NIST deprecates RSA-2048 from 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐹 Go
Not in CISA KEV

kube-audit-rest's example logging configuration could disclose secret values in the audit logGHSA-hcr5-wv4p-h2g2

Fix: RichardoC/kube-audit-rest@db1aa5b

GHSA-hcr5-wv4p-h2g2 is a Information Exposure vulnerability in github.com/RichardoC/kube-audit-rest. A fix is available for github.com/RichardoC/kube-audit-rest — see the affected versions and patch details below.

Also known asCVE-2025-24884GO-2025-3431
Published
Updated
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed
Exploitation data as of Nov 10, 2026 · OSV.dev, NVD, FIRST.org (EPSS)

Exploitation Status

No confirmed exploitation observed yet

  • CISA’s own triage has not observed active exploitation or public proof-of-concept code for this CVE as of its last assessment.

Exploitation and automatability from CISA’s SSVC triage for GHSA-hcr5-wv4p-h2g2.

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.2%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk+0.00%
Lower risk than most CVEs9th percentile — riskier than 9% of all scored CVEsHighest risk
0.00%0.23%0.46%0.70%0.0%0.2%May 26Sep 26Nov 26

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.

Real-World Exposure

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/RichardoC/kube-audit-rest

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted? If the "full-elastic-stack" example vector configuration was used for a real cluster, the previous values of kubernetes secrets would have been disclosed in the audit messages.

Patches

Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to? The example has been updated to fix this in commit 9df8886b4819409f566233adc7c3b7a43a4096ba

Workarounds

Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading? Replace


          if .request.requestKind.kind == "Secret" {
            del(.request.object.data)
            .request.object.data.redacted = "REDACTED"
            del(.request.oldObject.data)
            .request.oldObject.data.redacted = "REDACTED"
          }

In the vector "audit-files-json-parser-and-redaction" step with


          if .request.requestKind.kind == "Secret" {
            # Redact the secret data
            del(.request.object.data)
            .request.object.data.redacted = "REDACTED"
            del(.request.oldObject.data)
            .request.oldObject.data.redacted = "REDACTED"
            # Remove the previously set secret data - Not bothering to parse it as this annotation shouldn't ever be needed
            del(.request.object.metadata.annotations.["kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration"])
            del(.request.oldObject.metadata.annotations.["kubectl.kubernetes.io/last-applied-configuration"])
          }

References

Are there any links users can visit to find out more?

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/RichardoC/kube-audit-restall versions0.0.0-20250205113217-9df8886b4819go get github.com/RichardoC/kube-audit-rest@v0.0.0-20250205113217-9df8886b4819

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/RichardoC/kube-audit-rest, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/RichardoC/kube-audit-rest to 0.0.0-20250205113217-9df8886b4819 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-hcr5-wv4p-h2g2 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    Assume what was exposed is already known: rotate any credential, token or key that the affected component could return, restrict the endpoint to callers that genuinely need it, and strip sensitive fields from responses and error output at the boundary rather than relying on the client not to read them.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ If the "full-elastic-stack" example vector configuration was used for a real cluster, the previous values of kubernetes secrets would have been disclosed in the audit messages. ### Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_ The example has been updated to fix this in commit 9df8886b4819409f566233adc7c3b7a43a4096ba ### Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_ Replace ```yaml if .request.requestKind.kind == "Secret" {
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-hcr5-wv4p-h2g2 in your dependencies?

Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.

GHSA-hcr5-wv4p-h2g2: kube-audit-rest — Fix Available