How severe is GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf?

No CVSS score has been assigned to GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf yet. Review the advisory details and affected package list to assess your exposure.

Which packages are affected by GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf?

GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf affects the following packages: openclaw (npm). Ecosystems affected: npm.

How do I fix GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf?

Update openclaw to 2026.2.25 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

How do I detect GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf in my npm dependencies?

Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

How do I mitigate GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf if there is no patch (or I can't update yet)?

If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

How does O3 Security protect against GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf?

O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Is GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf actively exploited in the wild?

No public exploit code has been indexed for GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf yet. This does not mean the vulnerability cannot be exploited — absence of public exploits does not imply safety. Apply the recommended fix and use O3 Security to monitor your exposure.

When was GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf published, and has it been updated?

GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf was published on March 3, 2026 and was last updated on March 4, 2026. Advisory data evolves as severity scores, affected ranges, and exploit intelligence are revised — always check the latest version of the advisory before acting.

📦 npm

GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf

OpenClaw: MS Teams fileConsent/invoke missing conversation binding allowed cross-conversation pending-upload consumption

Published

Mar 3, 2026

Updated

Mar 4, 2026

Affected

1 pkg

Patched

1 / 1

Exploits

None indexed

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

openclawnpm

4.3Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

In openclaw MS Teams file-consent flow, pending uploads were authorized by uploadId alone. fileConsent/invoke did not verify the invoke conversation against the conversation that created the pending upload.

Impact

An attacker who obtained a valid uploadId within TTL could trigger cross-conversation upload completion (accept path) or cancel a victim pending upload (decline path).

Technical Details

Pending uploads stored conversationId, but invoke handling consumed by uploadId only.
The invoke path did not enforce conversation binding before uploadToConsentUrl(...) and pending-upload removal.
Fix binds accept/decline handling to normalized conversation id match before consuming pending upload state.

Affected Packages / Versions

Package: openclaw (npm)
Latest published npm version (as of February 26, 2026): 2026.2.24
Vulnerable range: <= 2026.2.24
Patched in release: 2026.2.25

Remediation

Upgrade to openclaw 2026.2.25 (or later) once published.

Fix Commit(s)

347f7b9550064f5f5b33c6e07f64e85b9657b6f1

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the release (2026.2.25). Advisory published with npm release 2026.2.25.

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed

Ecosystem	Package	Vulnerable range	Fix
📦npm	`openclaw`	all versions	2026.2.25

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency

Detect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update openclaw to 2026.2.25 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary In `openclaw` MS Teams file-consent flow, pending uploads were authorized by `uploadId` alone. `fileConsent/invoke` did not verify the invoke conversation against the conversation that created the pending upload. ### Impact An attacker who obtained a valid `uploadId` within TTL could trigger cross-conversation upload completion (accept path) or cancel a victim pending upload (decline path). ### Technical Details - Pending uploads stored `conversationId`, but invoke handling consumed by `uploadId` only. - The invoke path did not enforce conversation binding before `uploadToConsent

O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-j26j-7qc4-3mrf across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.

Scan my dependencies How O3 SCA works