Juju: Read All Controller Logs From Compromised WorkloadGHSA-j6f6-jp3p-53mw
MEDIUMFix: juju/juju@22cdcf6GHSA-j6f6-jp3p-53mw is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.9) CWE-863 vulnerability in github.com/juju/juju. A fix is available for github.com/juju/juju — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-j6f6-jp3p-53mw.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
github.com/juju/jujuReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
It is possible that a compromised workload machine under a Juju controller can read any log file for any entity in any model at any level.
There is a debug log endpoint in the API server that allows streaming of logs off of the controller. To access this endpoint you must be authentication and either be a machine agent, controller agent, controller admin or have model read permission.
The problematic is the machine agent story. The rest of the other checks have a high enough degree of safety that an attacker can not move side ways in the controller when obtaining log files.
Details
A compromised workload machine is capable of obtaining logs for both the controller and any model under the controller at any log level they wish. A bad actor can use this information as signal for further attacks or possible gain secret information leaked out in debug and trace logs. On top of this they would also be able to receive the logs from the charm itself for which we have no control over.
- here is where the authorizer is defined for the endpoint.
- here is where the authorizer is checked.
- here and onwards is the amount of information the attacker can gain access to.
PoC
If an attacker compromises a workload machine, they will have access to the agent.conf file containing the credentials. This can then be used to obtain debug logs for any part of the controller.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/juju/juju | all versions | 0.0.0-20250623030540-c91a1f404695go get github.com/juju/juju@v0.0.0-20250623030540-c91a1f404695 |
Affected Products
jujucanonicalDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/juju/juju, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/juju/juju to 0.0.0-20250623030540-c91a1f404695 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-j6f6-jp3p-53mw is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Put an independent control in front of the weakness: restrict the affected endpoint or interface to trusted networks, require an additional authentication factor or proxy-level check, and invalidate existing sessions and credentials in case the flaw has already been used.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-j6f6-jp3p-53mw in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.