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🐘 Packagist

GHSA-jv8r-hv7q-p6vc

MEDIUM

phpMyFAQ has Stored XSS in user list via admin-managed display_name

Also known asCVE-2025-68951
Published
Dec 29, 2025
Updated
Feb 3, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk14th percentile+0.21%
0.00%0.24%0.49%0.73%0.0%0.2%Jan 26Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐘thorsten/phpmyfaq

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript in an administrator’s browser by registering a user whose display name contains HTML entities (e.g., <img ...>). When an administrator views the admin user list, the payload is decoded server-side and rendered without escaping, resulting in script execution in the admin context.

Details

Root cause is the following chain:

  • User-controlled input stored: attacker-provided display_name (real name) is stored in DB (often as HTML entities, e.g., <img ...>).
  • Decode on read: phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/User/UserData.php decodes display_name using html_entity_decode(...) (“for backward compatibility”).
  • Unsafe sink: admin user list renders the decoded value unescaped using Twig |raw:
    • phpmyfaq/assets/templates/admin/user/users.twig (users table uses {{ user.display_name|raw }})

As a result, an entity-encoded payload becomes active HTML/JS when rendered in the admin user list.

Note: This report is about the display_name field + entity-decoding path. It is distinct from previously published issues focused on the email field.

PoC (minimal reproduction)

Preconditions / configuration

  • Registration enabled (security.enableRegistration = true).
  • Attacker does not need admin privileges.
  • Admin must view the admin user list page.

Steps

  1. As an unauthenticated user, open the registration page and create a new account.
  2. Set the display name / real name field to the following entity-encoded payload:
    • <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
  3. Complete registration.
  4. As an administrator, open the admin user list (example):
    • http://127.0.0.1:8080/admin/user/list
  5. Observe JavaScript execution in the admin’s browser (e.g., alert(1) triggers) and the payload is rendered as an actual <img> element.

Impact

Stored XSS in the admin context can enable:

  • admin session compromise (depending on cookie flags),
  • CSRF token exfiltration and privileged admin actions,
  • UI redress/phishing within the admin panel.

Evidence (what I observed)

  • Stored DB value (entities): &lt;img src=x onerror=alert(1)&gt;
  • Rendered HTML in admin user list: <img src="x" onerror="alert(1)">

Affected versions

Confirmed by code inspection

  • 4.0.14
  • 4.0.15
    • Both contain html_entity_decode for display_name in UserData.php and {{ user.display_name|raw }} in users.twig.

Confirmed by live reproduction

  • 4.1.0-RC (tested on current source checkout)

Environment (tested)

  • Host OS: macOS 15.6.1 (24G90)
  • Web container OS: Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm)
  • PHP: 8.4.5RC1
  • DB: MariaDB 11.6.2
  • phpMyFAQ source commit (tested): bca1c4192c2ad61a3595b4289d9551a51e0e9848

Contact / Credit

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐘Packagistthorsten/phpmyfaq4.0.14&&< 4.0.164.0.16

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for thorsten/phpmyfaq. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update thorsten/phpmyfaq to 4.0.16 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-jv8r-hv7q-p6vc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-jv8r-hv7q-p6vc is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-jv8r-hv7q-p6vc. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript in an administrator’s browser by registering a user whose **display name** contains HTML entities (e.g., `&lt;img ...&gt;`). When an administrator views the admin user list, the payload is decoded server-side and rendered without escaping, resulting in script execution in the admin context. ### Details Root cause is the following chain: - **User-controlled input stored**: attacker-provided `display_name` (real name) is stored in DB (often as HTML entities, e.g., `&lt;img ...&gt;`).
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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