GHSA-jv46-xfwm-36j7 is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.1) Improper Authentication vulnerability in relyra. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-jv46-xfwm-36j7 is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Relyra SAML SignatureValue not cryptographically verified -> authentication bypass
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-jv46-xfwm-36j7.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-jv46-xfwm-36j7 plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 0 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
relyraReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Hex packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Relyra 1.0.0 and 1.1.0 accept forged SAML signatures because SignatureValue was not cryptographically verified before the library returned a successful authentication result.
Details
In 1.0.0 and 1.1.0, the XMLDSig trust boundary was incomplete. :public_key.verify over the exclusive-C14N canonicalized SignedInfo was not performed against the configured IdP certificate's public key, DigestValue was not recomputed over the canonicalized referenced element, and canonicalize/2 remained an unused passthrough in the signature-verification path. The result was a structure-only acceptance path where document shape and trust-source rejection could succeed without proving the signature bytes.
Impact
A forged SignatureValue carrying an attacker-controlled NameID can be accepted as {:ok}. Any relying-party application using Relyra 1.0.0 or 1.1.0 can be logged into as an arbitrary user if it trusts the affected response path.
Patches
Relyra 1.2.0 closes the gap with real exclusive-C14N canonicalization, :public_key.verify against the configured IdP certificate's public key, and a constant-time DigestValue recompute/compare bound to the exact consumed node on both verify/4 and verify_metadata_root/4.
Workarounds
There is no safe configuration of 1.0.0 or 1.1.0. Upgrade to 1.2.0 or later.
Resources
- Fix commit
2e45689(wire real XMLDSig crypto into the candidate arm) - Fix commit
8910200(close metadata trust bypass, pin over DER) - Regression proof:
test/security/xml/adversarial_crypto_test.exs,test/relyra/metadata/auto_refresh_test.exs,test/security/ci_gate_integrity_test.exs
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 💧Hex | relyra | ≥ 1.0.0&&< 1.2.0 | 1.2.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for relyra. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update relyra to 1.2.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-jv46-xfwm-36j7 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-jv46-xfwm-36j7 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-jv46-xfwm-36j7. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-jv46-xfwm-36j7 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-jv46-xfwm-36j7 across Hex dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.