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HIGH severity

bitcoinj has a ScriptExecution P2PKH/P2WPKH Verification BypassGHSA-hfcf-v2f8-x9pc

HIGHFix: bitcoinj/bitcoinj@2bc5653

GHSA-hfcf-v2f8-x9pc is a high-severity (CVSS 7.5) CWE-347 vulnerability in org.bitcoinj:bitcoinj-core. A fix is available for org.bitcoinj:bitcoinj-core — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2026-44714
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 8, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA assesses this as automatable — exploitation doesn’t require manual, per-target effort, which raises the odds of mass scanning and opportunistic attacks.
  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-hfcf-v2f8-x9pc.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs19th percentile — riskier than 19% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.28%0.57%0.85%0.0%0.3%Jun 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

How urgent is this, really

Where this sits among everything scored

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
☕org.bitcoinj:bitcoinj-core

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

ScriptExecution.correctlySpends() contains two fast-path verification bugs for standard P2PKH and native P2WPKH spends in core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/script/ScriptExecution.java.

In both branches, bitcoinj verifies an attacker-controlled signature/public-key pair but fails to verify that the public key is the one committed to by the output being spent. As a result, any attacker keypair can satisfy bitcoinj's local verification for arbitrary P2PKH and P2WPKH outputs.

This doesn't affect the SPV (simple payment verification) trust model, as this model follows PoW and doesn't verify input signatures at all.

Details

The issue is in the optimized branches of ScriptExecution.correctlySpends(...).

In the P2PKH fast path at core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/script/ScriptExecution.java:1042, the code:

  • parses the attacker-supplied signature from scriptSig
  • parses the attacker-supplied public key from scriptSig
  • computes the sighash against the victim output's scriptPubKey
  • checks only pubkey.verify(sigHash, signature)

It never enforces the missing P2PKH binding:

  • HASH160(pubkey) == ScriptPattern.extractHashFromP2PKH(scriptPubKey)

That means the OP_DUP OP_HASH160 <hash> OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG semantics are not actually enforced in this fast path.

Relevant code:

} else if (ScriptPattern.isP2PKH(scriptPubKey)) {
    if (chunks.size() != 2)
        throw new ScriptException(...);
    TransactionSignature signature;
    try {
        byte[] data = Objects.requireNonNull(chunks.get(0).data);
        signature = TransactionSignature.decodeFromBitcoin(data, true, true);
    } catch (SignatureDecodeException x) {
        throw new ScriptException(...);
    }
    ECKey pubkey = ECKey.fromPublicOnly(Objects.requireNonNull(chunks.get(1).data));
    Sha256Hash sigHash = txContainingThis.hashForSignature(scriptSigIndex, scriptPubKey,
            signature.sigHashMode(), false);
    boolean validSig = pubkey.verify(sigHash, signature);
    if (!validSig)
        throw new ScriptException(...);
}

In the native P2WPKH fast path at core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/script/ScriptExecution.java:1023, the bug is similar. The code:

  • reads the attacker-supplied pubkey from witness
  • builds scriptCode from that attacker pubkey with ScriptBuilder.createP2PKHOutputScript(pubkey)
  • computes the BIP143 sighash using that attacker-derived scriptCode
  • verifies the signature against the attacker pubkey

It never enforces:

  • HASH160(pubkey) == ScriptPattern.extractHashFromP2WH(scriptPubKey)

So for P2WPKH, the attacker controls both the pubkey and the scriptCode used for signing.

Relevant code:

if (ScriptPattern.isP2WPKH(scriptPubKey)) {
    Objects.requireNonNull(witness);
    if (witness.getPushCount() < 2)
        throw new ScriptException(...);
    TransactionSignature signature;
    try {
        signature = TransactionSignature.decodeFromBitcoin(witness.getPush(0), true, true);
    } catch (SignatureDecodeException x) {
        throw new ScriptException(...);
    }
    ECKey pubkey = ECKey.fromPublicOnly(witness.getPush(1));
    Script scriptCode = ScriptBuilder.createP2PKHOutputScript(pubkey);
    Sha256Hash sigHash = txContainingThis.hashForWitnessSignature(scriptSigIndex, scriptCode, value,
            signature.sigHashMode(), false);
    boolean validSig = pubkey.verify(sigHash, signature);
    if (!validSig)
        throw new ScriptException(...);
}

Affected call sites include:

  • core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/core/TransactionInput.java:546
  • core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/wallet/Wallet.java:4520
  • core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/signers/LocalTransactionSigner.java:84
  • core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/signers/CustomTransactionSigner.java:77

These call sites use correctlySpends() for transaction/input validation and pre-signing checks. Any application that treats a successful result from this path as proof that a spend is valid is affected.

Fix

The issue is fixed on the release-0.17 branch via 2bc5653c41d260d840692bc554690d4d79208f9c, and on master via b575a682acf614b9ff95cacbdeb48f86c3ababe0. A 0.17.1 maintenance release has been made available on Maven Central.

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
☕Mavenorg.bitcoinj:bitcoinj-core≥ 0.15&&< 0.17.10.17.1org.bitcoinj:bitcoinj-core:0.17.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for org.bitcoinj:bitcoinj-core, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update org.bitcoinj:bitcoinj-core to 0.17.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-hfcf-v2f8-x9pc is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary `ScriptExecution.correctlySpends()` contains two fast-path verification bugs for standard `P2PKH` and native `P2WPKH` spends in `core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/script/ScriptExecution.java`. In both branches, bitcoinj verifies an attacker-controlled signature/public-key pair but fails to verify that the public key is the one committed to by the output being spent. As a result, any attacker keypair can satisfy bitcoinj's local verification for arbitrary `P2PKH` and `P2WPKH` outputs. This doesn't affect the SPV (simple payment verification) trust model, as this model follows PoW an
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

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