GHSA-hrr4-3wgr-68x3
Navidrome affected by Denial of Service and disk exhaustion via oversized `size` parameter in `/rest/getCoverArt` and `/share/img/<token>` endpoints
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/navidrome/navidromeReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
Authenticated users can crash the Navidrome server by supplying an excessively large size parameter to /rest/getCoverArt or to a shared-image URL (/share/img/<token>). When processing such requests, the server attempts to create an extremely large resized image, causing uncontrolled memory growth. This triggers the Linux OOM killer, terminates the Navidrome process, and results in a full service outage.
If the system has sufficient memory and survives the allocation, Navidrome then writes these extremely large resized images into its cache directory, allowing an attacker to rapidly exhaust server disk space as well.
Details
Both /rest/getCoverArt and /share/img/<token> accept a size parameter that is passed directly into the image processing routine without any upper bound validation. When a very large integer is provided, Navidrome attempts to generate a resized image of that size. This leads to excessive memory allocation inside the image resizing path.
In the /rest/getCoverArt handler, the value is read as:
size := p.IntOr("size", 0)
imgReader, lastUpdate, err := api.artwork.GetOrPlaceholder(ctx, id, size, square)
Because no limit is enforced, the image subsystem receives the supplied value as-is. When the requested size is extremely large, the process consumes large amounts of RAM until it is killed by the kernel's OOM killer. If the system has enough available memory to complete the resize operation, the resulting oversized image is then written to Navidrome's cache directory, which can quickly fill the server's disk.
The same behavior is reachable through /share/img/<token> as long as the attacker possesses a valid sharing token.
PoC
- Authenticate normally to obtain access to
/rest/getCoverArtor a valid sharing link containing a/share/img/<token>URL. - Send a regular request with a small size value, for example:
/rest/getCoverArt?...&size=300&square=true
- Replace the
sizeparameter with a very large number, such as:
/rest/getCoverArt?...&size=300000&square=true
- The server rapidly allocates memory while attempting to create an oversized image. This leads to the Navidrome process being terminated by the OOM killer.
- The same behavior can be reproduced with a valid shared-image link:
/share/img/<token>?size=300000&square=true
If the system does not run out of memory, the oversized resized image is written to the cache directory, causing disk usage to grow quickly.
Impact
Supplying an excessively large size parameter to /rest/getCoverArt or /share/img/<token> allows any authenticated user to trigger a Denial of Service condition. During image resizing, the server attempts to allocate extremely large amounts of memory, which can cause not only Navidrome itself to be terminated by the OOM killer, but in some configurations may also destabilize or crash the entire host system.
On systems with sufficient memory, the oversized resized images are written to Navidrome's cache directory instead, allowing an attacker to rapidly consume all available disk space. This leads to a second form of Denial of Service, where the host becomes unable to write logs, operate dependent services, or perform basic system tasks due to storage exhaustion.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/navidrome/navidrome | all versions | 0.60.0 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/navidrome/navidrome. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/navidrome/navidrome to 0.60.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-hrr4-3wgr-68x3 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-hrr4-3wgr-68x3 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-hrr4-3wgr-68x3. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-hrr4-3wgr-68x3 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-hrr4-3wgr-68x3 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.