PPTAgent: Arbitrary File Write + Directory Creation via markdown_table_to_imageGHSA-hrcw-xc63-g29m
MEDIUMFix: icip-cas/PPTAgent@418491aGHSA-hrcw-xc63-g29m is a medium-severity (CVSS 4.6) Path Traversal vulnerability in pptagent. A fix is available for pptagent — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-hrcw-xc63-g29m.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
pptagentReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The markdown_table_to_image tool accepts a caller-controlled path parameter and passes it directly to get_html_table_image:
# pptagent/mcp_server.py:127-143
def markdown_table_to_image(markdown_table: str, path: str, css: str) -> str:
"""
Args:
path (str): The file path where the image will be saved
"""
html = markdown_to_html(markdown_table)
get_html_table_image(html, path, css) # ← no path validation
return f"Markdown table converted to image and saved to {path}"
# pptagent/utils.py:337-366
def get_html_table_image(html: str, output_path: str, css: str = None):
parent_dir, base_name = os.path.split(output_path)
if parent_dir and not os.path.exists(parent_dir):
os.makedirs(parent_dir) # ← creates arbitrary directories
hti = Html2Image(...)
hti.screenshot(
html_str=html,
css_str=css,
save_as=base_name, # ← writes image to any directory
size=(1000, 600),
)
os.makedirs(parent_dir) creates arbitrary directory trees, and Html2Image.screenshot writes the rendered image to parent_dir/base_name. Unlike download_file in the same project, there is no is_relative_to(workspace) guard. This behaviour can be fixed with the same pattern as the above.
Impact
The concrete attack scenarios include
- SSH key replacement:
path = "/home/user/.ssh/authorized_keys"— replaces the authorized_keys file with an image binary (breaks - SSH but could be an image crafted with a specific PNG/JPEG payload). - Web shell:
path = "/var/www/html/uploads/shell.php"— writes the rendered PNG there; the file has the .php extension but PNG content; combined with Apache Options +MultiViews or file-include vulnerabilities could be dangerous. - Directory creation oracle:
path = "/root/test/probe.png"— if the directory is created, confirms the target path exists; if it errors, reveals permissions information.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | pptagent | all versions | 1.1.36pip install --upgrade 'pptagent==1.1.36' |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pptagent, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update pptagent to 1.1.36 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-hrcw-xc63-g29m is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Resolve every user-supplied path to its canonical form and reject anything that escapes the intended directory, and run the component under an account that has no read or write access outside the directory it legitimately serves.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-hrcw-xc63-g29m in your dependencies?
Find it across PyPI, including transitive dependencies.