GHSA-jwch-w7wh-gqjm
MEDIUMGHSA-jwch-w7wh-gqjm is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.8) remote code execution vulnerability in github.com/free5gc/udr. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-jwch-w7wh-gqjm is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
free5GC UDR: Fail-open handling in PolicyDataSubsToNotifyPost allows unintended subscription creation
Real-World Exposure
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Description
Summary
A fail-open request handling flaw in the UDR service causes the /nudr-dr/v2/policy-data/subs-to-notify POST handler to continue processing requests even after request body retrieval or deserialization errors.
This may allow unintended creation of Policy Data notification subscriptions with invalid, empty, or partially processed input, depending on downstream processor behavior.
Details
The endpoint POST /nudr-dr/v2/policy-data/subs-to-notify is intended to create a Policy Data notification subscription only after the HTTP request body has been successfully read and parsed into a valid PolicyDataSubscription object. [file:93]
In the free5GC UDR implementation, the function HandlePolicyDataSubsToNotifyPost in NFs/udr/internal/sbi/api_datarepository.go does not terminate execution after input-processing failures. [file:93]
The request flow is:
- The handler calls
c.GetRawData()to read the HTTP request body. [file:93] - If
GetRawData()fails, the handler sends an HTTP 500 error response, but does not return. [file:93] - The handler then calls
openapi.Deserialize(policyDataSubscription, reqBody, "application/json"). [file:93] - If deserialization fails, the handler sends an HTTP 400 error response, but again does not return. [file:93]
- Execution continues and the handler still invokes
s.Processor().PolicyDataSubsToNotifyPostProcedure(c,policyDataSubscription). [file:93]
As a result, the endpoint operates in a fail-open manner: request processing may continue after fatal input validation or body handling errors, instead of being safely aborted. [file:93]
This differs from safer handlers in the same file, which use a helper pattern that explicitly returns on body read or deserialization failure before calling the corresponding processor routine. [file:93]
Security Impact
This issue affects a write-capable API that creates Policy Data notification subscriptions. [file:93]
Because execution continues after body read or parsing failure, the processor may receive an uninitialized, partially initialized, or otherwise unintended PolicyDataSubscription object. [file:93]
The exact runtime impact depends on downstream processor behavior and storage validation. [file:93]
At minimum, this is a security-relevant robustness flaw that can lead to inconsistent request handling; under certain runtime conditions it may allow creation of invalid or unintended subscription state. [file:93]
Reproduction Status
The code path has been statically confirmed. [file:93] A complete runtime proof of unintended subscription creation after GetRawData() or deserialization failure has not yet been established. [file:93]
Patch
The handler should immediately terminate after sending an error response for body read or deserialization failure. [file:93]
A minimal fix is to add missing return statements in HandlePolicyDataSubsToNotifyPost:
reqBody, err := c.GetRawData()
if err != nil {
logger.DataRepoLog.Errorf("Get Request Body error: %+v", err)
pd := openapi.ProblemDetailsSystemFailure(err.Error())
c.Set(sbi.IN_PB_DETAILS_CTX_STR, pd.Cause)
c.JSON(http.StatusInternalServerError, pd)
return
}
err = openapi.Deserialize(&policyDataSubscription, reqBody, "application/json")
if err != nil {
logger.DataRepoLog.Errorf("Deserialize Request Body error: %+v", err)
pd := util.ProblemDetailsMalformedReqSyntax(err.Error())
c.Set(sbi.IN_PB_DETAILS_CTX_STR, pd.Cause)
c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, pd)
return
}
Additionally, the deserialization call should pass a pointer to the destination object so that the parsed body is written into the intended structure. [file:93]
###Details
The issue is compounded by the handler's deserialization call, which passes
policyDataSubscription directly to openapi.Deserialize(...) instead of
passing a pointer to the destination object. This inconsistent usage further
increases the risk that request processing continues with an empty, partially
initialized, or otherwise unintended subscription object. [file:93]
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/free5gc/udr | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/free5gc/udr. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of github.com/free5gc/udr has shipped for GHSA-jwch-w7wh-gqjm yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-jwch-w7wh-gqjm is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-jwch-w7wh-gqjm. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-jwch-w7wh-gqjm in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-jwch-w7wh-gqjm across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.