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n8n-MCP: Cross-tenant access to workflow version backups in multi-tenant HTTP deploymentsGHSA-j6r7-6fhx-77wx

CRITICAL

GHSA-j6r7-6fhx-77wx is a critical-severity (CVSS 9.9) CWE-639 vulnerability in n8n-mcp. A fix is available for n8n-mcp — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-54052
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 13, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • A successful exploit gives an attacker total control of the affected component, not partial access.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-j6r7-6fhx-77wx.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs31th percentile — riskier than 31% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.30%0.59%0.89%0.4%0.4%0.4%Sep 26Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

GHSA-j6r7-6fhx-77wx by exploitation likelihood (EPSS) against impact (CVSS). Outside the shaded patch-first corner.

Where this sits among everything scored

Of 386,684 CVEs with a current EPSS score, this one falls in the < 10% band (highlighted). Counts from FIRST.org, log-scaled.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

0other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
n8n-mcpnpm
52Kdownloads / week

Description

Impact

In multi-tenant HTTP deployments — where a single n8n-mcp server serves several tenants — the locally stored workflow version history (the automatic backups taken before workflow updates) was not isolated per tenant. An authenticated tenant could read workflow version snapshots belonging to other tenants, and could delete or destroy other tenants' stored backups.

A stored snapshot includes full node definitions, so the exposed data can contain credential references and authorization headers configured on nodes. This is therefore a confidentiality issue in addition to an integrity/availability one.

Affected configurations

  • HTTP mode with multi-tenancy enabled (ENABLE_MULTI_TENANT=true), where multiple tenants are served by a single shared instance and database.

Not affected:

  • stdio / single-user deployments (e.g. Claude Desktop).
  • Single-tenant HTTP deployments (one tenant per instance and database).

Affected versions

<= 2.56.0

Patched version

2.56.1. The stored version history is now isolated per instance, so a tenant can only access its own backups. Upgrading runs a one-time migration that isolates existing history and clears previously stored, un-scoped backups (these are auto-created, short-retention backups).

Workarounds

If users cannot upgrade immediately:

  • Disable the workflow version tool by setting DISABLED_TOOLS=n8n_workflow_versions in the server environment (for example, in your Docker .env). This removes the affected tool from the deployment for all tenants; automatic backups are unaffected, but the cross-tenant access path is closed.
  • Alternatively, do not run in multi-tenant mode — serve each tenant from a separate instance with its own database, so no local store is shared between tenants.
  • Restrict network access to the HTTP endpoint to trusted operators.

stdio and single-tenant HTTP deployments are not affected.

Credit

Reported by Francisco Rosales (@0xmagic0) and coordinated by Ax Sharma (@axsharma) of Manifold Security.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmn8n-mcpall versions2.56.1npm install n8n-mcp@2.56.1

Affected Products

1 product · 1 configurations
Application
n8n-mcpn8n-mcp
< 2.56.1
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for n8n-mcp, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update n8n-mcp to 2.56.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-j6r7-6fhx-77wx is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Impact In multi-tenant HTTP deployments — where a single n8n-mcp server serves several tenants — the locally stored workflow version history (the automatic backups taken before workflow updates) was not isolated per tenant. An authenticated tenant could read workflow version snapshots belonging to other tenants, and could delete or destroy other tenants' stored backups. A stored snapshot includes full node definitions, so the exposed data can contain credential references and authorization headers configured on nodes. This is therefore a confidentiality issue in addition to an integrity/a
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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