bitcoinj has a ScriptExecution P2PKH/P2WPKH Verification BypassGHSA-hfcf-v2f8-x9pc
HIGHFix: bitcoinj/bitcoinj@2bc5653GHSA-hfcf-v2f8-x9pc is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-347 vulnerability in org.bitcoinj:bitcoinj-core. A fix is available for org.bitcoinj:bitcoinj-core — see the affected versions and patch details below.
Exploitation Status
No confirmed exploitation observed yet
- CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
- CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.
Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-hfcf-v2f8-x9pc.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
org.bitcoinj:bitcoinj-coreReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
ScriptExecution.correctlySpends() contains two fast-path verification bugs for standard P2PKH and native P2WPKH spends in core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/script/ScriptExecution.java.
In both branches, bitcoinj verifies an attacker-controlled signature/public-key pair but fails to verify that the public key is the one committed to by the output being spent. As a result, any attacker keypair can satisfy bitcoinj's local verification for arbitrary P2PKH and P2WPKH outputs.
This doesn't affect the SPV (simple payment verification) trust model, as this model follows PoW and doesn't verify input signatures at all.
Details
The issue is in the optimized branches of ScriptExecution.correctlySpends(...).
In the P2PKH fast path at core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/script/ScriptExecution.java:1042, the code:
- parses the attacker-supplied signature from
scriptSig - parses the attacker-supplied public key from
scriptSig - computes the sighash against the victim output's
scriptPubKey - checks only
pubkey.verify(sigHash, signature)
It never enforces the missing P2PKH binding:
HASH160(pubkey) == ScriptPattern.extractHashFromP2PKH(scriptPubKey)
That means the OP_DUP OP_HASH160 <hash> OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG semantics are not actually enforced in this fast path.
Relevant code:
} else if (ScriptPattern.isP2PKH(scriptPubKey)) {
if (chunks.size() != 2)
throw new ScriptException(...);
TransactionSignature signature;
try {
byte[] data = Objects.requireNonNull(chunks.get(0).data);
signature = TransactionSignature.decodeFromBitcoin(data, true, true);
} catch (SignatureDecodeException x) {
throw new ScriptException(...);
}
ECKey pubkey = ECKey.fromPublicOnly(Objects.requireNonNull(chunks.get(1).data));
Sha256Hash sigHash = txContainingThis.hashForSignature(scriptSigIndex, scriptPubKey,
signature.sigHashMode(), false);
boolean validSig = pubkey.verify(sigHash, signature);
if (!validSig)
throw new ScriptException(...);
}
In the native P2WPKH fast path at core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/script/ScriptExecution.java:1023, the bug is similar. The code:
- reads the attacker-supplied pubkey from
witness - builds
scriptCodefrom that attacker pubkey withScriptBuilder.createP2PKHOutputScript(pubkey) - computes the BIP143 sighash using that attacker-derived
scriptCode - verifies the signature against the attacker pubkey
It never enforces:
HASH160(pubkey) == ScriptPattern.extractHashFromP2WH(scriptPubKey)
So for P2WPKH, the attacker controls both the pubkey and the scriptCode used for signing.
Relevant code:
if (ScriptPattern.isP2WPKH(scriptPubKey)) {
Objects.requireNonNull(witness);
if (witness.getPushCount() < 2)
throw new ScriptException(...);
TransactionSignature signature;
try {
signature = TransactionSignature.decodeFromBitcoin(witness.getPush(0), true, true);
} catch (SignatureDecodeException x) {
throw new ScriptException(...);
}
ECKey pubkey = ECKey.fromPublicOnly(witness.getPush(1));
Script scriptCode = ScriptBuilder.createP2PKHOutputScript(pubkey);
Sha256Hash sigHash = txContainingThis.hashForWitnessSignature(scriptSigIndex, scriptCode, value,
signature.sigHashMode(), false);
boolean validSig = pubkey.verify(sigHash, signature);
if (!validSig)
throw new ScriptException(...);
}
Affected call sites include:
core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/core/TransactionInput.java:546core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/wallet/Wallet.java:4520core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/signers/LocalTransactionSigner.java:84core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/signers/CustomTransactionSigner.java:77
These call sites use correctlySpends() for transaction/input validation and pre-signing checks. Any application that treats a successful result from this path as proof that a spend is valid is affected.
Fix
The issue is fixed on the release-0.17 branch via 2bc5653c41d260d840692bc554690d4d79208f9c, and on master via b575a682acf614b9ff95cacbdeb48f86c3ababe0. A 0.17.1 maintenance release has been made available on Maven Central.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| ☕Maven | org.bitcoinj:bitcoinj-core | ≥ 0.15&&< 0.17.1 | 0.17.1org.bitcoinj:bitcoinj-core:0.17.1 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.bitcoinj:bitcoinj-core, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update org.bitcoinj:bitcoinj-core to 0.17.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-hfcf-v2f8-x9pc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-hfcf-v2f8-x9pc in your dependencies?
Find it across Maven, including transitive dependencies.