GHSA-jwf4-8wf4-jf2m
OpenClaw: BlueBubbles (optional plugin) pairing/allowlist mismatch when allowFrom is empty
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.
openclawnpmDescription
Summary
BlueBubbles is an optional OpenClaw channel plugin. A configuration-sensitive access-control mismatch allowed DM senders to be treated as authorized when dmPolicy was pairing or allowlist and allowFrom was empty/unset.
Severity Rationale (Medium)
Severity is set to medium because:
- this affects an optional plugin, not core messaging surfaces;
- many deployments use owner-controlled/private BlueBubbles identities with limited external reachability;
- practical exploitability depends on an untrusted sender being able to reach that specific BlueBubbles account identifier.
In typical personal/self-hosted BlueBubbles setups, the mapped Apple identity is single-owner and not broadly reachable, so this is usually low practical risk.
Risk is higher in deployments where the identifier is publicly reachable and/or agent tool permissions are broad.
Technical Details
- BlueBubbles DM policy defaults to
pairing(dmPolicy ?? "pairing"). - Effective allowlist can be empty (
effectiveAllowFrom). - DM/reaction authorization called
isAllowedBlueBubblesSender(...). - That delegated to shared
isAllowedParsedChatSender(...), which previously returnedtruefor empty allowlists. - Result: unknown senders could bypass intended pairing/allowlist gating when
allowFromwas empty.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Vulnerable versions:
<= 2026.2.21-2 - Planned fixed version:
2026.2.22
Fix
The shared parsed-chat allowlist helper now fails closed on empty allowlists, restoring expected BlueBubbles DM gating behavior. BlueBubbles inbound gating was also refactored to use one shared DM/group decision helper for both message and reaction paths to reduce future drift.
Fix Commit(s)
9632b9bcf032c5f2280c3103961fde912ab1f9202ba6de7eaad812e5e8603018e14e54e96bdd57dd51c0893673de8e5cea64e64351dbfa4680ba0dec4540790cb62412676f7b61cfc6e47443f84a251e
OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | openclaw | all versions | 2026.2.22 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update openclaw to 2026.2.22 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-jwf4-8wf4-jf2m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-jwf4-8wf4-jf2m is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-jwf4-8wf4-jf2m. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-jwf4-8wf4-jf2m in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-jwf4-8wf4-jf2m across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.