GHSA-jc6x-rj79-w4mx — CoreWCF.Primitives
MEDIUMGHSA-jc6x-rj79-w4mx is a medium-severity (CVSS 5.9) CWE-347 vulnerability in CoreWCF.Primitives. A fix is available for CoreWCF.Primitives — see the affected versions and patch details below.
CoreWCF: WS-Security signature substitution via document-wide Signature lookup
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-jc6x-rj79-w4mx.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
How urgent is this, really
GHSA-jc6x-rj79-w4mx plotted by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). The shaded corner — EPSS 50%+ and CVSS 7.0+ — is where this CVE doesn't sit, though severity or exploitability alone can still warrant action.
Where this sits among everything scored
Of 374,847 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Real counts from FIRST.org, not a sample — log-scaled since the landscape is heavily right-skewed.
Real-World Exposure
CoreWCF.Primitives.NETCoreWCF.PrimitivesReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects NuGet packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Impact
An unauthenticated remote attacker who can place a SOAP header lexically before wsse:Security can embed a ds:Signature of their choosing inside that header and cause the server to verify the attacker-supplied signature instead of the one carried in the security header.
Preconditions
Exploitation requires the endpoint be configured with an endorsing supporting token binding, and the attacker constructs a ds:Signature whose KeyInfo resolves through the receive-side token resolver to a key under the attacker’s control. Both are conditions outside the attacker’s direct control on a generic deployment.
Patches
Fixed in CoreWCF v1.8.1 and v1.9.1
Workarounds
Use a security token resolver that only accepts references to issuer-pinned X.509 chains (the default when expecting a static set of signing certificates).
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| .NETNuGet | CoreWCF.Primitives | all versions | 1.8.1dotnet add package CoreWCF.Primitives --version 1.8.1 |
| .NETNuGet | CoreWCF.Primitives | ≥ 1.9.0&&< 1.9.1 | 1.9.1dotnet add package CoreWCF.Primitives --version 1.9.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for CoreWCF.Primitives, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update CoreWCF.Primitives to 1.8.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-jc6x-rj79-w4mx is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 Security's impact-aware SCA analyses which vulnerable code paths your application actually calls, so a match like GHSA-jc6x-rj79-w4mx can be triaged on real exposure rather than presence alone.
Tailored to GHSA-jc6x-rj79-w4mx. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-jc6x-rj79-w4mx in your dependencies?
O3 Security finds GHSA-jc6x-rj79-w4mx across NuGet dependencies, including transitive ones, and its impact-aware SCA ranks findings by whether your code actually calls the vulnerable path.