GHSA-h7p7-w5gc-xj3w
MEDIUMGHSA-h7p7-w5gc-xj3w is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.8) Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in pydantic-ai-slim. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-h7p7-w5gc-xj3w is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.
Pydantic AI: Unvalidated UploadedFile references in UI adapters allow server-side file access using the application's credentials
Real-World Exposure
pydantic-ai-slim🐍pydantic-ai-slim🐍pydantic-ai🐍pydantic-aiReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Summary
A client that can submit message history to a Pydantic AI UI adapter can reference arbitrary files in the application's model-provider or cloud-storage account. The server forwards the reference to the model provider, which fetches it using the server's own credentials, allowing the client to read files it should not have access to.
Details
UI adapters reconstruct file parts from client-submitted message history and forward them to the model provider. File URL parts are validated against a scheme allowlist before being forwarded, but UploadedFile references — which point to a file by provider file ID or cloud-storage URI (e.g. s3://…, gs://…) — were forwarded without validation.
Because the provider resolves an UploadedFile using the server-side identity (IAM role, service account, or provider API key) rather than the client's, a client that crafts message history containing an attacker-chosen UploadedFile can cause the server to read objects belonging to its own account or to other tenants, given a referenceable identifier.
Impact
Applications that pass untrusted client-submitted message history to an agent through a UI adapter (such as the Vercel AI adapter). Exploitation requires the attacker to reference a valid file identifier; depending on how the application names objects, such identifiers are not always unguessable.
Patches
Upgrade to 1.106.0 (1.x) or 2.0.0b6 (the 2.x beta line), which validate UploadedFile references on client-submitted messages the same way file URLs are validated.
Workarounds
If users cannot upgrade, do not pass untrusted client-submitted message history to the agent, or strip UploadedFile parts from incoming messages before running the agent.
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐍PyPI | pydantic-ai-slim | ≥ 1.65.0&&< 1.106.0 | 1.106.0 |
| 🐍PyPI | pydantic-ai-slim | ≥ 2.0.0b1&&< 2.0.0b6 | 2.0.0b6 |
| 🐍PyPI | pydantic-ai | ≥ 1.65.0&&< 1.106.0 | 1.106.0 |
| 🐍PyPI | pydantic-ai | ≥ 2.0.0b1&&< 2.0.0b6 | 2.0.0b6 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for pydantic-ai-slim. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update pydantic-ai-slim to 1.106.0 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-h7p7-w5gc-xj3w is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-h7p7-w5gc-xj3w is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-h7p7-w5gc-xj3w. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-h7p7-w5gc-xj3w in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-h7p7-w5gc-xj3w across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.