-m9jh-jf9h-x3h2 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-m9jh-jf9h-x3h2 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-m9jh-jf9h-x3h2. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact OctoPrint versions up until and including 1.11.1 contain a vulnerability that allows an attacker with the `FILE_UPLOAD` permission to exfiltrate files from the host that OctoPrint has read access to, by moving them into the upload folder where they then can be downloaded from. The primary risk lies in the potential exfiltration of secrets stored inside OctoPrint's config, or further system files. By removing important runtime files, this could also be used to impact the availability of the host. Given that the attacker requires a user account with file upload permissions, the actu
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-m9jh-jf9h-x3h2 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-m9jh-jf9h-x3h2 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.