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Maven

GHSA-h7qf-qmf3-85qg

HIGH

Allure Report allows Improper XXE Restriction via DocumentBuilderFactory

Also known asCVE-2025-52888
Published
Jun 25, 2025
Updated
Jun 25, 2025
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
3 / 3
Exploits
None indexed

EPSS Exploitation Probability

via FIRST.org ↗
0.3%probability of exploitation in next 30 days
Lower Risk24th percentile+0.12%
0.00%0.27%0.55%0.82%0.0%0.3%Dec 25Apr 26Jun 26

EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.

Blast Radius

3 pkgs affected
io.qameta.allure.plugins:xunit-xml-pluginio.qameta.allure.plugins:junit-xml-pluginio.qameta.allure.plugins:trx-plugin

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Maven packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

A critical XML External Entity (XXE) vulnerability exists in the xunit-xml-plugin used by Allure 2. The plugin fails to securely configure the XML parser (DocumentBuilderFactory) and allows external entity expansion when processing test result .xml files. This allows attackers to read arbitrary files from the file system and potentially trigger server-side request forgery (SSRF).

Details

In \allure2-main\plugins\xunit-xml-plugin\src\main\java\io\qameta\allure\xunitxml\XunitXmlPlugin.java the application uses DocumentBuilderFactory without disabling DTDs or external entities. By generating a report with a malicious xml file within it, an attacker can perform XXE to leverage SSRF, or to read system files.

PoC

To recreate this vulnerability, you need to install allure for command-line (In my POC I used a Windows 11 Machine).

  1. Create a folder called allure, and within it, create a malicious XML file. I will attach my SSRF and file reading payloads, however, for the rest of the POC, I will focus on reading system files for better screenshots. ##SSRF (replace webhook link with your own) image

##Reading System Files image

  1. Put the malicious .xml file into the allure directory created previously
  2. Run the following command to run the report allure generate C:\path\to\directory\allure -o report --clean
  3. To view and confirm the executed payload, run allure open report
  4. When the report opens, confirm the payload executedby going to Categories > Product defects > <payload response> image

Impact

The explained XXE vulnerability can lead to Arbitrary File Disclosure and Server-Side Request Forgery. This exploitation can also be carried out silently, meaning it can be carried out without user interaction if the tool is automated within an application, and can go undetected with a carefully crafted payload. This could allow a malicious actor to view other source codes which may contain API or product keys, internal application URLs, or other secret items. This makes it an especially high risk when ran within a CI/CD platform.

Affected Packages

3 total 3 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
Mavenio.qameta.allure.plugins:xunit-xml-pluginall versions2.34.1
Mavenio.qameta.allure.plugins:junit-xml-pluginall versions2.34.1
Mavenio.qameta.allure.plugins:trx-pluginall versions2.34.1

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for io.qameta.allure.plugins:xunit-xml-plugin. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update io.qameta.allure.plugins:xunit-xml-plugin to 2.34.1 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-h7qf-qmf3-85qg is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-h7qf-qmf3-85qg is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-h7qf-qmf3-85qg. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary A critical XML External Entity (XXE) vulnerability exists in the xunit-xml-plugin used by Allure 2. The plugin fails to securely configure the XML parser (`DocumentBuilderFactory`) and allows external entity expansion when processing test result .xml files. This allows attackers to read arbitrary files from the file system and potentially trigger server-side request forgery (SSRF). ### Details In `\allure2-main\plugins\xunit-xml-plugin\src\main\java\io\qameta\allure\xunitxml\XunitXmlPlugin.java` the application uses `DocumentBuilderFactory` without disabling DTDs or external entit
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-h7qf-qmf3-85qg in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-h7qf-qmf3-85qg across Maven dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.