GHSA-jjgp-whrp-gq8m — in-toto
GHSA-jjgp-whrp-gq8m is a security vulnerability in in-toto. No vendor fix is recorded yet; mitigation options are listed below.
in-toto: PGP trust model not (fully) considered
Real-World Exposure
in-totoReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
This security advisory lists multiple concerns about how in-toto uses PGP keys. The findings are aggregated here, because they are all eligible to the same mitigation strategy. Note that the findings are rated with different severities (see inline) and the highest score was chosen for this advisory:
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PGP Key Creation Time Not Validated (severity: low) in-toto does not check, if the validity period of a PGP Key (starting with the key creation time) is in the future, when copying the key from GnuPG to a layout, or when verifying signatures. A validity period in the future is usually a sign of a wrong system clock, meaning it can’t be trusted for verifying the validity period. A MITM attacker who is able to manipulate delivered software products might also be able to control the system time by manipulating NTP. In a scenario where an attacker gained control over two expired subkeys with no overlapping validity period, the attacker could set the system time to a time before the validity period of either key, resulting in both keys being accepted.
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PGP Key Revocation Not Considered (severity: medium) in-toto does not check PGP revocation signatures, when copying the key from GnuPG to a layout, or when verifying signatures. This means that a key may still be accepted in signatures, even if it has been revoked in GnuPG.
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PGP Key Usage Flags Not Considered (severity: low) in-toto does not check PGP usage flags, when copying the key from GnuPG to a layout, or when verifying signatures. This means that at a key may still be accepted in signatures, even if it is not permitted to sign data as per its key usage flags.
Security auditors recommend to verify these properties at signature verification time.
However, this is not planned, as in-toto does not rely on PGP’s trust model, because it should not be required to consult with a separate PKI/web-of-trust at verification time. Instead the project owner establishes ultimate trust by adding a PGP public key to a layout, and thus is responsible for its validity, and also to revoke the layout, if the key is no longer trusted. The same is true for PGP public keys used to verify a layout.
The preferred mitigation strategy is to verify these properties when exporting a public key from GnuPG, and to clarify usage documentation that no verification against the PGP trust model is performed afterwards.
References
- "Handle GPG revocation signatures" -- https://github.com/secure-systems-lab/securesystemslib/issues/190
- "inconsistent use of GnuPG" -- https://github.com/in-toto/in-toto/issues/569
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | in-toto | all versions | No fix |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for in-toto, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Remediation status
No patched version of in-toto has shipped for GHSA-jjgp-whrp-gq8m yet. Where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range, and apply any maintainer-recommended mitigation.
Mitigate without a patch
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-jjgp-whrp-gq8m can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-jjgp-whrp-gq8m. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-jjgp-whrp-gq8m in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-jjgp-whrp-gq8m across PyPI dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.