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in-toto: PGP trust model not (fully) consideredGHSA-jjgp-whrp-gq8m

GHSA-jjgp-whrp-gq8m is a security vulnerability in in-toto. The records list no fixed version yet; check the vendor advisory below and apply the mitigations in the meantime.

Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
None yet
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 30, 2024 · OSV.dev, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐍in-toto

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

This security advisory lists multiple concerns about how in-toto uses PGP keys. The findings are aggregated here, because they are all eligible to the same mitigation strategy. Note that the findings are rated with different severities (see inline) and the highest score was chosen for this advisory:

  • PGP Key Creation Time Not Validated (severity: low) in-toto does not check, if the validity period of a PGP Key (starting with the key creation time) is in the future, when copying the key from GnuPG to a layout, or when verifying signatures. A validity period in the future is usually a sign of a wrong system clock, meaning it can’t be trusted for verifying the validity period. A MITM attacker who is able to manipulate delivered software products might also be able to control the system time by manipulating NTP. In a scenario where an attacker gained control over two expired subkeys with no overlapping validity period, the attacker could set the system time to a time before the validity period of either key, resulting in both keys being accepted.

  • PGP Key Revocation Not Considered (severity: medium) in-toto does not check PGP revocation signatures, when copying the key from GnuPG to a layout, or when verifying signatures. This means that a key may still be accepted in signatures, even if it has been revoked in GnuPG.

  • PGP Key Usage Flags Not Considered (severity: low) in-toto does not check PGP usage flags, when copying the key from GnuPG to a layout, or when verifying signatures. This means that at a key may still be accepted in signatures, even if it is not permitted to sign data as per its key usage flags.

Security auditors recommend to verify these properties at signature verification time.

However, this is not planned, as in-toto does not rely on PGP’s trust model, because it should not be required to consult with a separate PKI/web-of-trust at verification time. Instead the project owner establishes ultimate trust by adding a PGP public key to a layout, and thus is responsible for its validity, and also to revoke the layout, if the key is no longer trusted. The same is true for PGP public keys used to verify a layout.

The preferred mitigation strategy is to verify these properties when exporting a public key from GnuPG, and to clarify usage documentation that no verification against the PGP trust model is performed afterwards.

References

Affected Packages

1 total
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIin-totoall versionsNo fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for in-toto, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Remediation status

    The records we use list no patched version of in-toto for GHSA-jjgp-whrp-gq8m. Check the maintainer's advisory, and where your build allows, override or pin the dependency away from the vulnerable range.

  3. Mitigate without a patch

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact This security advisory lists multiple concerns about how in-toto uses PGP keys. The findings are aggregated here, because they are all eligible to the same mitigation strategy. Note that the findings are rated with different severities (see inline) and the highest score was chosen for this advisory: - **PGP Key Creation Time Not Validated** (severity: low) in-toto does not check, if the validity period of a PGP Key (starting with the key creation time) is in the future, when copying the key from GnuPG to a layout, or when verifying signatures. A validity period in the future is
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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in-toto: PGP trust model not (fully) considered