GHSA-h75p-j8xm-m278
HIGHCoreDNS Loop Detection Denial of Service Vulnerability
EPSS Exploitation Probability
EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) is a daily probability model maintained by FIRST.org. It estimates the likelihood a CVE will be exploited in production environments within the next 30 days, derived from real-world threat intelligence signals.
Blast Radius
github.com/coredns/corednsReal-time download stats are indexed for npm and PyPI packages. This vulnerability affects Go packages — download data is not available via public APIs for these ecosystems.
Description
Executive Summary
A Denial of Service vulnerability exists in CoreDNS's loop detection plugin that allows an attacker to crash the DNS server by sending specially crafted DNS queries. The vulnerability stems from the use of a predictable pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) for generating a secret query name, combined with a fatal error handler that terminates the entire process.
Technical Details
Vulnerability Description
The CoreDNS loop plugin is designed to detect forwarding loops by performing a self-test during server startup. The plugin generates a random query name (qname) using Go's math/rand package and sends an HINFO query to itself. If the server receives multiple matching queries, it assumes a forwarding loop exists and terminates.
The vulnerability arises from two design flaws:
-
Predictable PRNG Seed: The random number generator is seeded with
time.Now().UnixNano(), making the generated qname predictable if an attacker knows the approximate server start time. -
Fatal Error Handler: When the plugin detects what it believes is a loop (3+ matching HINFO queries), it calls
log.Fatalf()which invokesos.Exit(1), immediately terminating the process without cleanup or recovery.
Affected Code
File: plugin/loop/setup.go
// PRNG seeded with predictable timestamp
var r = rand.New(time.Now().UnixNano())
// Qname generation using two consecutive PRNG calls
func qname(zone string) string {
l1 := strconv.Itoa(r.Int())
l2 := strconv.Itoa(r.Int())
return dnsutil.Join(l1, l2, zone)
}
File: plugin/loop/loop.go
func (l *Loop) ServeDNS(ctx context.Context, w dns.ResponseWriter, r *dns.Msg) (int, error) {
// ... validation checks ...
if state.Name() == l.qname {
l.inc() // Increment counter
}
if l.seen() > 2 {
// FATAL: Terminates entire process
log.Fatalf("Loop (%s -> %s) detected for zone %q...", ...)
}
// ...
}
File: plugin/pkg/log/log.go
func Fatalf(format string, v ...any) {
logf(fatal, format, v...)
os.Exit(1) // Immediate process termination
}
Exploitation Window
The loop plugin remains active during the following conditions:
| Condition | Window Duration | Attack Feasibility |
|---|---|---|
| Healthy startup | 2 seconds | Requires precise timing |
| Self-test failure (upstream unreachable) | 30 seconds | HIGH - Extended window |
| Network degradation | Variable | Depends on retry behavior |
Attack Scenario
Primary Attack Vector: Network Degradation
When the upstream DNS server is unreachable (network partition, misconfiguration, outage), the loop plugin's self-test fails repeatedly. During this period:
- The loop plugin remains active for up to 30 seconds
- Each self-test attempt generates an HINFO query visible in CoreDNS logs
- An attacker with log access (shared Kubernetes cluster, centralized logging) can observe the qname
- The attacker sends 3 HINFO queries with the observed qname
- The server immediately crashes
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ ATTACK TIMELINE │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ T+0s CoreDNS starts, PRNG seeded with UnixNano() │
│ T+0.5s Self-test HINFO query sent (visible in logs) │
│ T+2s Self-test fails (upstream timeout) │
│ T+3s Retry #1 - counter resets, qname unchanged │
│ T+5s Retry #2 - attacker observes qname in logs │
│ T+5.1s ATTACKER: Send HINFO #1 → counter = 1 │
│ T+5.2s ATTACKER: Send HINFO #2 → counter = 2 │
│ T+5.3s ATTACKER: Send HINFO #3 → counter = 3 → os.Exit(1) │
│ T+5.3s SERVER CRASHES │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Impact Assessment
Attack Requirements
| Requirement | Notes |
|---|---|
| Network Access | Must be able to send UDP packets to CoreDNS port |
| Log Access | Required to observe the qname (common in shared clusters) |
| Timing | Extended window during network degradation |
| Authentication | None required |
Real-World Impact
CoreDNS is the default DNS server for Kubernetes clusters. A successful attack would:
- Disruption: All DNS resolution fails within the cluster
- Cascading Failures: Services unable to discover each other
- Restart Loop: If attack persists, CoreDNS enters crash-restart cycle
- Data Plane Impact: Application-level failures across the cluster
References
- CoreDNS GitHub: https://github.com/coredns/coredns
- Loop Plugin Documentation: https://coredns.io/plugins/loop/
- Go math/rand Documentation: https://pkg.go.dev/math/rand
Affected Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Vulnerable range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| 🐹Go | github.com/coredns/coredns | all versions | 1.14.2 |
Detection & mitigation playbook
Open-source dependencyDetect
Scan your dependency tree (package-lock.json, pnpm-lock.yaml, requirements.txt, go.sum, etc.) for github.com/coredns/coredns. O3's reachability analysis confirms whether the vulnerable code path is actually invoked in your application, so you act on real exposure instead of every transitive match.
Fix
Update github.com/coredns/coredns to 1.14.2 or later, then make sure no transitive (indirect) dependency still pins the vulnerable range — O3 confirms GHSA-h75p-j8xm-m278 is resolved across your whole dependency graph.
Workarounds
If you can't upgrade right away: gate or disable the affected feature, validate untrusted input at the boundary, and avoid passing attacker-controlled data into the vulnerable path. O3's runtime protection blocks exploitation in production as an interim safeguard until the upgrade lands.
How O3 protects you
O3 pinpoints whether GHSA-h75p-j8xm-m278 is reachable in your code and exactly where to fix it, then blocks exploitation in production at runtime until the patched version is deployed.
Tailored to GHSA-h75p-j8xm-m278. Runtime protection reduces exposure until a permanent patch is applied and verified — it complements patching, it doesn't replace it.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is GHSA-h75p-j8xm-m278 in your dependencies?
O3 detects GHSA-h75p-j8xm-m278 across Go dependencies and uses function-level reachability to confirm whether the vulnerable code path is actually reachable — not just present. No false positives.