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GHSA-m67g-87rx-v42c

MEDIUM

Calico Inserts Sensitive Information into Log File

Also known asCVE-2026-41185GO-2026-5891
Published
May 28, 2026
Updated
Jul 7, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk24th percentile0.00%
0.00%0.27%0.55%0.82%0.0%0.3%0.3%Jun 26Jul 26Jul 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/projectcalico/calico🐹github.com/projectcalico/calico

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

When Calico is configured with the Azure IPAM plugin, the Calico CNI binary mutates the incoming CNI configuration to attach subnet information before delegating to the IPAM plugin. After mutating, the Azure IPAM helper logs the entire unmarshaled configuration map (stdinData) at INFO level to /var/log/calico/cni/cni.log on every CNI ADD and DEL invocation — once per pod scheduled or terminated on the node. When the cluster is deployed using token-based Kubernetes authentication, this log entry contains the ServiceAccount token, client key, and certificate authority in plaintext. Any principal with read access to /var/log/calico/cni/cni.log on a node  can read these logs and extract the credentials, which grant cluster-wide Calico networking admin privileges.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/projectcalico/calico2.0.0&&< 3.31.63.31.6
🐹Gogithub.com/projectcalico/calicoall versions1.11.0-cni-plugin.0.20260417001138-cd73bc2cea0f

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/projectcalico/calico. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/projectcalico/calico to 3.31.6 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-m67g-87rx-v42c is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-m67g-87rx-v42c is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-m67g-87rx-v42c. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

When Calico is configured with the Azure IPAM plugin, the Calico CNI binary mutates the incoming CNI configuration to attach subnet information before delegating to the IPAM plugin. After mutating, the Azure IPAM helper logs the entire unmarshaled configuration map (stdinData) at INFO level to /var/log/calico/cni/cni.log on every CNI ADD and DEL invocation — once per pod scheduled or terminated on the node. When the cluster is deployed using token-based Kubernetes authentication, this log entry contains the ServiceAccount token, client key, and certificate authority in plaintext. Any principal
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-m67g-87rx-v42c in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-m67g-87rx-v42c across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.