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n8n: Unauthenticated Persistent Storage Exhaustion via OAuth Dynamic Client Registration EndpointGHSA-hh89-3r9w-qj3j

GHSA-hh89-3r9w-qj3j is a CWE-770 vulnerability in n8n. A fix is available for n8n — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-86075
Published
Updated
Affected
2 pkgs
Patched
2 / 2
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Oct 23, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-hh89-3r9w-qj3j.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.6%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs49th percentile — riskier than 49% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.11%0.44%0.78%1.11%0.6%0.6%Oct 26Oct 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

2 pkgs affected

How broadly this vulnerability is actually deployed: weekly install volume shows current usage, and reverse-dependency count shows how many other packages break if it stays unpatched.

36other npm packages depend on this — each one inherits the vulnerability until it's patched upstream
n8nnpm
80Kdownloads / week

Description

Impact

The OAuth Dynamic Client Registration endpoints validated field sizes only for redirect_uris, leaving client_name and grant_types bounded by presence checks alone. An unauthenticated remote caller could submit arbitrarily large values in either field and have them persisted to the database. Repeated registration therefore grew persistent storage without limit and without any account on the instance. The patch caps client_name at its column length and limits grant_types to the grant types the server actually implements, with the array capped at that count.

Patches

The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.37.7 and 2.38.2. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:

  • Restrict network access to the n8n instance so that only trusted clients can reach it.
  • Place the instance behind a reverse proxy configured to enforce strict request body size limits below the default 16 MiB.
  • Monitor database size for unexpected growth and audit the oauth_clients table for anomalous entries.

These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.

Affected Packages

2 total 2 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
📦npmn8n≥ 2.38.0&&< 2.38.22.38.2npm install n8n@2.38.2
📦npmn8nall versions2.37.7npm install n8n@2.37.7

Affected Products

1 product · 2 configurations
Application
n8nn8n
≥ 2.38.0 && < 2.38.2
range

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for n8n, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update n8n to 2.38.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-hh89-3r9w-qj3j is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Cap what an attacker can consume: apply request size, rate and timeout limits in front of the affected component, and run it with memory and CPU limits so exhaustion degrades one worker rather than the whole service.

Frequently Asked Questions

## Impact The OAuth Dynamic Client Registration endpoints validated field sizes only for `redirect_uris`, leaving `client_name` and `grant_types` bounded by presence checks alone. An unauthenticated remote caller could submit arbitrarily large values in either field and have them persisted to the database. Repeated registration therefore grew persistent storage without limit and without any account on the instance. The patch caps `client_name` at its column length and limits `grant_types` to the grant types the server actually implements, with the array capped at that count. ## Patches The
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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