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📦 npm

GHSA-hjvp-qhm6-wrh2

LOW

OpenClaw Node system.run approval context-binding weakness in approval-enabled host=node flows

Also known asCVE-2026-32058
Published
Mar 2, 2026
Updated
Mar 30, 2026
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk9th percentile+0.15%
0.00%0.23%0.46%0.69%0.0%0.0%0.0%0.2%Apr 26Jun 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected

Weekly download volume for affected packages — a proxy for how broadly this vulnerability is deployed.

openclawnpm
4.4Mdownloads / week

Description

Summary

In approval-enabled host=node workflows, system.run approvals did not always carry a strict, versioned execution-context binding. In uncommon setups that rely on these approvals as an integrity guardrail, a previously approved request could be reused with changed env input.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: npm openclaw
  • Latest published npm version at triage: 2026.2.25
  • Affected range: <= 2026.2.25
  • Planned fixed version (next npm release): 2026.2.26

Preconditions / Typical Exposure

This requires all of the following:

  • system.run usage through host=node
  • Exec approvals enabled and used as an execution-integrity control
  • Access to an approval id in the same context

Most default single-operator local setups do not rely on this path, so practical exposure is typically lower.

Details

Approval matching now uses a required versioned binding (systemRunBindingV1) over command argv, cwd, agent/session context, and env hash.

The fix:

  • Requires commandArgv when requesting host=node approvals.
  • Requires systemRunBindingV1 when consuming approvals for node system.run.
  • Removes legacy non-versioned fallback matching and fails closed on missing/mismatched bindings.
  • Keeps env mismatch handling explicit and blocks GIT_EXTERNAL_DIFF in host env policy.
  • Adds/updates regression and contract coverage for mismatch mapping and binding rules.

Impact

Configuration-dependent approval-integrity weakness in node-host exec approval flows. Severity remains medium because exploitation depends on this specific approval mode and context.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 10481097f8e6dd0346db9be0b5f27570e1bdfcfa

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (2026.2.26) so once npm release 2026.2.26 is published, the advisory can be published without further metadata edits.

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmopenclawall versions2026.2.26

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openclaw. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update openclaw to 2026.2.26 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-hjvp-qhm6-wrh2 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-hjvp-qhm6-wrh2 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-hjvp-qhm6-wrh2. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary In approval-enabled `host=node` workflows, `system.run` approvals did not always carry a strict, versioned execution-context binding. In uncommon setups that rely on these approvals as an integrity guardrail, a previously approved request could be reused with changed env input. ### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: npm `openclaw` - Latest published npm version at triage: `2026.2.25` - Affected range: `<= 2026.2.25` - Planned fixed version (next npm release): `2026.2.26` ### Preconditions / Typical Exposure This requires all of the following: - `system.run` usage through `ho
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-hjvp-qhm6-wrh2 in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-hjvp-qhm6-wrh2 across npm dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.