GHSA-jp3w-3q88-34cf
Miscomputation when performing AES encryption in rust-crypto
Blast Radius
rust-cryptoReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects crates.io packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
The following Rust program demonstrates some strangeness in AES encryption - if you have an immutable key slice and then operate on that slice, you get different encryption output than if you operate on a copy of that key.
For these functions, we expect that extending a 16 byte key to a 32 byte key by repeating it gives the same encrypted data, because the underlying rust-crypto functions repeat key data up to the necessary key size for the cipher.
use crypto::{
aes, blockmodes, buffer,
buffer::{BufferResult, ReadBuffer, WriteBuffer},
symmetriccipher,
};
fn encrypt(
key: &[u8],
iv: &[u8],
data: &str,
) -> Result<String, symmetriccipher::SymmetricCipherError> {
let mut encryptor =
aes::cbc_encryptor(aes::KeySize::KeySize256, key, iv, blockmodes::PkcsPadding);
let mut encrypted_data = Vec::<u8>::new();
let mut read_buffer = buffer::RefReadBuffer::new(data.as_bytes());
let mut buffer = [0; 4096];
let mut write_buffer = buffer::RefWriteBuffer::new(&mut buffer);
loop {
let result = encryptor.encrypt(&mut read_buffer, &mut write_buffer, true)?;
encrypted_data.extend(
write_buffer
.take_read_buffer()
.take_remaining()
.iter()
.copied(),
);
match result {
BufferResult::BufferUnderflow => break,
BufferResult::BufferOverflow => {}
}
}
Ok(hex::encode(encrypted_data))
}
fn working() {
let data = "data";
let iv = [
0xF0, 0xF1, 0xF2, 0xF3, 0xF4, 0xF5, 0xF6, 0xF7, 0xF8, 0xF9, 0xFA, 0xFB, 0xFC, 0xFD, 0xFE,
0xFF,
];
let key = [
0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E,
0x0F,
];
// The copy here makes the code work.
let key_copy = key;
let key2: Vec<u8> = key_copy.iter().cycle().take(32).copied().collect();
println!("key1:{} key2: {}", hex::encode(&key), hex::encode(&key2));
let x1 = encrypt(&key, &iv, data).unwrap();
println!("X1: {}", x1);
let x2 = encrypt(&key2, &iv, data).unwrap();
println!("X2: {}", x2);
assert_eq!(x1, x2);
}
fn broken() {
let data = "data";
let iv = [
0xF0, 0xF1, 0xF2, 0xF3, 0xF4, 0xF5, 0xF6, 0xF7, 0xF8, 0xF9, 0xFA, 0xFB, 0xFC, 0xFD, 0xFE,
0xFF,
];
let key = [
0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E,
0x0F,
];
// This operation shouldn't affect the contents of key at all.
let key2: Vec<u8> = key.iter().cycle().take(32).copied().collect();
println!("key1:{} key2: {}", hex::encode(&key), hex::encode(&key2));
let x1 = encrypt(&key, &iv, data).unwrap();
println!("X1: {}", x1);
let x2 = encrypt(&key2, &iv, data).unwrap();
println!("X2: {}", x2);
assert_eq!(x1, x2);
}
fn main() {
working();
broken();
}
The output from this program:
Running `target/host/debug/rust-crypto-test`
key1:000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f key2: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
X1: 90462bbe32965c8e7ea0addbbed4cddb
X2: 90462bbe32965c8e7ea0addbbed4cddb
key1:000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f key2: 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f
X1: 26e847e5e7df1947bf82a650548a7d5b
X2: 90462bbe32965c8e7ea0addbbed4cddb
thread 'main' panicked at 'assertion failed: `(left == right)`
left: `"26e847e5e7df1947bf82a650548a7d5b"`,
right: `"90462bbe32965c8e7ea0addbbed4cddb"`', src/main.rs:83:5
Notably, the X1 key in the broken() test changes every time after rerunning the program.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🦀crates.io | rust-crypto | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for rust-crypto. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Remediation status
No patched version of rust-crypto has shipped for GHSA-jp3w-3q88-34cf yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-jp3w-3q88-34cf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-jp3w-3q88-34cf. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-jp3w-3q88-34cf in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-jp3w-3q88-34cf across crates.io dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.